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Cold Fire is a study of how the international film industry in Thailand became a 
productive site for expressions of gendered cultural nationalism from the 1950s to the 
1970s. National development projects expanded both state power and commercial 
markets for foreign and domestic film distribution. Those changes were facilitated by 
the domestic rise of military authoritarianism, intensive US political and economic 
intervention, rapid industrialization, and the communist threat in Asia. The United 
States and Thai governments used film as an instrument of psychological warfare to 
propagate conservative representations of Thai culture and society aimed at combating 
Communist sympathy. In doing so, they produced gendered representations of 
political behavior. Political consciousness was a masculine threat to the state. Thai 
women were positioned as inherently non-political, and therefore impervious to the 
threats of communism. The core values of Thai society promoted during this period, 
namely loyalty, passivity, and peacefulness, were implicitly feminine. Meanwhile, a 
new generation of filmmakers drew on the international discourse of modernization 
theory to promote technological advancement in Thai national cinema. The movement 
also articulated popular concerns, particularly towards the expanding presence of the 
United States and commercial development of the countryside. With the importation 
of commercial popular culture promoting alternative models for women and the 
 visibility of prostitution alongside military bases, elite expressions of Thai femininity 
were used to delineate national difference in opposition to the United States. As such, 
Thai women were viewed as deeply vulnerable to the threat of Americanization. 
Indeed, government censors and filmmakers alike increasingly focused on 
representations of gender and sexuality in commercial films. With the 1970s, a small 
group of filmmakers brought to prominence a conservative national cinema that drew 
on elite notions of a romanticized agrarianism and traditional femininity to assert an 
image of Thai authenticity. I therefore argue that during the Cold War communism 
and Americanization functioned as mutually constitutive threats within a gendered 
Thai political and social discourse. Cinematic regulation and representation of Thai 
women as wives, mothers, lovers, and prostitutes produced the gendered boundaries of 
the modern state. National cultural identity was predicated on women’s unique and 
unequal status.  
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Scene One: In the 1957 Rat Pettanyi film Rongraem narok (lit. Hotel Hell), a glamorous female 
musician enters a tiny country hotel and bar.1 The woman, named Flor, is dressed in a dramatic 
strapless evening gown and carries a guitar. She greets the barman with a “Good Evening!” in 
English. The barman, Noi, enthusiastically welcomes her in Thai. Again in English, the musician 
thanks him. Noi turns to a guest, a young woman named Riam who claims to be a sixty-five year 
old opium trader with twelve children. He tells her that the woman is a Filipina musician of the 
highest tier. She begins to sing, in Tagalog, the classic Filipino kundiman “Dahil Sa Iyo.”2 Riam 
sits just in front of her, glumly eating a late dinner in her dressing gown. Finishing the song’s 
slow prelude, Flor switches to English for the rest of the song about the hope given by a true 
love. As she travels around the room, Noi and the hotel’s only other guest, a man named Chana, 
listen intently. Noi gives Chana a thumb up to show his enjoyment of the performance, which 
Chana returns. Keeping his thumb up, Chana looks cautiously over to Riam. Riam gives a thumb 
up, but then makes a face and sticks her tongue out at him. She is still angry at Chana from an 
earlier fight over the hotel’s only room that left Riam to make do with sleeping on the lobby 
sofa. 
 
Scene Two: Riam, the heroine of Choed Songsri’s 1977 romantic film Plae kao (The Scar), 
awakes in the middle of the night in a four-poster bed in a Bangkok mansion. Dressed in a 
luxurious silk nightgown that reflects the films setting in the 1930s, she walks onto the large 
balcony overlooking the Chaophraya River. Haunted by the sound of a khlui phiang au (a 
vertical bamboo flute), Riam stares into the depths of the river and sees her former lover, Khwan, 
playing his flute. She turns, as if surprised, and has flashbacks to her childhood and adolescence 
amongst the rice paddies in a small village in central Thailand. There, she fell in love with 
Khwan despite their feuding families. While Riam has since enjoyed the westernized lifestyle of 
the Bangkok elite, from the latest foreign fashions to waltzing at lavish parties, the scene makes 
clear the pull that her former life still has on her. 
 
These two scenes were produced nearly twenty years apart by two renowned Thai 
filmmakers. They present starkly different views of how gender informs Thailand’s culture, 
national identity, and international relationships. Although the two female leads are both named 
Riam, their similarities stop there. Rat Pettanyi’s Riam is feisty and complex, but not overtly 
                                                
1 While the film’s title literally means “Hotel Hell” or “Hellish Hotel,” it is usually translated into English as 
Country Hotel.  
2 Just seven years after the production of Rongraem Narok, “Dahil Sa Iyo” would gain renewed prominence when it 
became Imelda Marcos’ favorite song to sing on the campaign trail with her husband, Ferdinand Marcos. The song 
would come to be intimately associated with the Marcos brand. Christine Bacareza Balance, “Dahil Sa Iyo: The 
Performative Power of Imelda’s Song,” Women & Performance: A Journal of Feminist Theory 20, no. 2 (2010): 
119–40. 
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feminine.3 That adjective is more aptly applied to Flor, the Filipina musician. Flor gracefully 
performs as the embodiment of femininity. Riam sulks in her pajamas. While Riam is 
undoubtedly the heroine, both women capture the viewer’s attention. Choed Songsri’s Riam has 
no such ownership over her identity as a woman. She is pulled between two different worlds: the 
westernized elite circles in Bangkok and the traditional Thai space of her girlhood village. The 
authenticity of the former is embodied in her intimate relationship with Khwan. However, Riam 
is thrown about by the currents of her family’s vendetta and the dramatic changes wrought by 
Thailand’s growing engagement with the outside world. Her intimate choices symbolize 
Thailand’s national predicament. 
The two scenes offer a glimpse into a transition in social history of gender in Thailand. In 
the 1950s, Thai national identity lacked clear assertions of distinctly Thai femininity.4 By the 
1970s, a model for proper Thai femininity that all Thai women were expected to adhere to was at 
the core of national identity. Film was a critical medium through which representations of a 
standardized Thai femininity was propagated throughout the nation. Films provided powerful 
models showing how Thai women spoke, moved, dressed, felt, and behaved. That film had the 
power to do so was in large part because cinema became an important medium through which 
the state and disparate socio-political elite represented and critiqued national identity, belonging, 
and difference. It was also empowered by the rise of a national cinema movement that gained 
strength beginning in the 1960s. 
The emergence of a dominant narrative that asserted gender, and specifically femininity, 
as defining Thai cultural difference was also the result of dynamics of Thailand’s Cold War 
                                                
3 Kaewta Ketbungkan, “Restored ‘Santi-Vina’ Offers Refreshing Window to ‘Thainess’ Past,” Khaosod English, 
July 27, 2016, http://www.khaosodenglish.com/life/movies/2016/07/27/restored-santi-vina-reflects-thainess-
rescreens-thursday/. 
4 This is not to say that previously gender had no role in Thai national identity. Indeed it did. I argue, however, that a 
coherent model for a “Thai woman” was not previously a figure in representations of Thai national identity. 
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experience. The formulation of a gendered threat to national cultural identity was shaped by the 
rise of the communist threat, American Cold War intervention, rapid industrialization, 
authoritarian military politics, and the rise of the monarchy under King Bhumibol (1946-2016) 
and Queen Sirikit. National identity was framed in opposition to the political and economic 
threat of communism and the cultural and social threat of the United States. These processes 
contributed to the standardization of conservative, elite formulations of femininity as a defining 
element in Thailand’s sovereignty and unique national identity. Riam’s westernized dress and 
lifestyle in Plae kao were far from stylistic features, but indicative of lost authenticity. 
The difference in how gender operates as a component of national identity in the two 
films also demonstrates that Thailand’s Cold War experience was not just about fighting 
communist ideologies and insurgents. Instead, the period was characterized by concerted efforts 
by government leaders, officials, and cultural elites to define and shape a national culture. The 
battle was fought not just with guns, but with cameras and screens as well. With the growth of 
infrastructure networks and international trade, the film industry expanded dramatically across 
the country. Film became the country’s most important leisure business. It symbolized 
Thailand’s modernity and the strength of its international connections.5 In this way, the Thai film 
industry became a productive site of negotiation over the construction of a national identity.  
Conservative assertions of Thailand’s modern identity sought to situate it in traditional and 
uniquely Thai norms of behavior. Formulations also drew on discourses of development and 
internationalism. Filmmakers like Rat Pettanyi and Choed Songsri used innovative approaches 
and technologies to present a new type of cinema in which the nation could experience itself on 
screen.   
                                                
5 Boonrak Boonyaketmala, “The Political Economy of Cultural Dominance/Dependence/Disengagement: The 
Transnationalized Film Industry in Thailand, 1897-1983” (University of Hawai’i at Manoa, 1984), 209. 
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The rise of nationalistic filmmaking in Thailand is intimately connected to official and 
elite intervention in the cultural sphere. Efforts to build a national cinema went hand in hand 
with the political and social engineering of the modern period. The 1950s to the 1970s were 
defined by the interplay of both state development efforts and social development efforts. State 
development efforts expanded the central political capacity, for example through the expansion 
of the civil service. Social development, meanwhile, involved shaping and regulating the 
cultural, economic, and ecological landscape of Thailand as a nation. 
The growth of the film industry thus went together with the expansion of state power 
during the Cold War. Yet the state by no means exercised exclusive control over film production. 
Indeed, in addition to Thai and US state-produced propaganda, films were made by such diverse 
individuals as a prince and leftists intellectuals. Even with films that critiqued politics and 
society, the aims of their producers and directors were disparate. However, in the chaotic traffic 
of Cold War era cinematic representation, a crossroads formed with respect to the role of women 
and femininity in national identity. Constructions of gender and national cultural belonging were 
with few exceptions deeply conservative. Thai and US government representatives and Thai 
filmmakers alike promoted static and elitist conceptions of female morality and feminine 
behavior. Those depictions became the ideal standard and critical marker of cultural and national 
difference. That assertions of difference were formulated in opposition to both the United States 
and communism highlights the ambivalent and contested ways that societies like Thailand dealt 
with the dynamics of Cold War developmental ideologies.  
Indeed, national identity is made comprehensible by way of comparison and difference.6 
Official efforts to propagate national identity were ubiquitous during the Cold War, and 
                                                
6 Craig J. Reynolds, “Introduction: National Identity and Its Defenders,” in National Identity and Its Defenders: 
Thailand Today (Chaing Mai: Silkworm Books, 2002), 3; Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the 
Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 3. 
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institutionalized, for example, through policy, education, official media, and community 
organizations. Formulations were grounded in notions of Thailand’s uniqueness- that Thailand 
alone in Southeast Asia survived the colonial period unscathed, that it had a unique national 
culture, and that it had to protect its sovereignty.7 The monarchy was intrinsic to that conception. 
This was particularly so during the reign of King Bhumibol, who was promoted and seen as the 
“father of the land” (pho haeng phaendin) or “father of the nation” (pho haeng chat).8 
Cinema in Thailand also had long benefited from an association with the monarchy. The 
first films came to Siam in 1897. Royal symbols were used in theaters, and some of the earliest 
films of Siam or Siamese were produced by or featured royalty. At the same time, the domestic 
market gradually expanded and more people became involved in domestic production and 
exhibition. Yet even as the mass appeal of film grew, the medium’s association with monarchy 
continued to grant it an elite status. It also became an important way for Thai citizens to partake 
in the ritual of the monarchy, as the state encouraged the practice of standing for the royal 
anthem prior to film screenings. Following on this legacy as a political medium, cinema from 
1957 to 1977 assumed a privileged position in how the country’s political and social 
development was depicted and consumed in the public sphere. 
The relationship between Thailand’s film industry and national identity formation was 
also situated within the global dynamics of the Cold War. With the onset of the Cold War, 
strategic relationships were structured along political and economic ideologies that made 
transnational alliances and development programs crucial aspects of both global and national 
                                                
7 Reynolds, “Introduction: National Identity and Its Defenders,” 11; Benedict R. O’G Anderson, “Studies of the Thai 
State: The State of Thai Studies,” in Exploration and Irony in Studies of Siam over Forty Years (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Southeast Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2014), 19. 
8 Søren Ivarsson and Lotte Isager, “Introduction,” in Saying the Unsayable : Monarchy and Democracy in Thailand 
(Copenhagen: NIAS, 2010), 3. 
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security.9 Amidst decolonization and post-World War II globalization, governments and 
multinational corporations focused on transnational mass communication technologies as a 
critical element in development and cultural modernization. Broadcast media introduced 
domestic and foreign radio, television, and film to larger audiences than ever before. They 
became powerful sources of information for people at every level of local and transnational 
society.10 In the Cold War era, film emerged as a vital medium for both the promotion and 
contestation of ideologies, and thereby an important site at which broader political and social 
dynamics were expressed, consumed, and debated.11  
  Cinema also expanded as the Thai government pursued intense national development 
schemes, including massive infrastructure and communications projects. In part informed by 
modernization theory and related discourses on international development and progress, the 
projects were initiated under the authoritarian government of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat 
(1957-1963) after his 1957 coup against the prime minister, Field Marshal Plaek 
Phibunsongkhram (Phibun) (1938-1944, 1948-1957).12 The 1961 National Economic 
Development Plan, brought new roads and communication technologies that spread across the 
nation alongside an increased government administrative and police presence, especially in the 
northeastern region.13 In coordination with development projects, private and government-backed 
cinemas were built in rising numbers outside of Bangkok, while travelling film teams found it 
                                                
9 See, for example, Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of 
Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions : Asia and 
Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005); Albert O Hirschman, The 
Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958). 
10 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996). 
11 Ronnie D Lipschutz, Cold War Fantasies: Film, Fiction, and Foreign Policy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2001); Tony Shaw, Hollywood’s Cold War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007). 
12 Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2003). 
13 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program 
Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2007). 
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easier to travel in rural areas.14 From the end of the 1950s there was a rapid increase in the 
production of domestic films and a general expansion of the Thai film industry, largely the result 
of improved access to the technology necessary for film production and continuing growth of a 
voracious domestic market. These changes accompanied increasing governmental use of film as 
a form of propaganda and communication with the masses, as in the case of the mobile 
development teams. 
The expansion and development of technology and infrastructure increased the practical 
ability for the state to intervene in the lives of the populace. At the same time, capitalist markets 
reached greater portions of the population than ever before. The stakes were also high, as both 
the threat of communism and the impact of the American intervention created a crisis amongst 
members of the governing and elite classes. Indeed, since the 1930s, communism, and its 
associations with the Chinese, was “the epitome of un-Thainess.”15 American influence, 
meanwhile, came to be perceived as a significant threat in the 1960s and 1970s. While many of 
the standards of Thai national identity were birthed in the first half of the twentieth century, they 
became mobile in the second.  
Meanwhile, the role of the monarchy in national life was revitalized under Sarit. The king 
and queen took on more active roles, particularly in rural areas where their developmental efforts 
had great effect. At the same time, perceived threats to national security at the village level 
demanded unprecedented attention to the geographically dispersed peoples living within 
Thailand’s borders. Under the guidance of the US, Thailand initiated extensive psychological 
                                                
14 Annette Hamilton, “Cinema and Nation: Dilemmas of Representation in Thailand,” in Colonialism and 
Nationalism in Asian Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 141–61; May Adadol Ingawanij, 
“Transistor and Temporality: The Rural as Modern Thai Cinema’s Pastoral,” in Representing the Rural: Space, 
Place, and Identity in Films about the Land (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2006), 80–97. 
15 Kasian Tejapira, Commodifying Marxism: The Formation of Modern Thai Radical Culture, 1927-1958 (Kyoto: 
Kyoto University Press, 2001), 190. 
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warfare operations, in which hundreds of films were produced to build villager loyalty to the 
“pillars” of the Thai state ideology—nation, religion, and king. While not officially one of the 
pillars, the security apparatus, particularly through the military and border patrol police, were 
likewise depicted as critical to the modern national-state.  
As part of this, the village emerged as a major symbol of Thai authenticity.16 What the 
village meant for most Thai people varied dramatically across Thailand, and was influenced by 
factors such as distance from other towns and villages, access to resources, size, and location. A 
village in the predominantly Muslim south near the ocean would be substantially different from a 
northeastern Buddhist village on the Mekong River. While villagers in each may (or may not) 
have thought of themselves as Thai citizens, their beliefs, experiences, and even their daily 
language were likely to differ. However, in almost every film that I studied, the image of the 
rural, northeastern village dominated. Indeed, the northeastern Buddhist village became during 
the Cold War the quintessential Thai village. To a lesser extent, filmmakers used villages in 
central Thailand, although still predominantly those on the periphery of the northeast.  
Cinema offers an important perspective on these patterns. It provides insight into the 
gendered social and political dynamics of Cold War Thailand and national identity formation 
because films so often claimed to represent and be accessible to ordinary people. Film indeed 
had a mass appeal. No major purchases needed to be made by individuals, as was the case with 
television or radio. Literacy was not required, in contrast to novels or newspapers. Audience 
comprehension admittedly benefitted from experience watching films. However, the act itself 
was also the education. Moreover, villagers did not need to be fully trained in the art of cinema 
to enjoy and reflect on the films.  
                                                
16 Philip Hirsch, “What Is the Thai Village?,” in National Identity and Its Defenders: Thailand Today, ed. Craig 
Reynolds (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2002), 262. 
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At the same time, cinema was not an autonomous cultural phenomenon. It was also 
regulated and influenced by political, social, and economic forces. Film was not simply a mirror 
of society, but an important site of negotiation in the public sphere. Film was a creative medium, 
but one that also had to generate financial profits or receive critical acclaim to be considered a 
success. This fact vexed filmmakers, as they sought to break the influence of provincial 
audiences, who they saw as economically influential but prone to bad taste. Indeed, as 
filmmakers sought to control representation in film, its growing accessibility proved a double-
edged sword. 
The accessibility of representations of national identity in films contrast with the elevated 
position of prominent male public figures, including Prime Ministers Sarit and Thanom 
Kittikachorn (1963-1973), as well as King Bhumibol. The words and actions of those men 
inform the bulk of historical knowledge about the period. By contrast, women, with the 
occasional exception of Queen Sirikit, figure almost not at all. Thai identity is often viewed, and 
for good reasons, as deeply masculine and militaristic.  
Propaganda and popular culture, however, make apparent that gender was not only 
critical to formulations of national identity, but that it became predicated on a certain type of 
Thai femininity. When the state made appeals for Thai people to be loyal, passive, and peaceful, 
they were mapping feminine ideals onto the whole of the Thai nation. Likewise, when 
commercial filmmakers portrayed national issues through subjects like prostitution, they linked 
gender issues to national security. There was also some room for alternatives and, at times, 
dissent. Female characters in Rat Pettanyi’s films were complex and far from typically feminine. 
Ji Ungpakorn’s Kan to su khong kamakon ying hara rong ngan hara (The Hara Factory 
Workers’ Struggle, 1975), a documentary about female factory workers on strike, provided 
 10 
evidence of female radicalism.  
The mass appeal and prestige of film was tapped by the Sarit regime and the US as both 
sought to legitimacy through the deployment of royalist and developmental imagery. Indeed, 
representations of the monarchy on screen proved critical for making the figure of the king 
familiar to people living across the nation and promoting his image as a benevolent figure who 
would help bring the country forward. The production and exhibition of two films, Niw petch 
(Diamond Finger, 1958) and A Sentimental Journey (1960), showcased the monarchy. Niw petch 
was produced by the Ministry of Fine Arts and Rat Pettanyi for exhibition in the 1958 Brussels 
World’s Fair. King Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit attended the screening. A Sentimental Journey 
was produced by the United States Information Service (USIS) to cover the royal family’s 1960 
tour of the United States. The royal pair’s attendance at the 1958 screening and coverage in the 
1960 film were indicative of their newly prominent roles in the promotion of Thai culture at 
home and abroad. Their prominence also had important implications for gendered 
representations of Thailand, as Queen Sirikit’s own fashion choices and support for Thai national 
dress contributed to women’s position as symbols of national difference and tradition. 
Psychological operations and joint Thai-American propaganda, including films, likewise 
played an important role in promoting the monarchy and the production of a Thai anti-
communist national identity. The Thai-American mobile film unit program and the production of 
propaganda films like the 1965 USIS film Cold Fire provide evidence that the primary goal of 
the government was to promote loyalty to the symbols of the Thai state. The focus on loyalty 
took precedence over other rhetorical priorities, including anti-communism, social development, 
and nation-building. Depictions of women as part of the fabric of traditional Thai society were 
part of the anti-communist propaganda deployed by both the Thai and US governments. Through 
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its production of films, the USIS was an active participant in the production of Thai femininity. 
Cold Fire demonstrates how depictions of national loyalty and anti-communism promoted 
traditional gender roles and the innate goodness of women. However, the programs also created 
new opportunities for women to participate in public gatherings where information about 
national events was disseminated and discussed.  
Although the US played a critical role in Cold War representations of the Thai nation, its 
intervention did not go unquestioned. Anxieties over the impact of foreign social and cultural 
models in American films, especially amongst filmmakers and government officials in charge of 
regulating the industry, resulted in increasing concern with depictions of female sexuality and 
adultery. The production of representations of women as wives, mothers, and lovers by these 
same groups in turn played a defining role in the creation of boundaries of modern Thai culture 
and national belonging.  
Cinema also engaged women as subjects of nationalism and propaganda in new ways. 
Unlike other media forms through which articulations of national identities were funneled, such 
as newspapers or radios, cinema was more accessible to a broader segment of the population. At 
the same time, women in Thailand were themselves reshaping the position of women in society 
and culture through participation in women’s rights programs, labor movements, and student 
activism. The dynamics of authoritarianism and development had significant and historically 
situated impacts on women’s positions in Thailand cultural, social, and political order, as 
symbols, subjects, and participants. 
Anxieties over the status of women were connected to broader socio-economic changes. 
With rapid national development came widespread concern over its impact on so-called 
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traditional social structures, gender roles, and livelihoods.17 The concern with representations of 
gender became clear with state censorship. Between 1962 and 1972, the military government 
increased its use of censorship to regulate the film industry. Although censorship was used to 
regulate depictions of political issues, analysis of censorship of foreign films reveals a persistent 
effort to censor what were seen as inappropriate depictions of gender, family relations, and 
sexuality. Within regulations of depictions of sexuality and family relations, a focus on the issue 
of adultery in foreign films revealed not only the bureaucracy’s own contested relationship with 
the legacies of polygyny, but also distinct concerns over female sexual morality and a growing 
women’s rights movement. Censorship was not merely restrictive, but a productive tool in 
broader efforts to promote Thai values in the face of foreign models. 
Censorship evidenced acute awareness by officials that film required careful regulation. 
Domestic filmmakers, on the other hand, increasingly advocated a different type of regulation for 
the industry. They argued that discontent with domestic cinema grew from perceptions of its low 
quality, particularly in comparison with Hollywood films. In the aftermath of the Second World 
War, the Thai film industry had dealt with post-war shortages and the lack of domestic 
production facilities by producing cheap sixteen millimeter films.18 Filmmakers drew on 
indigenous performative traditions and exhibited films in raucous settings, such as festivals and 
celebrations. Commercially successful, the sixteen millimeter films did best in the provinces 
outside Bangkok. There, the films were condemned as nang nam nao, or putrid water films. 
                                                
17 Benedict Anderson, “Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6 Coup,” in Exploration 
and Irony in Studies of Siam over Forty Years (Southeast Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, 
Cornell University Press, 2014), 47–76; Benedict Anderson and Ruchira Mendiones, In the Mirror: Literature and 
Politics in Siam in the American Era (Bangkok, Thailand: Duang Kamoi, 1985); Juthamas Tangsantikul, “Kritsana 
Son Nong: The Politics and Practice of Manners in Modern Thailand (1950s-1970s),” Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies 47, no. 2 (2016): 189–209; Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002). 
18 Sixteen millimeter films were cheaper, and therefore favored by home and amateur filmmakers, but also of lower 
quality (in size, color, and clarity).  
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Engaging with modernization discourse, filmmakers like Rat, as well as intellectuals and some 
government representatives, called for progress in the domestic industry.  
Similar perspectives from the 1960s on led Thai filmmakers to work with the government 
to develop a national cinema. They sought to create a protected sphere of domestic film 
production and reduce foreign competition, particularly from the United States. Foreign films 
and their studios were portrayed as predatory, both in the commercial sense by creating 
monopolies and in the cultural sense through importing foreign values. A national cinema, by 
contrast, would promote the domestic industry as well as Thai national culture. Beginning in the 
early 1960s, three filmmakers, including Prince Phanuphan, Prince Anuson Mongkhonkan, and 
Rat Pettanyi, particularly sought official classification for a film “industry,” in line with 
government reforms to protect key national industries. In 1963, the government classified Thai 
film production and exhibition as an “industry” for the first time, but fell short of offering 
measures to curb foreign imports. The following year saw the creation of the Thai Motion 
Picture Producers Association (TMPPA) under Rat Pettanyi. These efforts promoted an approach 
to domestic cinema that made claims to cultural authenticity and national representation. But 
access to the methods of production and exhibition was largely restricted to a very limited 
number of studios led by elite men.  
In defiance of nationalist attempts at reforming the industry, international markets, film 
festivals, and the dominance of American cinema in Thailand, meant that film was inherently 
and inescapably transnational. While other national cinemas were important in the Thai market, 
notably films from Chinese-speaking countries, American films held by far the largest market 
share. Even as filmmakers deplored the influence of Hollywood studios, they produced films 
using imported technologies and often with knowledge acquired from outside national borders. 
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Many of the most of the prominent domestic filmmakers, including Prince Chatrichaloem 
Yukhon and Choed Songsri, were educated abroad. It was also a point of pride for films to 
achieve success at international film festivals. But they chafed against the competition from 
American studios, which often had monopolistic contracts with local theaters. Thailand’s first 
major film movement to produce a national cinema, the First New Wave, emerged in large part 
in reaction to unprecedented transnationalism. Although in Rongraem Narok English, Tagalog, 
and Thai mix fluidly in a scene featuring a Filipina singer living in a provincial town in Thailand, 
later films were more inward looking. Leaving behind characters like the unpredictable Riam, 
films like Plae Kao would tightly link idealized masculine and feminine gendered behaviors with 
nationalism. Cinema as a medium changed dramatically during the Cold War period, and so did 
its message. 
Despite attempts by the state to control the message, the reality was that the land was not 
as peaceful as official images of the village would have it. Student demonstrations against the 
military government grew with the end of the 1960s and early 1970s. Villager discontent with 
the failure of the government to deliver on development promises led to an activist rural 
movement.19 The alliance with the US was rendered increasingly tenuous, becoming a source of 
criticism domestically as the US sought to decrease its presence in Southeast Asia. In October 
1973, arrests of student activists led to a popular uprising in Bangkok that forced the Thanom 
regime into exile.  
The populism of anti-American sentiment became clear with the inauguration of the 
tumultuous period of democratic government that lasted from 1973 until 1976. As successive 
governments struggled to find political unity, address serious economic issues, and curb 
                                                
19 Tyrell Haberkorn, Revolution Interrupted: Farmers, Students, Law and Violence in Northern Thailand (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 106. 
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perceived threats from growing domestic communist forces, one of the few popular moves, made 
under the Kukrit Pramoj (1975-1976) government in May 1975, was to secure the withdrawal of 
US combat forces from Thailand.20 Reflecting those anti-American and nationalist sentiments, 
filmmakers drawn from an increasingly powerful middle-class and cultural elite advocated 
cinematic modernization through a combination of technological advancement and social 
engagement. They called for far-reaching reforms to support a film industry that would compete 
with both low-quality domestic and exploitative foreign productions. Filmmakers like Choed and 
Chatrichaloem, but also Piak Poster, exemplified the shift towards professional filmmaking.  
The ideal national film would be produced by a Thai citizen using domestic equipment, 
actors, and locations, financed by local investors with support from the government, and 
incorporate a “uniquely” Thai character, from music to costumes to landscape to themes. The 
new generation also more explicitly engaged in political and social issues in their attempts to 
depict contemporary Thailand. In the 1970s, an artistic movement called sinlatham phuea chiwit 
(Art for Life) introduced new ways of using film for political purposes. Unlike the First New 
Wave, it was inspired by socialist, rather than nationalist, ideals. Activist and leftist filmmakers 
critically discussed the lives of Thailand’s rural and urban poor in films such as The Hara 
Factory Workers’ Struggle and Thongpan.  
However, conservative perspectives began to dominate Thailand’s national cinema. This 
was particularly so in the aftermath of the 1976 military coup against the democratic 
government.21 Thanin Kraivichien (1976-1977), an ultra-conservative law professor with links to 
                                                
20 In March 1975, there were 27,000 US military personnel at six bases and other facilities. By July 1976, there were 
less than 250 military personnel remaining. The Comptroller General of the United States, “Withdrawal of U.S. 
Forces From Thailand: Ways to Improve Future Withdrawal Operations,” Report to Congress, (1977). 
21 Continued government instability and the victories of communist forces in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia 
had led to a resurgence of the right-wing movement. This culminated in a massacre of student protesters at 
Thammasat University on October 6, 1976. A military coup followed that evening, and the democratic period ended.   
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both the military and the palace, was installed as prime minister. His government banned films 
like Thongpan. Choed exemplified that style in his use of nostalgic rural landscapes to assert 
images of traditional Thai culture in opposition to Western modernity. Indeed, the film began 
with a title screen appealing to the need to protect Thainess. From the film’s landscape to the 
music, the film was deeply rooted in familiar sights and sounds. But conceptions of what 
constituted national character and who qualified as a legitimate filmmaker were defined along 
class and gender lines. It evidenced increasingly anti-Western depictions of proper Thai women. 
Practices that were associated with the lower class had no place in Thailand’s modern cinema. 
Plae Kao was filmed in modern thirty-five millimeter stock with careful attention to 
cinematography, narrative, and editing.    
In tandem, the government also finally made significant changes to support the film 
industry. At the end of 1976, the conservative Thanin government raised tariffs on imported 
finished film stock, which substantially increased the cost of importing foreign films. The 
increase was backed by the TMPPA and conservative politicians, who saw foreign films as a 
threat and sought to address the problem of a national cinema in Thailand. The years 1976 to 
1977 were, from the promotion of Thainess through conservative values to nationalistic 
protectionism, the result of cumulative efforts over the previous two decades.  
The conservative turn in late 1970s Thai cinema to a degree reflects the coercive power 
of the Thai state, particularly during periods of military rule. Indeed, the 1950s to 1970s made a 
profound impact on the relationship between state and society in Thailand, as well as on the 
status of the film industry in mediating that relationship. However, authoritarian governments 
operate through both coercive (despotic) power and infrastructural power, meaning the ability to 
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shape society by embedding the state within it.22 Sociologist Michael Mann’s understanding of 
the autonomous power of the state is in this respect useful. He distinguishes despotic power, 
which he describes as “the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without 
routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups,” from infrastructural power.23 
Infrastructural power is, by contrast, “the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, 
and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.”24 Because under 
authoritarianism both despotic and infrastructural power is high, the period from 1957-1973 is 
significant for understanding how the two forms operate in Thailand. The dynamics of what 
Mann observed as developmental infrastructural power are visible in the post-1976 period. That 
is, while despotic power oscillates historically, infrastructural power proved more enduring 
through the modern period in industrializing societies.25  
Societal dynamics structured possible avenues through which the state could develop, and 
the vision that it pursued. However, as Mann noted, even in authoritarian states, “their power to 
change the fundamental rules and overturn the distribution of power within civil society is 
feeble- without the backing of a formidable social movement.”26 In Thailand, official 
collaboration with civil society actors produced important notions of national cultural and social 
belonging. Businessmen, artists, activists, and government officials were all involved in the 
social, cultural, economic, and political rise of the film industry. While the roots of nationalism 
in Thailand are traced back to the early twentieth century, national identity in the context of 
modern authoritarianism emerged in the late 1950s with the rise of leaders like Phibun and Sarit.  
                                                
22 Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State : Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results,” European Journal 
of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv Für Soziologie 25, no. 2 (1984): 113. 
23 Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State,” 113. 
24 Ibid, 113. 
25 Ibid, 116. 
26 Ibid, 114. 
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These men were part of Thailand’s social, political, economic, and cultural elite that, at 
times with members of the up-and-coming middle class, shaped Thai politics for most of its 
modern history. However, those are incredibly diverse groups of people who usually had 
different agendas (when they have them at all) and are difficult to define. Who qualifies as an 
elite or middle-class is based on complicated contexts of time and circumstance. The elite and, 
again to some degree, the middle-class exercised inordinate control over the production (but not 
consumption) of film. Film was an expensive and difficult medium to produce and access. By 
and large, is was a select group of people who could forge careers in the commercial field. 
Moreover, the US and Thai governments had a monopoly on cinematic propaganda, as well as 
the regulation of the film industry.  
 With the long history and current revival of authoritarian politics in Thailand, it is 
necessary to consider the features of authoritarian states that make them alluring to citizens. As 
Thak Chaloemtiarana argued in his important study of Sarit,  
His rule was harsh, repressive, despotic, and inflexible. Yet we must make clear 
assessments of the role he played in the development process of modern Thai politics. It 
is necessary that scholars answer the questions regarding Sarit’s popularity, which was 
much greater than one would predict, given his distasteful tight-fisted rule; we must also 
note the system’s limitations and built-in flaws, which eventually led to its own 
disintegration. By answering these questions, we will be able to understand the nature of 
modern Thai politics and glimpse certain aspects with the system that were inherited 
from the past and passed on to the present.27  
 
Not only do the roots of modern authoritarianism begin in the 1950s, but it is also from that 
period onwards that we see the intensification of state power in Thai society. By looking at 
infrastructural power and the collaboration of Thai civil society, the appeal of authoritarianism, 
whether in terms of popular opinion or as a mechanism for sustaining power, is, if not 
understandable, then at least more readily contextualized. The film industry was to a significant 
                                                
27 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Despotic Paternalism, 10. 
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degree harnessed for the development and negotiation of identities based on conservative ethnic, 
gender, and class norms. For that reason, it is a critical medium to examine the productive nature 
of infrastructural power in Thailand’s modern history. 
  The films made during the Cold War in Thailand were embedded within the political and 
economic context in which they were produced. As filmmakers moved between Thailand and the 
United States for their education, between Bangkok film studios to international film festivals for 
exhibition, and from Bangkok to the Thai countryside for filming, they negotiated Thailand’s 
international and domestic politics.28 Thailand’s international alliances, trade agreements, 
economic policies, and domestic development schemes all were part of the landscape that shaped 
film production. Thus, films became a major site of expression about Thailand’s modern 
experience of capitalism, modernization, and the early stages of globalization.  
Looking at the film industry through the lens of international political economy 
highlights the interplay of domestic and international economic and political forces in shaping 
the development of the local film industry. External stakeholders, namely the US government 
through the USIS and Hollywood studios, exerted a great deal of influence in the production and 
exhibition of films. For the USIS, which operated internationally to disseminate information 
promoting the United States its strategic and economic agenda, this was done through cultural 
diplomacy and psychological warfare. USIS used film, and the political power of American 
official and economic actors in Thailand, to attempt to shape cultural norms and loyalty to the 
state in order to fight communism. Hollywood studios, meanwhile, took advantage of unequal 
trade agreements and the consumer appeal of Hollywood films to dominate the commercial 
industry. Through their market power, they also wielded significant social and cultural influence, 
                                                
28 This echoes Benedict Anderson’s discussion of the circulation of individuals between colony and metropole. 
Anderson and Mendiones, In the Mirror; Benedict R. O’G Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006).  
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often to the chagrin of Thai civil servants and filmmakers. Hollywood studios and the US 
government in general worked well together in Thailand, although not in collaboration. While 
Hollywood ruled the commercial cinemas, the USIS provided films for official operations and 
US-sponsored events. Both were important elements in US soft power. However, sometimes the 
relationship was more direct. Whenever politicians or filmmakers called for increased tariff rates 
on foreign films, US government officials in Bangkok were always quick to discourage the Thai 
government from enacting any policy on the matter.  
However, because the Thai state exerted control and influence in the film industry, any 
analysis of film during the Cold War must account for central state power. As political scientist 
Robert Gilpin noted, even in the contemporary period “the nation state plays the central role in 
guiding economic development and has to lead rather than follow the market.”29 Indeed, the Thai 
state consistently sought to exercise control over the production and circulation of film. 
Moreover, as Thailand’s relationship with the United States and rapid economic and social 
change elicited a resurgence of nationalism, the nation as a symbol had a central role in film 
narratives.  
 It is also evident that women and femininity were critical to how Thai political and social 
actors dealt with the Cold War period and the contemporary expressions of national identity and 
belonging. However, with the rise of conservative nationalism in particular and official 
censorship of sexuality in films, depictions of women not only asserted so-called traditional 
models of modesty, but also denied women’s positions as political and economic actors in their 
own right. As Cynthia Enloe argued in her appeal for a feminist approach to international 
relations, we need methodological approaches that take women seriously and account for how 
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ideas of femininity contribute to unequal experiences of international power relations. However, 
in analyses of international relations, the absence of women has been productive in perpetuating 
the invisibility of those unequal experiences.  
 It is clear that women in Thailand experienced the Cold War period unequally, whether 
due to Thailand’s international relationships, national modernization, or the resurgence of 
nationalism. In each case, women were objectified as bearers of cultural and social tradition, and 
used to reinforce assertions of difference in national identities. However, it was a challenge to 
make women in the Thai film industry, as opposed to actresses, visible. To my knowledge, there 
were no female directors or producers. They weren’t included in discussions of how to build a 
national cinema or reform state policy. They didn’t accompany the USIS with its mobile film 
team. Drawing out the role of women in Thailand’s political change remains a challenge because 
their erasure was pervasive. Nonetheless, women were active in the political and social change 
that substantially transformed Thailand from the 1950s to the 1970s. Thus, making women 
visible requires reading between the lines of post-exhibition surveys, censorship documents, and 
leftist documentaries. By looking at censorship of adultery in foreign films, for example, the 
significance of women’s rights movements and attempts to reform family law become clearer.    
While depictions of women as symbols of cultural authenticity produced an unequal 
experience of modernity and development, those representations were useful for the 
consolidation of political and social legitimacy by the state and elite actors. Constructions of 
national authenticity more often than not served the needs of only a few. Indeed, from censorship 
and to protectionism to propaganda, the central Thai elite, despite their different backgrounds 
and agendas, wielded the film industry to maintain the hierarchical status quo.30 The intersection 
of varied agendas on certain points demonstrates the centrality of gender and class in the 
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operation of authoritarianism and national culture in Thailand. Indeed, Thailand’s uniqueness 
and the need to protect cultural Thainess was and is still used to justify disciplinary and 
repressive measures.  
The films featured in this study provide important insights into these processes. They 
come from a range of sources and genres, from commercial melodramas to short documentaries. 
As I will discuss, Thai films are not easily categorized into genres in the Western sense. Most 
films mix aspects of genres, moving, for example, between melodrama and comedy. However, 
the style of film that I give the least attention is the sixteen millimeter productions so often 
derided as nam nao. I was more concerned in films produced with an agenda, be it artistic, 
political, or social. In other words, my choice of films reflected my interest in attempts to use 
film for more than entertainment. Therefore, many of the films I used came from the First New 
Wave and Art for Life movements. Rat Pettanyi likewise figured prominently because he was 
such an influential figure in the industry at the time and is today considered iconic. 
Finally, my choices were also determined by access. Many films did not survive the 
decades between their production and the present. Fortunately, the excellent work of the Film 
Museum and Archives in Thailand has saved many films from ruin. The latest example of this is 
their restoration of Santi-Vina. Regrettably, I was unable to view this film in time, but instead 
relied on newspaper accounts. Many of the films preserved by the Museum and Archives are 
now included in the annual Moradok phapphayon khong chat (National Film Heritage) registry, 
compiled by the Museum and Archives since 2011. 
 Rongraem narok and Phlae kao were among the first films to make the list. The two 
films present starkly difference views of society, gender, and cinema in Thailand, but are now 
nonetheless both part of a national film canon. The films sit alongside short documentary films 
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of royal activities (footage of King Chulalongkorn in Switzerland), clips of historical events (the 
1942 flood in Bangkok), radical leftist films (Thongpan), glossy heritage films (Hom rong), and 
contemporary avant-garde productions using digital technologies (Uncle Boonmee Who Can 
Recall His Past Lives). The creation of the list reveals that the search for a national cinema 
remains significant, and that previously controversial films are not being incorporated in large 
part for their historical and artistic merit. However, the inclusion of historically controversial 
films alongside royal documentaries and conservative ‘heritage’ films provides an important 
reminder that Thailand national identity remains both an ongoing and contested project.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE DIAMOND FINGER: MONARCHY AND EXHIBITION 
 
On March 24, 1950, King Bhumibol Adulyadej returned to Thailand for the first time since 1946. 
His fiancée, MR Sirikit Kitiyakara, accompanied him. Arriving on the HTMS Sri Ayutthaya in 
military uniform, King Bhumibol’s return marked the beginning of the modern revival of the 
Thai monarchy. Over the next 73 days, Thailand held the royal cremation of Bhumibol’s brother, 
King Ananda Mahidol (1935-1946), the marriage ceremony for Bhumibol and Sirikit, and the 
three-day coronation ceremony in which Bhumibol officially ascended the throne.31  
 The ceremony was filmed by the newly created Private Film Unit of the King.32 The unit 
would become a constant presence in the public activities of the king, whose public image would 
only grow in the coming decades. The film of the ceremony was screened at the Sala Chaloem 
Krung, one of Bangkok’s most luxurious cinemas. It was built two decades earlier, in 1920, by 
Bhumibol’s uncle and amateur filmmaker King Prajadhipok (1925-1935). However, King 
Prajadhipok had little opportunity to enjoy the theater himself, since construction was finished 
only after the 1932 overthrow of the absolute monarchy. Prajadhipok abdicated in 1935, after 
which time the monarchy had a diminished presence in Thailand. So it was perhaps appropriate 
that the film of the returning king should play at the Charoen Krung. Architectural historian 
Lawrence Chua reflected on this event, writing,  
Ordinary citizens and school groups flocked to the theater to see the film of King Rama 
IX… being crowned. This was the first opportunity for many to see a royal spectacle of 
this scale. The theater continued to be a venue for ordinary citizens to see royal 
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ceremonies until they began to be broadcast on television. It seemed as if the monarchy 
had resolutely conquered the raucous space of the cinema once and for all. At the turn of 
the century, the cinema was a crudely built vernacular space where newly emerging 
classes in Thai society could confront the contradictory looks, feelings, and odors of a 
nascent nation-state. By the middle of the century, it had become an example of polite 
architecture and a tool of the monarchy for projecting their own polished image of a 
“civilized” and “progressive” nation-state.33   
 
The filming of King Bhumibol’s 1950 return drew on a historical, if sometimes fraught, 
connection between the Thai monarchy and cinema. It also foreshadowed the way that film 
would become a critical tool in the promotion of the monarchy as a pillar in Cold War Thai 
society.  
The use of film to celebrate and promote royal activities had precedent from the earliest 
period of cinema in Thailand. From the very beginnings, domestic film production was a leisure 
activity of the elite class. Consumption of films, by contrast, was a mass entertainment activity 
that, while centered in Bangkok, crossed class boundaries. With the development of indigenous 
commercial cinema in the 1920s, the government began to treat film as a medium of political 
communication. It was during that same period that coordinated official attempts to promote the 
government and monarchy emerged, including the creation of a government film unit. After the 
1932 coup, the structures put in place to regulate the film industry and promote the government 
were deployed to foster anti-royal sentiment and loyalty to the new government. These patterns 
increased with the military, fascist order under Phibun. However, while various regimes and 
elites may have exercised significant control over the film industry, they did not do so 
consistently or for the same reasons. Indeed, they often had starkly different motives. Changes in 
the political use of cinema throughout the 1950s highlight that very point. With Phibun’s tenuous 
domestic position, the rise of Cold War politics in Asia, and more dramatically after Sarit’s 1957 
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coup, the monarchy became an important symbol of Thai cultural unity and anti-communism. 
Cinema was harnessed again to promote the monarchy as a pillar of Thai nationalism.  
This chapter is divided into three parts that examine the shifting connection between 
cinema and monarchy. In the first part, I argue that efforts by the state under the absolute 
monarchy to regulate cinema were a response to the growth of the domestic commercial market. 
Despite cinema’s popular appeal, its status as a royal hobby granted it important prestige that 
survived the absolute monarchy. In the second part, I argue that the use of film as propaganda 
accelerated from 1932 to 1957. In the early years, it was intended to bolster the new government 
and combat royalist sentiments. However, with Phibun’s rise to power, cinema was used to 
promote his leadership and the importance of the military. In the third part, I discuss how, 
through the 1950s, the US alliance and Sarit’s military regime together contributed to the revival 
of the monarchy under King Bhumibol.  
The three sections highlight the historical use of film as propaganda and the development 
of psychological warfare during the Cold War. They also emphasize important changes in how 
domestic regimes viewed the relationship between the government and the people. How 
governments harnessed film, whether to promote the military or the monarchy, spoke to the 
strategic significance of Thai citizens in the security of the nation-state. Throughout these 
decades, government propaganda and psychological operations contributed significantly to 
conceptions of a national identity no longer consumed and embodied solely by the Bangkok 
elite, but by the citizens throughout nation. 
 Internationally, the rise of imperialism was an historical phenomenon that was critically 
shaped and enabled by technological innovations, which was in turn shaped by the demands of 
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imperialism.34 For example, the creation of a network of telegraph wires in India and submarine 
cables to Britain enabled unprecedented rapidity of information between colony and metropole.35 
In Thailand, the technological advancement of communication and transport networks played an 
important role in the integration of Isan under King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) and throughout 
the first half of the twentieth century.36 Film acted in a similar way in the expansion of central 
Thai cultural and state power. Films allowed representatives of the government, whether the 
prime minister or the king, to be seen and represented in remote villages even when the men 
themselves were far away. Films made real the people and activities of the central Thai 
government and monarchy. They allowed villagers to imagine themselves as part of the 
developing and progressing nation. With the 1950s, moreover, films and cinematic events, such 
as the 1958 Brussels World Fair, allowed the same figures and symbols to be promoted abroad.  
Film thus became part of the national ritual of monarchy through the use of royal 
symbolism in theaters, the attendance of royals at screenings, and the documentation of royal 
activities in films. Repetition, either through the act of standing during the King’s Anthem before 
each film screening or the numerous documentaries detailing royal activities, was made possible 
through technology. It became a critical feature of how films projected the image of the 
monarchy. Eventually, repetition turned into its own ritual, while also contributing to the broader 
ritualization of the monarchy. Repetition and ritual are features in the development of what 
political scientist Michael Suk-Young Chwe called “common knowledge.” Describing the 
concept, Chwe wrote that “knowledge of the message is not enough; what is also required is 
knowledge of others’ knowledge, knowledge of others’ knowledge of others’ knowledge, and so 
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on- that is, ‘common knowledge.’”37 Public ceremonies, for example, convey direct meaning to 
each member of the audience, but more importantly let the members of the audience know that 
the other members also know. In other words, rituals do no simply convey meaning, but 
collectively produce social knowledge. 
From the beginning, film was used by Thai governments and the monarchy to shape 
social knowledge about the monarchy as an institution and Thai kings as symbols of the nation. 
Moreover, with the revival of the monarchy under King Bhumibol, film also played a role in 
promoting his image internationally and cemented the link between the monarchy and the nation 
in the world’s eyes. Looking back on the history of cinema in Thailand, it is clear that the 
medium’s political characteristics were fundamentally shaped and intertwined with the history of 
the monarchy.  
From the first film screenings in Bangkok in 1897 until after World War II, the 
production and distribution of film was almost exclusively in the hands of members of the Thai 
aristocracy and a few foreign, mostly Chinese, companies. The early period from 1887 to 1932 is 
associated in particular with the activities of the monarchy. Cinema’s royal origins proved 
crucial to shaping Thailand’s early experience of cinema, as well as later debates about cinematic 
quality. From the beginning, it created a privileged space for film in the national consciousness. 
King Chulalongkorn is credited as the first Thai to see a film.38 In 1896, less than a year after the 
Lumiere invention of the Cinematographe, King Chulalongkorn saw Thomas Edison’s 
Kinetoscope in Singapore. In his diary, the king wrote of  
A machine whose name we cannot remember. Inside it is attached a role of photographic 
film, whose rotation occurs at a pace which makes the images seem to move by 
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themselves. One sees a cockfight; the cocks hop about at the beginning of the fight, their 
feathers flying, then the out-stretched hands of the gamblers, as if all these images had a 
life of their own.39 
Chulalongkorn’s recollection highlights the documentary nature of early cinema. Most of the 
earliest films were recordings of daily life.40  
The first film that featured content about Siam was an 1897 recording of King 
Chulalongkorn in a royal procession in Berne, Switzerland.41 In 1897, at a playhouse owned by 
Prince Alangkan, the travelling showman S.G. Marchovsky premiered the first film screening in 
Siam, which included one film about an undersea diver and another about a boxing match.42 
Private screenings were put on for members of the aristocracy and royal family, including Prince 
Damrong, the Ministry of the Interior, and Prince Thewawong, the Foreign Minister. Another 
showing was arranged for Queen Saowapha, the mother of King Vajiravudh (1910-1925) and 
Prajadhipok.43  
That same year, Prince Thongthaem Sapphasat Suphakit (Sapphasat), a younger brother 
of King Chulalongkorn, purchased “three sets of nang farang (Western Films)” whilst on a royal 
tour of Europe. Royal interest in photography translated well into familiarity with the emergence 
film technology in Europe. Prince Sapphasat exhibited his films in Bangkok from at least 1900, 
becoming Siam’s first filmmaker.44 Most of Sapphasat’s films were of King Chulalongkorn and 
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royal ceremonies.45 In general, however, his films were shown among select groups of the royal 
elite in private viewings.46 He is now regarded as the “father of Thai cinema.”47  
Royal association with cinema was also indicative of the modernization of the image of 
the monarchy more broadly. Maurizio Peleggi, a cultural historian of Thailand, argued that at the 
end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the monarchy refashioned itself “in the 
project of asserting their ‘civilized’ status and, consequentially, their claim to ‘national’ 
leadership.”48 This impacted royal practices of consumption, representation, building, and public 
spectacles. Technology, such as photography, was used to promote the monarchy. Royal contact 
with Siamese subjects was facilitated through the distribution of royal imagery in photographs, 
stamps, and postcards. That Chulalongkorn was filmed in Switzerland in a grand European-style 
royal procession was evidence of those changes. The relationship between monarchy and 
technology was fundamentally political. 
Royal modernization and consumption also had productive effects. When film was taken 
up as a royal hobby, it influenced popular conceptions of the medium. Indeed, the monarchy was 
crucial to the early development of a “national” cinema. Thailand scholar Scot Barmé argued 
that:  
Royal patronage of the cinema during this time was of particular significance in that it 
conferred film with a degree of prestige denied to other types of popular commercial 
entertainment such as likay [Thai folk theatre] or ngiw [a Chinese form of folk theatre]. 
Elite distaste for these cultural forms was based on a feeling that they were too 
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immediate, too recognizable and most importantly, too identifiable with the lower orders, 
while the cinema, as an imported foreign form from the ‘civilised’ world, was, in spite of 
its popular appeal, valued as embodying the mystique of modernity.49 
 
Royal symbolism was extended from production to content to the infrastructures of cinema itself. 
Cinemas from very early on used royal patronage and imagery to increase the prestige of the 
cinema.50 For example, the Japanese Cinematograph, the first permanent theater in Siam, 
underwent renovation and reopened in 1910. The owners had “‘by special appointment to His 
Majesty the King’, received permission to call itself ‘The Royal Japanese Cinematograph.’ In 
September 1910, an official ceremony, attended by Prince Damrong and his two daughters 
together with a number of other princes, was performed in which a royal coat of arms was 
erected at the front of the theatre.”51 
The popularity of film also resulted in the rapid construction of cinemas more generally. 
Especially in Bangkok, cinemas quickly became important social institutions. A night out to see 
a film became a popular form of entertainment and social activity. Cinemas were built in local 
provincial capitals, as well as outdoor screenings in rural areas around Thailand.52 Early cinemas 
sold tickets cheaply and were open to audiences from a wide variety of social and economic 
backgrounds.53 The mixed nature of the crowds did not always please patrons. As described in 
the beginning, Chua found that “Bangkok cinemas had been raucous public spaces where older 
elites encountered newly emergent social classes with unprecedented intimacy. Letters written by 
audience members to the magazine Phapayon Sayam in the 1920s complained of the bad smell 
and uncouth behavior of poor and immigrant Chinese cinema goers who were referred to 
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alternately as “nuisances” and “the stinking hordes.””54 From the very earliest period, then, the 
prestigious character of film contrasted with the less savory nature of mass audiences.  
While many cinema operations were foreign-owned, Hollywood studios offered the bulk 
of films. No systematic statistical data is available before 1934. However, newspaper articles, 
film booklets, and advertisements of film programs demonstrate Hollywood’s market advantage 
and popular appeal. By the late 1930s, 95% of films screened in Thailand were from the United 
States, followed in ranking by Hong Kong, France, Britain and Japan.55 Hollywood’s early 
advantage was in part due to the presence of American studio “advisors” who were able to 
negotiate lucrative contracts with local companies.56  
Through the 1920s the royal government became more directly involved in the 
production of film for commercial and propaganda purposes. Vajiravudh had a deep, personal 
interest in film. He organized an amateur film club at Jitlada Palace “whose objectives were to 
gather together high-ranking state managers who liked pictures in order to view and exchange 
their collections.”57 But he also saw the potential for cinema in political terms. In 1922, for 
example, Vajiravudh secretly began supporting the Sayam Niramai Company. The king 
apparently did this to prevent Siao Songuan Sibunruang, a middle-class Sino-Thai, from gaining 
a monopoly of the film industry.58 Vajiravudh was deeply concerned about Chinese influence in 
the cinema industry, and sought to increase royal influence. However, despite royal patronage, 
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the Sayam Niramai Company lasted only two years before going bankrupt.59  
It is also likely that the broader context of political opposition and criticisms of the 
monarchy incentivized considerations of greater regulation of the public sphere. After 1917, for 
example, with rising numbers of literate intellectuals in Bangkok, political journalism developed 
to offer nationalist – and highly critical - alternatives to the royal narrative.60 King Vajiravudh in 
particular was the target of criticism, which contributed to the declining popularity of the 
monarchy more broadly.61  
The technology and capital required to produce films, by contrast, prevented a similar 
expression in cinema. Instead, the government was in a better position to control the medium for 
its own purposes. This long duration of elite control over the means of film production during the 
early decades of cinema in Siam cemented perceptions of the medium as both an elite form of art 
and a political tool. In 1922 the Topical Film Service was established within the Royal State 
Railways Department to make films advertising royal activities, tourism, government initiatives, 
public health, as well as some commercial films.62 The service produced some 509,600 feet of 
film, including 74 separate titles.63 Two members of the royal family directed the film service, 
Prince Kamphaengphet and Prince Purachat.64 Barmé argued that: 
These documentary films, and later similar works, were screened in Bangkok cinemas as 
well as those in regional cent[er]s, and represent the beginning of a new era whereby the 
Thai state sought to promote its interests on a mass scale by visual means. For the first 
time audiences were brought into closer contact with their fellow compatriots through 
film which began to help shape and define the growth of a national imaginary, a 
consciousness of an emergent Thai nation.65 
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Films promoting government and royal activities, therefore coexisted alongside critical 
newspapers.  
Commercial domestic filmmaking, distinct from royal or government cinema, grew 
slowly during the late 1920s. In June 1927 the Wasuwat Brothers produced the first “Thai” 
feature film, titled Chok Song Chan (Double Luck).66 Manit, Phao, and Kasian Wasuwat were 
the children of Phraya Suthorn Phimon (Phle Wasuwat) and Khunying Thim. Manit was 
educated at the Royal Pages’ College and worked as an official in the Ministry of Finance, 
before becoming involved in business.67 Phao and Kasian worked for the Film Service, and 
joined with Manit to establish the Sikrung Film Company.68 The first domestic sound film, Long 
Thang (Going Astray, 1932), was also produced by the Wasuwat brothers.69 The influence of 
elite families shaped the expansion of the commercial industry.  
With the reign of Prajadhipok, royal concern over the public image of the government 
grew. As Thai scholar Matthew Copeland observed,  
During the course of the reign, the king and his ministers not only paid close attention to 
press opinion- summarizing viewpoints, cataloguing clippings, and all the while 
exchanging commentary among themselves as to which essays warranted governmental 
action and which governmental sanction- but court speculation as to the desires and likely 
responses of ‘the public’ was almost invariably phrased in terms of “writings that had 
appeared or could be expected to appear in the Bangkok press.”70 
 
That the government acknowledged the fact of a “public opinion” went hand-in-hand with the 
need to court that opinion. It appears, then, that the 1920s offered an opening of the public 
sphere, if not in the nation as a whole then at least in Bangkok.  
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Prajadhipok himself was an amateur filmmaker. In 1929, he filmed Waen Wiset (The 
Magic Ring), a short black and white film produced on 16 mm film stock, while on a trip in Ko 
Pha-Ngan.71 All of the actors in the film were members of the royal family.72 The film is about an 
abusive father with five step-children. The family travels to an island off the coast of Thailand in 
order to gather fruit. There, the children meet a water spirit (phrai nam), who gives them the 
magic ring that will grant their wishes. When their father sees the power of the ring, he plots to 
kill the child wearing it. But when he attempts to kill his son, the son turns the father into a dog. 
The kids take their fathers marijuana pipe and puff smoke into the dog’s mouth. When the kids 
decide to turn their dad back into a human, he is extremely high. He hugs his children, and 
promises to raise them better going forward. The family pack up to leave, but as they board their 
boat the rings slips from the child’s finger and falls into the water. They conclude that the spirit 
must have wanted the ring back, and leave the island a happier family. 
The film is one of the oldest intact domestic films in Thailand today. It is notable as well 
for its creative use of intertitles, complete with child-like drawings to complement the dialogue. 
However, there is no evidence that the film was ever commercially shown. Barmé wrote that “as 
far as can be determined, none of the king’s works were ever exhibited in the Bangkok cinemas, 
perhaps out of fear that they would be publicly criticized by discerning viewers for their lack of 
sophistication in comparison with the productions of other, more skillful filmmakers.”73 
Ironically, the film likely would not have passed the censorship rules under the 1930 film act. A 
young boy turning his father into a dog and smoking marijuana certainly would have violated 
key points in the censorship guidelines.  
Beyond his private filmmaking, Prajadhipok also sought to harness cinema to promote 
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the monarchy. In the 1920s, the King’s Anthem began to be played after the end of the film, 
during which audiences were expected to stand. However, many did not conform to the new 
practice. Reports recall audiences rushing from the theaters before the anthem was finished.74 
Chua argued that theatres “fomented political rebellion. Audiences routinely refused to stand for 
the playing of the king’s anthem, leading the monarchy to implement stricter punishment to 
those who displayed such open ambivalence towards the royal institution.”75 The description 
highlights the double-edged sword of cinema as an arena for the performance of national 
identity. When national rituals are observed correctly, they create and reinforce collective 
understandings that in turn shape behavior. However, when deviations occur, they also become 
public spectacles. As Chwe observed, common knowledge is created through public rituals, 
which act as “social practices”. The phenomenon of shared spectatorship – knowing that others 
are observing a social phenomenon – serves to generate spontaneous normative consensus 
amongst the spectators.76 Thus the spectacle of audience members watching one another showing 
disrespect for the royal anthem risked translating individual anti-royalist sentiment into a wider 
social practice.  
In response to the lowly and transgressive nature of theater crowds, in the 1920s and 
1930s cinemas underwent a “civilizing process” intended to assert the image of the absolute 
monarchy as the head of a progressive and civilized nation.77 In 1921, the government passed 
legislation to prevent fires at cinemas in response to the unsafe conditions and the flammability 
of film stock.78 But perhaps the most concerted effort under the monarchy to civilize Bangkok 
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cinema was the construction of the Sala Chaloem Krung theater and establishment of the United 
Cinema Company under King Prajadhipok.79 Chua observed that “in the early 1930s the absolute 
monarchy of Siam sought to shore up some of its failing popularity by building the first self-
consciously modern cinema in Southeast Asia, the Sala Chaloem Krung.”80 With the use of air-
conditioning and modern building styles, the theater was a sign of the royal role in nation-
building and technological progress. Audiences acted as spectators not only to the films 
displayed on the screen itself, but also to royal authority and physical displays of national 
development.81  
The king also helped create the Saha Cinema Company, which, after buying the 
previously dominant Siam Film Company, became the largest film company in Thailand until the 
Second World War. As I will discuss in further detail in chapter three, the 1930 Film Act 
institutionalized government oversight of film production, importation, exhibition, and 
advertising. Under Prajadhipok the “cinema trade and distribution business was now almost 
completely under the control of the government and the absolute monarchy.”82 Yet it was too late 
to save the absolute monarchy. On the morning of 24 June 1932, the Khana Ratsadon, or the 
People’s Party, took over the government in Bangkok while Prajadhipok was at the vacation 
palace in Hua Hin. The absolute monarchy was overthrown, and its place taken by a 
constitutional monarchy.  
 The 1932 coup inaugurated a tumultuous period in politics in Thailand. Two of the 
members of the Khana Ratsadon would come to dominate politics until the 1950s, namely 
Phibun and Pridi Phanomyong. One of the first orders of business after the coup, and indeed for 
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all subsequent governments, was to legitimize the new government in the court of public 
opinion. By 1932, official use of cinema for political propaganda was well established. In fact, in 
the area of film production there was a great deal of continuity from the royal government to that 
of the People’s Party. The Wasuwat brothers, for example, received support from the People’s 
Party because of their personal connections in that faction. They were commissioned to make a 
documentary of the People’s Party victory. However, the film was never completed, a reflection 
of the internal factionalism and jockeying that followed the party’s ascent to rule. Meanwhile, 
the new government abolished the Topical Film Service as a royal ministry and in its place 
created the Film Section under the Department of Public Information.83 Otherwise, cinema in the 
1930s generally was marked by a continuation of elite and government domination of the 
production of film and cinema business.  
One of the most notable official productions of the decade was the documentary-style 
Luat thahan thai (Undaunted Sons of Siam), released in 1935 to play at the Sala Chaloem Krung 
Theater.84 In addition to being the best venue in town, the appropriation of the royal theater was 
redolent with political symbolism. The film was produced by the Ministry of Defense with the 
guidance of both Phibun, who was the then Minister of Defense, and Luang Wichit Wathakan, 
the minister of propaganda, in order to promote the Thai military.85 The film was about a group 
of men and women engaged in military service when a war breaks out. Ultimately, Thailand is 
victorious. The film reflected Phibun’s personal influence. He devoted significant resources to 
the project.86 It foreshadowed his promotion of militaristic nationalism, and his belief that war 
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was unavoidable.87 Accompanied by martial music and showcasing battle scenes, the film drew 
on nationalistic and martial themes established after the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932.  
The production of the film was in keeping with the promotion of the arts under Phibun and 
Luang Wichit. Luang Wichit in particular was instrumental in reviving the Department of Fine 
Arts after 1933, which had been marginalized under King Prajadhipok.  
Under Phibun’s tenure as Prime Minister first from 1938 to 1944 and again from 1948 to 
1957, the Thai government made films to promote national sentiment and official activities. The 
politicization of the popular and fine arts for political ends and propaganda was a global trend, 
especially amongst the fascist regimes of Europe that Phibun and Luang Wichit were known to 
admire. As historian E. Bruce Reynolds reported, “During World War II the director general of 
the Thai Publicity Department, Phairot Chayanam, acknowledged… that his agency had been 
modeled on the Reich Propaganda Ministry,” and claimed that “‘just as in Germany, Thailand 
has centralized as far as possible the issuing of government news, enlightenment and 
propaganda’.”88  Reynolds also showed that Phibun and Luang Wichit actively admired and used 
models from the Japanese empire and Chiang Kai-shek.89 These years emphasize the flexibility 
of Luang Wichit’s loyalties, as years later he would work with Sarit to revitalize the monarchy.  
Luat Thahan Thai was just the beginning of a number of productions and film events 
sponsored by the Thai government. But it’s worth pondering if these projects met with 
controversy within the domestic film industry. In the early 1930s, members of royal and noble 
families still made up most of the existing filmmaking community.  Intriguingly, the need by the 
government to produce film materials supporting the new order may have resulted to some extent 
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in increased sponsorship for commoner filmmakers and film companies, including those owned 
by Chinese families. Indeed, one of the first productions was designed to sell the 1932 
revolution. Sponsored in 1934 by the Office of Propaganda (Samnakngan khosanakan), the film 
itself was made by the Siam Cinema Company.90  The Siam Cinema Company was owned by 
Siaw Songuan Sibunruang, the very man that Vajiravudh had attempted to compete with in the 
1920s. Ultimately, however, the government took control over another former royally operated 
film company, the United Cinematograph Company, in order to ensure state control over the 
cinematic public sphere.   
In 1934, for example, the United Cinematograph showed the film The Battle, translated 
into Thai as Rak chat ying chip (Loving the Nation More than Existence), to Thai Navy 
audiences in order to promote loyalty.91  Phibun had identified military audiences as particular 
target groups to be both courted and shown materials supportive of the new regime. This went 
beyond issues directly related to military matters. In 1933, Phibun had requested the production 
of two films intended for military audiences, apparently titled Chalong ratthathamnun 
(Celebrating the Constitution) and Kanplianplaeng pokkhrong meua wan thi 24 mithuna 
(Changes in Governance on 24 June).92  Phibun’s focus on the military and his use of propaganda 
to ally them to his form of government revealed the extent to which his rise to power was 
connected to the military. Indeed, military loyalties to Phibun would keep him in power through 
the next two decades, despite turbulence brought on by a world war, regicide, and major political 
infighting amongst members of the 1932 coup group. His early involvement with propaganda, 
even before his rise to premiership, also prefaced his infamous cultural mandates and extensive 
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attempts to inculcate nationalism in the Thai population.  
Some of the films were, ultimately, too politically sensitive to be publicly released. In 
fact, Changes in Governance, produced by Manit Wasuwat and Luang Konkan Chaenchit, was 
never allowed to be screened to the public after a complaint by then Prime Minister (and former 
Privy councilor to Vajiravudh) Phraya Manopkon Nitithada that the film “was inappropriate to 
be shown in theaters because of the derision would cause hurt, or to put it another way, pound 
down the nail, and be excessively traumatic to the king and members of the royal family.”  In the 
end, the film was taken into government possession, and Manit Wasuwat given ฿4,000.93 While 
the film did not end up being shown, the decision clearly indicates an anti-royalist character to at 
least some of the post-1932 productions.   
The years leading to the Second World War saw Pridi and Phibun’s rivalry coalesce into 
a cinematic duel. In 1941, while he was serving as Minister of Finance, Pridi released his 
English-language Prachao chang pheuak (The King of the White Elephant) to play at the Sala 
Chaloem Krung.94 The film was produced in English and premiered in New York and 
Singapore.95 It a clear attempt to influence international perceptions of Thailand as a peaceful 
nation. The film depicted an Ayutthaya king forced to go to war with Hongsawadi. The strongly 
anti-war themes were a clear rebuke of Phibun’s relationship with the Japanese and European 
fascist regimes.  
Interestingly, the film seemed to have cloaked itself in the legitimacy of the monarchy 
and cultural departments, with one of the title screens saying, “We are deeply obliged and hereby 
show our appreciation to the Royal Household and Fine Arts Departments of Thailand for the 
assistance kindly rendered.” Moreover, the royal association with white elephants and the films’ 
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use of a wise monarchy to deliver its message further amplified the changing dynamics of royal 
politics. Considering Pridi’s reputation as a staunch anti-royalist, the inclusion of royal 
symbolism is somewhat surprising.   
On December 8th, 1941, Japanese forces crossed over into Thailand from Indochina 
while simultaneously landing along the Kra Peninsula, as a prelude to the invasion of British 
colonies in Malaya and Burma. On the 21st of December, Tokyo and Bangkok signed a mutual 
offensive-defensive alliance pact. By way of the agreement, Japan had full access to Thai 
transportation infrastructure, communication networks, weapons, and military facilities. Rising 
militarization also changed the use of film by the government. Phibun backed the production of 
Ban rai na rao (Our Land), which was released in April 1942.96 The film, like others before it, 
premiered at the Sala Chaloem Krung, as well as the Odeon Theater. It combined themes of 
military duty, agricultural devotion, and loyalty to nation to present an image of a simultaneously 
agricultural and militaristic society where citizens were obeisant to the central state. Eventually, 
the Japanese had approximately 150,000 troops stationed in Thailand, although Thailand was 
never officially occupied.  In return, Japan, then in control of most of Southeast Asia, granted 
territory to Thailand along its North, Northeast, and Southern borders, the so-called “Lost 
Territories.”  
While the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia was characterized by brutality and 
violence, including widespread rape of “comfort women,” their presence in Thailand was 
comparatively without incident. However, Japanese attempts at cultural influence were 
extensive. According to a report from the US Office of Strategic Services, the Japanese 
government had attempted to influence Thai public opinion through cultural exchange since the 
early 1930s. As the author observed, “in one sense the three thousand Japanese in Bangkok on 
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invasion day were all cultural agents prepared to sell collaboration and co-prosperity to the 
Thai.”97 During the war, cultural exchange was formalized with the Japan-Thailand Cultural 
Agreement treaty, ratified in Thailand on December 21st, 1942. The treaty, which had fourteen 
articles detailing the various types of cultural exchange between the two countries, declared that 
Japan and Thailand would:  
Endeavor to supply the other, in as large quantities and as frequently as possible, with 
publications, cinematographic films, lantern slides, photographs, gramophone records and 
musical scores of this country which it deems contributory to promoting the mutual 
knowledge and understanding between the two countries, and the other shall give special 
consideration as to their preservation, distribution, presentation and exhibition so that 
these may be utilized effectively in its country.98 
 
Based on the available evidence, it is fair to surmise that the exchange of material was generally 
a one-way transaction. It is, however, quite possible that Phibun, having a front-seat position to 
Japanese propaganda, would have taken the lessons from the war into the 1950s. 
However, growing concerns regarding the Phibun government and recognition that Japan 
was losing the war led to widespread dissatisfaction with the relationship. In 1944, the National 
Assembly forced Phibun out, and replaced him with Khuang Aphaiwongse, who was secretly 
allied with the Seri Thai.99 The resistance achieved some victories between 1944 and 1945. But 
at the time of the Japanese surrender, Thailand was still technically allied with Japan and at war 
with some the Allied Powers, although not with the United States.  
The years from the start of World War II through to the early fifties seemed to bring a lull 
in Thai propaganda film production. While the Japanese released propaganda films during their 
occupation in Southeast Asia, domestic production was severely limited. Many domestic 
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producers and cinemas went out of business.100 The cinema business took some time to recover. 
It was only from the mid-fifties that there is once again evidence of government production of 
films. By that time, however, the domestic and international political context had changed. 
Phibun had returned to power after a 1947 coup by Royal Thai Army units. But going into the 
1950s, Phibun’s grasp was tentative. To maintain power, he first had to carefully balance 
different factions of the government and military. He also allied Thailand with the United States 
in the fight against communism in Asia, which I will discuss further in chapter two. The alliance 
resulted in significant economic and military aid, and thus bolstered both the Thai military and 
Phibun’s own government. 
 In 1952, Phibun announced the new Ministry of Culture (re-established from the National 
Institute of Culture from his previous government), intended to promote Thai arts and culture.101 
The ministry was created in large part to foster a uniform national culture. The same year, 
Thailand’s first television broadcast, by the Public Relations Department and backed by Police 
Chief Lt. Gen Phao Sriyanond, showcased “Thai” culture through dancing and singing.102 New 
1952 censorship laws were applied to films as the Interior Ministry sought to promote 
“conservative, traditional and submissive morals, encouraging obedience and ‘true 
entertainment.’”103  
Around the same time, efforts to use film to promote Thailand’s image abroad increased. 
In 1953, for example, the government produced a film intended to promote Buddhism in advance 
of the 1957 celebration of 2500 years since the passing of Buddha. While the films showcased 
                                                
100 Dome Sukwong, History of Thai Film, 36. 
101 Maurizio Peleggi, “Refashioning Civilization: Dress and Bodily Practice in Thai Nation-Building,” in The 
Politics of Dress in Asia and the Americas (Brighton [England]: Sussex Academic, 2007), 76. 
102 Grossman, Chronicle of Thailand, 60-63. 
103 Ibid, 70. Phibun’s policy during this period was a continuation of his ultranationalist campaigns and mandates 
during the 1930s. 
 45 
“Thai” Buddhist morality, culture, and customs, it was explicitly intended to be shown to 
international audiences as well. In fact, the government memo introducing the project reads 
something like a missionary statement, that the government would make the film “in order to 
propagate (Thai Buddhism) in foreign countries as part of the organization of the celebrations in 
the year B.E. 2500.”  Notably, amongst the scenes to be included in the film, such as famous 
sites and religious individuals, the government highlighted royal religious activities. These two 
aspects of the film, the internationalization of the audience and the inclusion of royal religious 
patronage (and by extension legitimation of the role of the monarchy in the culture of the 
country), would come to characterize official and commercial filmmaking through the 1970s. 
In July 1955, Bangkok hosted the first International Information Film Festival (IIFF) in 
Lumpini Park. Intended to strengthen the friendship between the foreign residents of the 
diplomatic community in Bangkok and Thai people, participating countries were invited to 
submit 16mm films of less than thirty minutes that would showcase each of the individual 
countries. Of course, the films would be prescreened for approval by the Thai government.  The 
festival included films from fifteen countries, including the United States, Germany, Japan, 
India, South Vietnam, Australia, and Indonesia. The three-day event was attended by large 
crowds and viewed by the government as a major success.104 
Although the Thai government hosted the event, it was paid for in full by the Japanese 
Embassy in Bangkok. It is likely that the inspiration for Japan’s support for the festival was 
similar to that of forming the Southeast Asian Film Festival a year earlier. In some respects, 
Thailand was the ideal staging ground for its reengagement with the region. Thailand and Japan 
maintained generally positive relations. Indeed, the Thai submission to the program showcased 
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that relationship, as it was filmed during Phibun’s visit to Japan in that same year.  
However, the mid-1950s saw a simultaneous intensification of Cold War dynamics, 
especially in Southeast Asia, and the increased role of the US in Thailand. The newspaper Siam 
Nikhon reported in September 1954 that the Ministry of the Interior called a meeting from the 
twenty-forth to the thirtieth of that month to train all provincial governors in aspects of 
psychological warfare.105 The growing influence of the United States in Thailand was already 
evident at the IIFF. The American exhibition featured a Cinerama (a new widescreen process 
that utilized three synchronized projectors and a large, curved screen), which had previously 
showed in Bangkok at the International Trade Fair as part of Eisenhower’s initiative to showcase 
American culture abroad. Memos circulated in advance of meetings to plan for the cinerama 
reminded officials to dress appropriately and maintain courtesy “to protect the honor of the 
bureaucracy.”106  These interactions highlighted recognition of the need to present a respectable 
Thai face to the world.  
Even the ill-fated 1958 elections were promoted through film exhibitions. Siam Rat 
reported on a tactic supported by then Minister of the Interior Lt.-General Praphat Charusethian, 
whereby “in addition to usual methods used to encourage the people to the polls, special films 
will be shown in all theaters. These films are comedies and star comedians have been engaged to 
take part in them, the stories of which are not only amusing but also emphasize to the people the 
importance of going to the polls to vote.”107 Editorializing, Siam Rat Weekly Review remarked 
that “this new plan of the authorities to show films acted by popular and well-known comedians 
as the means by which to encourage the people to go to the polls and vote only seems to indicate 
the objective to show that elections and Thai democracy are in reality a comedy with no meaning 
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whatever.”108 This assessment seemed right, as only a short period later, in October 1958, the 
elections were invalidated in Sarit’s auto-coup. The next elections were not held until 1969.  
 Official campaigns to promote Thailand’s image abroad were sporadic in the first half of 
the twentieth century. Indeed, the government’s attitude towards the exhibition of films abroad 
was evident in an incident involving the Thai filmmaker, Rat Pettanyi. Now regarded as the 
“father of contemporary Thai cinema,” Rat was one of the first Thai filmmakers actively 
showing his films abroad. In 1954, Rat took part in the first Southeast Asian Film Festival in 
Tokyo. Like the IIFF, the festival was inaugurated that year as a Japanese-led effort to create a 
pan-Asian film industry, as well as to open the Southeast Asia market for Japanese films. The 
initiative was somewhat contentious, given that less than a decade earlier Japan’s presence in 
Southeast Asia was characterized by brutal imperialism. Indeed, Indonesia ultimately declined to 
participate due to concerns over the restoration of diplomatic relations.  Given Thailand’s 
different experience of the period, however, Thai filmmakers participation was far less 
contentious.  
 Rat submitted his film Santi-Vina (named for the lead characters, Santi and Vina) to the 
festival, making it the first feature length Thai film to be shown at an international film 
festival.109  Produced especially for the festival, the film was shot in color on 35mm film stock, a 
first for Thailand. With the largest budget for any Thai film up to that date, the film was 
technological progressive in an era dominated by 16mm film. Santi-Vina used some common 
melodrama themes (class-differences between lovers, forced marriage, family arguments, etc.) to 
deliver a Buddhist morality tale. The film also displayed the Tham Khao Luang Cave in 
Phetchaburi, which has since become a famous tourist attraction. Although each country was 
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permitted five entries, Rat’s film was the only submission from Thailand. The film received 
critical praise at the Southeast Asian Film Festival, a real accomplishment given the Japanese 
disregard for most of the Southeast Asian entries.  It also received three awards, including the 
Golden Harvest Award for Best Photography, Best Art Direction, and the Special AMPP Award 
for Best Culture film. For the last award, Rat personally received a Mitchell movie camera.  
Initially, the Thai government, specifically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of Culture, greeted the film and the awards it won with great pleasure. Indeed, because 
Rat had to return early to Bangkok before the awards ceremony, the Royal Thai Ambassador to 
Japan, Luang Phinit-Aksorn, accepted Rat’s awards and gave a speech. In it, Luang Phinit-
Aksorn admitted the limits of the Thai film industry, but also asserted the ways that Santi-Vina 
displayed Thai culture: 
[Santi-Vina] is… the first 35 mm color picture ever made in our country; and 
therefore the achievement of Mr. [Pettanyi] in winning the best photography award is the 
more remarkable. Our film company flew out the sensitive Eastman Color film from 
Rochester; we kept it refrigerated on location in the tropical climate of the Thai rice 
fields; each weekend, we flew the exposed film to Tokyo for developing. And so, the 
production under unusually difficult conditions proceeded, eight weeks of shooting in the 
provinces, rice fields and deep in beautiful Khao Luang Cave, a natural cave, which is a 
spectacular temple with gold-leafed [Buddha], stalagmites, stalactites and dripping walls 
of every hue. 
This is what the Thai producers sought to bring to you- these extraordinary scenes 
with this simple moving story of a boy, a girl and a priest. And these are the conditions 
under which our film was produced. As someone not involved in the production, may I 
say as a proud Thai that these are my people, these are their customs, these are their 
ceremonies; this is indeed my land.110 
 
For most of the talk, the ambassador spoke of the film as a communal production, “our” film. 
Ignoring the reality of how little the government actually did to support producers like Rat, the 
ambassador asserted the production of the film as emerging from the particular conditions of the 
Thai cinema industry and Thailand’s hot and humid climate in order to show the world the 
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beauty and culture of the Thai people and countryside (and soon-to-be tourist attractions). 
  In a letter reporting the success of the film at the festival, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
noted that the film had “made a very famous name for Thailand in the Japanese film industry and 
for foreigners in Tokyo.”111 The news was even reported directly to Phibun. But then, in an about 
face, the government fined Rat for screening his film abroad without first clearing it with the 
censors. The incident is frequently referenced in histories of Thai cinema, and often used as an 
example of the government’s lack of support for Thai cinema. While that assertion is true, the 
exchanges and reactions that took place afterwards revealed the recognition, at least in some 
quarters, that international film festivals could be useful for broader efforts to promote the image 
of the country. While Rat was punished for violating strict censorship and importation laws, his 
overseas activities were in fact supported and praised by the government.   
Moreover, Rat’s assistance to the Office of the Prime Minister in 1957 indicates that Rat 
maintained good relations with the government, despite the 1954 incident and his own objections 
to the lack of direct government support for the domestic film industry. In January 1957, Rat was 
contacted by the political division of the Office of the Prime Minister to provide advice for the 
production of two film projects. The films, titled The Power of Sacrifice and The Power of Love, 
were jointly sponsored by the Ministry of Culture and the Office of the Prime Minister. Upon 
receiving the request, with only the names of the films to accompany it, Rat replied politely, if 
also perhaps tersely: 
According to the letter… the Prime Minister in his position as the President of the 
Ministry for National Culture has ordered the Board of National Culture to produce a film 
about The Power of Sacrifice and The Power of Love, and has given me the honor of 
asking my advice and assistance in the production of those two films. Therefore, I do not 
want to miss thanking you for the opportunity. 
The production of a film is a large task and requires resolving several details: 
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1. The plot 
2. Is it to be made as a play or a film? 
3. Acting 
4. Will it be done elaborately or frugally? 
5. Are there any aims for screenings in foreign countries, or not? For example.112 
 
Rat also suggested a meeting to discuss the plans further. At that time, Phibun was Prime 
Minister, with Sarit’s coup still eight months away. By the time of the 1958 World’s Fair in 
Brussels, the government would once again hope to showcase Thai culture through film.  
When the Brussels World’s Fair opened on 17 April 1958, the ideological stakes of the 
event were made clear by the adjacent positions of the United States and Soviet Union pavilions. 
Although they were just two of the fifty national pavilions and eight international exhibits 
showcased at the fair, their central position highlighted the importance of cultural diplomacy in 
the conflict between the two nations.113 The use of cultural diplomacy came to prominence as 
psychological warfare emerged as an important component of President Eisenhower and John 
Foster Dulles’ “New Look” strategy after 1955. In part, this strategy was adopted with the 
acknowledgement that the use of force (and resulting casualties) to combat the Soviet Union was 
not a politically feasible option.114 Cold War and military historian John Lewis Gaddis argued 
that for the Eisenhower administration, psychological warfare “meant simply a robust faith in the 
efficacy of public posture: The belief that by merely making pronouncements and striking poses, 
the United States could increase the difficulties under which its adversaries operated.”115 
Psychological warfare specifically, and cultural diplomacy broadly, were related exercises aimed 
at the destabilization of Communist Party-led governments and an important strategy in 
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preventing communism from spreading into vulnerable areas like Thailand. It was in this 
atmosphere that the 1958 World’s Fair commenced. 
 For the Thai government, the world’s fair represented an important demonstration of Thai 
culture, sophistication, and its position in the world order. As the Siam Nikon newspaper 
reported, the Thai Office of the Prime Minister had proposed Thailand’s participation in the fair 
in order to “promote the art and reputation of the country.”116 The approach had historical 
precedent. Historian Thongchai Winichakul has discussed how the Siamese elite used the 
world’s fairs in the beginning of the twentieth century, writing that, “They believed that their 
participation in those major fairs would increase their recognition and elevate their status in the 
eyes of the world. Yet they appropriated exhibitions, museums and the World’s Fairs in the ways 
they understood them and saw their benefits.”117 This attitude was likewise evident in the 1958 
fair. As one reporter related,  
I came across a picture of a Thai temple that was prominently placed and adjacent with a 
picture of a Russian building on the left side and American on the right. And the poster 
didn’t cut the picture of the Thai temple at all. It shows that a picture of a tiny Thai 
temple in little country that nobody knows can be praised in importance alongside 
buildings of Russian and the United States.118 
 
But Thailand’s position in 1958 was different from the one faced by Siamese 
governments at the turn of the century. With colonialism on the wane and the new Cold War 
order emerging, the Thai government saw opportunities for international alliances that were 
mutually beneficial. Certainly, by 1958 Thailand had firmly allied itself with the United States, 
on the side of capitalist democracies in the fight against international communism. At the start of 
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the World’s Fair in April 1958, Sarit had already staged a successful coup against Phibun, an 
action that ultimately strengthened the relationship between the Thai and US governments.119  
Press coverage in Thailand of the fair increased in the lead-up to “Thailand Day,” on 
September 10th. The Thai exhibition featured a large sala, which was becoming an architectural 
symbol of Thai culture during this period. In 1967, for example, King Bhumibol dedicated a sala 
at the East-West Center in Hawaii. Yet it also asserted a traditional image of Thai culture, and 
became intricately connected to tourist images of Thai aesthetic and religious life. Aside from 
the architectural exhibit, the government also sent two films for showing, Thailand and Niw 
Petch (The Diamond Finger), both produced by Rat. The film screening held within the Thai 
exhibit exemplified the priorities of the new regime.120 The combined features of the Thai 
exhibit, with a traditional sala, the tourist-oriented Thailand, display of traditional Thai dance 
and folklore in The Diamond Finger, and attendance of the king and queen reveal the combined 
force of Thailand’s modern image. These features are all apparent in Thailand’s contemporary 
tourist promotions and official attempts at image control. These were evident from the 1950s 
onwards, and the Brussels World’s Fair acted as Thailand’s big coming out. 
 Today, Rat is best known for his commercial work. But in 1958, he undertook three 
documentary films that were produced by the Ministry of Fine Arts. The films, titled Thamachak 
(The Wheel of Dharma), Thailand, and Niw petch (The Diamond Finger), explored different 
aspects of Thailand’s cultural heritage. Thamachak, for example, explored symbolic 
representations of dhamma in historical wheel carvings. Thailand was a tourist-oriented film 
promoting cultural and historic sites in the nation. Although Rat is often remembered by 
historians of cinema in Thailand for his criticisms of the government, he also worked extensively 
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with government projects. 
 The Diamond Finger, like the other two films, was a collaboration between Rat’s 
Hanuman Film studio and the Department of Fine Arts. The film employed forty-four of the 
nation’s best classical dancers to depict a story from the Ramakian. The drama was accompanied 
by classical Thai ensemble music, with both music and narration kept minimal in order to 
highlight the dancing.121 The film depicted the story of Nontook, a small god working at the foot 
of Khao Krailat. His job is to wash the feet of the greater gods before they ascend the mountain 
to pay homage to Phra Isuan. But the gods tease Nontook and abuse him, causing him to seek 
revenge. He asks for a blessing from Phra Isuan, who granted him a diamond finger with the 
power of death. Whenever Nontook points the finger at anyone, it causes them to die. But 
Nontook uses it to terrorize the gods, and kills a number of them. To stop him, Phra Narayan 
disguises himself as a young female dancer, and asks Nontook to dance alongside him. As 
Nontook mimic’s his movements, Phra Narayan points to his knee. Nontook, doing the same, 
accidentally kills himself. 
 The film was narrated in English by Kukrit Pramoj, a prominent scholar and politician 
who would go on to play Thailand’s Prime Minister in the 1963 Hollywood film, The Ugly 
American, and become the actual Prime Minister from 1975 to 1976. Kukrit’s great interest in 
khon drama likely inspired his participation. Indeed, his Siam Rath Weekly Review put out an 
extensive issue on the production, including extensive praise for the project’s support for khon.122 
The English narrative is the most obvious indication that the film was intended to showcase 
Thailand’s art and culture to international audiences. One newspaper critique commented 
favorably that, “I know that one manager of a very large Western company went so far as to 
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circulate a notice to the authorities that every Westerner in the company should go to see the 
film. It was art so pure as to be comprehensible no matter what your nationality or language.”123 
Referring to both Thailand and The Diamond Finger, another newspaper, Phuean Ban, put it 
thus: 
Regarding these films, normally Westerners come to Thailand to make films in our 
country. They choose what to film and follow the Western vision… for example trash or 
a shabby house. But this film that we have made ourselves is because we want to give let 
them see the truth of what we have, Mr. Rat Pettanyi of Hanuman Films. These films 
perhaps are not so peculiar or special in the eyes of Thai people, because we see things in 
them everyday. But when Westerners see, they will want to see Thailand, want to see the 
real image.124 
 
 Before the film was eventually released domestically, Kukrit wrote a review, saying that, 
“It has been mentioned already that the film The Diamond Finger is comparable to an export, 
produced for foreign customers. The film circulated extensively around the globe, playing at 
international film festivals, such as in Berlin and San Francisco.125 That the film is now 
introduced to show in Thailand is to test whether domestic customers like this new production or 
not.”126 The film did indeed show for one screening in Bangkok.127 In November 1958, the 
Department of Fine Arts requested that both The Diamond Finger and Thailand be aired on 
television, so that more Thai would have the opportunity to see them. They also suggest that 
showing the films would “promote (song soerm) the art and culture (watthanatham) of the Thai 
people.”128 However, the Arts Department declined. The primary reason was that they were not 
in possession of the actual films, since they were being shown in the United States.  
 The department also cautioned that the films were inappropriate for television, since they 
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were best seen in color (rather than TV’s black and white). In other words, the films needed 
better technology to be fully appreciated. Furthermore, according to the department, “The 
department created these films according to the tastes (rot niyom) of Europeans and Americans 
and to show in Europe and American in particular. Were the films to be shown on television, 
which is mostly watched by Thais, it might not receive favor from Thais, because their tastes are 
different.”129 Instead, the department suggested that Public Relations hire the dancers directly. 
The comment revealed a high degree of consciousness regarding the tastes of different 
audiences. Even as Hollywood films dominated domestic cinemas, the department nonetheless 
presumed that Thai tastes were distinct from Western ones. 
 Many of Thailand’s prominent cultural and political figures were present at the screening 
of The Diamond Finger at the Brussels exhibition. Thanom Kittikachorn, for example, attended 
with his wife. But none was so significant as King Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit. The king’s 
presence in the government exhibition was notable, considering that just the previous year he had 
chosen not to attend celebrations for the Twenty-Fifth Centennial Buddhist Celebrations, 
apparently to demonstrate his “annoyance” at Phibun.130 Indeed, the initial period after King 
Bhumibol’s ordination has been marked by tension with Phibun’s government. The biography of 
the king, A Life’s Work, reported that:  
“The king now speaks with some bitterness about the early years of his reign, though 
without mentioning names,” Barbara Crossette of The New York Times reported in a 
lengthy profile in 1989. “When I’d open my mouth and suggest something, they’d say: 
‘Your Majesty, you don’t know anything,” the king recalls. “So I shut my mouth. I know 
things, but I shut my mouth. They don’t want me to speak, so I don’t speak.”131 
 
 Bhumibol’s public role and visibility did increase despite the tension with Phibun. His 
                                                
129 NAศธ 0701.9.5.1/98 [2] 
130 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Despotic Paternalism, 205. 
131 Nicholas Grossman, ed., King Bhumibol Adulyadej: A Life’s Work: Thailand’s Monarchy in Perspective 
(Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2011), 99. 
 56 
coronation and marriage were filmed by M.C. Sukarawannadis Diskul, formerly of the Royal 
State Railways Film unit, and shown at cinemas throughout the country. Shortly after, His 
Majesty’s Private Film Unit was established to document royal activities. When King Bhumibol 
ordained as a monk, the ceremony was captured for USIS cameras. The resulting film, The 
Ordination of the King of Thailand (Phrabatsomdet phrajaoyuhua sadet ok phanuat) entered into 
the regular circulation of USIS films. Even as the king withheld public shows of cooperation 
with Phibun, the monarchy found other ways to promote the institution. 
 The association between the king, queen and film would develop further over subsequent 
decades. For a least three years, from 1964 to 1966, King Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit presided 
over the Tukata thong film awards, the first major annual film awards in Thailand. The pair were 
seated at the front of the awards area and personally handed out the awards, much as they did 
with university degrees. Between 1954 and 1976, the pair saw some ninety-one films, both Thai 
and Western. The Thai films included Rat’s Santi-Vina (1954) and Phrae dam (Black Silk) 
(1961), as well as other hits like Ruen phae (House Boat) (1961), Nguen, Nguen, Nguen (Money, 
Money, Money) (1965), and Mae nak phra khanong (1970). After the last appearance at the Sala 
Chaloem Thai theater to see Phaen din khong rao (Our Land) in 1976, it appears that the next 
film that the king and queen publicly attended was 2001’s Suriyothai.132  
 More broadly, King Bhumibol also became more and more involved in public projects, 
especially development initiatives aimed at improving livelihoods and modernizing the country. 
In 1955, he and Queen Sirikit became the first Chakri monarchs to visit Isan in a 19-day tour by 
road and rail.133 Apparently the king’s popularity during this trip greatly alarmed Phibun.134 
Bhumibol’s prominence in promoting the developmental agenda and his visits to Isan would 
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grow with the government of Sarit Thanarat, who overthrew Phibun in the 1957 coup. As Thak 
Chaloemtiarana explained, 
 The Sarit Coup Group also had little historical basis for legitimacy compared with 
the leaders of the 1932 Revolution, whose claim to power rested on constitutionalism and 
their role in overthrowing absolute monarchy…. Sensing the instability of its own 
foundation, the Sarit clique turned to the throne for support and legitimacy…. Sarit 
proclaimed to the press and public that his position was legal because the king had given 
his approval and had presented Sarit with a document, which was immediately displayed. 
Thus in 1957, the monarchy had the function of legitimizing a new political leadership. 
 As a result, the development of the monarchy as a political institution saw rapid 
progress after 1957. The Sarit regime made conscious efforts to give the king more 
exposure domestically and internationally. As the prestige of the king increased, the 
government’s popularity grew. Under Sarit’s leadership, elaborate tours of the country 
and foreign countries were arranged for representatives of the monarchy, traditional 
ceremonies were revived, the national day was changed to coincide with the king’s 
birthday, and the royal family was encouraged to participate in military affairs.135  
 
Thus, the monarchy as a symbol increased in significance, with the ability to confer legitimacy 
and respect.   
 Even the selection of a story from the Ramakian was deeply connected to the institution 
of the monarchy. The standard version of the Ramakian is the one written by the founder of the 
Chakri dynasty, King Pra Phutthayotfachulalok (1782-1809), or Rama I, in 1785. His revival of 
the Ramakian, after previous written versions were destroyed during the Burmese sack of 
Ayutthaya in 1767, was part of his efforts to resuscitate the royal institution and confer 
legitimacy on the new dynasty. His son and successor, Rama II (1809-1824) created a shortened 
version more appropriate for stage performance, not dissimilar to the khon performed in The 
Diamond Finger.136 It was Vajiravudh who drew on the story to take the name Rama to refer to 
the kings of the dynasty. Thus, when the story was performed in The Diamond Finger, it would 
have immediately recalled the tradition and prestige of the royal institution.  
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 With the figures of King Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit, moreover, the monarchy cast an 
aura of prestige and sophistication. This was true both domestically and internationally. Thak 
explained,  
To play down the ‘vulgarity’ of his regime, Sarit turned to the king for help. The king had 
been brought up in Europe since childhood and spoke many languages. He also had a 
very attractive queen who was well-adjusted to the ways of the West. To enhance the 
prestige of the country and the government, Sarit therefore arranged elaborate visits for 
the royal couple.”137  
 
The sophistication of the royal pair was also enhanced through bodily practice and their social 
prestige. As Peleggi observed, 
In 1960, with Sarit’s encouragement, the Thai royals undertook a tour of Europe and the 
USA, during which Queen Sirikit wore fashionable two-piece dresses to match King 
[Bhumibol’s] suits (which he alternated with dress uniforms). As a result, an image of 
Thailand’s royals as modern and cosmopolitan, emphasized by their encounters not only 
with monarchs and heads of state but also with pop idols such as Benny Goodman and 
Elvis Presley, was projected on the international stage.138 
 
Particularly in comparison to Sarit, who was viewed as a rough military man and did not speak 
English very well, the king and queen presented a sophisticated face to the world.139 However, 
their image was not only due to their position as royalty. It was also because of their sartorial 
navigation of international and domestic cultural politics. 
 At home in Thailand, King Bhumibol tended to wear a full uniform, as befitted his status 
as Head of the Thai Armed Forces (Chom thap thai). It drew on a tradition begun under King 
Mongkut, who imitated the military fashions of nineteenth century European rulers in his 
adoption of military uniform.140 Even on Bhumibol’s first visit to Thailand with his brother, King 
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Ananda, in 1938, he and his brother wore military dress.141 Queen Sirikit, on the other hand, 
wore what was coming to be “traditional” Thai dress, including the ankle-length (phasin).142 
Here promotion of national dress emphasized the link between female dress and nationalism, all 
the more so with her status as the “mother” of the nation. Her connection with traditional 
costumes and the production of Thai textiles would grow in the following decades, and indeed 
would become a major component of her public works and image.  
 Thus, the exhibition of The Diamond Finger and the arrival of the king and queen was 
situated within a broader display of Thai national identity. Royal symbolism was prominent. 
Thailand’s display, for example, included royal paraphernalia, including royal costumes.143 The 
use of royal imagery, however, was not received without complaint. A journalist with Satri San 
criticized the royal photograph displays, writing that they were not appropriate to the dignity of 
the crown. The reason was that in the painted photograph, the king’s hair was slightly unkempt, 
unlike in the photograph that it was based on.144 Regardless, the king and queen imparted 
significant legitimacy to the event, and domestically to the Sarit government, when they attended 
the fair and screening of The Diamond Finger. With King Bhumibol in fashionable evening 
wear, a double-breasted, wide shouldered white evening jacket, and Queen Sirikit in a formal, 
off-the-shoulders black evening dress, the pair appeared comfortably in images of 1950s 
international social sophistication.  
 The king and queen were thus part of gendered patterns of national representation at 
home and abroad. This was most clearly evident with Queen Sirikit, who drew a great deal of 
attention with her sartorial choices. During the 1960 royal world tour, she was seen as blending 
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“old and new” styles to showcase the best of Thai modern dress.145 Furthermore, it was largely 
from this point that Sirikit led changes to feminine national dress that drew on notions of national 
tradition and heritage. As historian of Thailand Matthew Phillips quoted from the queen’s own 
reflections on the trip, 
…prior to the world tour, there was ‘no typical national dress code like our neighbouring 
countries, whose native costumes have become well known world-wide, for example, the 
Indians with their saris, the Chinese with their silk gowns, and the Japanese with their 
Kimonos’. To prepare for the world tour she had therefore ordered for a ‘search to be 
made in royal palaces, or noble homes for photographs and portraits of former queens’, 
so she could study their dress practices, particularly when they were accompanying the 
King on official visits. But they had found that during the colonial era, queens would 
generally mix the Western styles with Thai ones, or in some cases would wear Western 
dress. For her, she explained, this ‘would not be appropriate, and the Western news media 
would criticize the strange look of our half-Western, half-Thai national dress’. 
Consequently, after a careful study of pre-colonial dress styles, a new set of costumes 
were created which could be considered uniquely Thai.146 
 
While a national costume was likewise developed for men, it received far less notice. 
Significantly, the use of military dress, clearly derived from Western traditions, was not looked 
upon as problematic in the way that a woman wearing Western dress was. The emphasis on 
national costume was mainly about female costume.  
 During the world tour, the king and queen visited the United States. The visit was 
symbolic of the developing ties between the two countries, and foreshadowed the role of the US 
in promoting the image of the monarchy. As The New York Times observed, “The United States 
feels that no matter what happens, Thailand’s King Bhumibol Adulyadej can unify the country… 
The United States has helped distribute hundreds of thousands of coloured pictures of the king 
throughout the country.”147 The entire trip, from Bangkok to the White House, was captured by 
the United States Information Agency (USIA) on three reels of Eastman Color-produced film 
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stock. The film, titled A Sentimental Journey, depicted the effusive and friendly reception of the 
royal family by the American people. That the entire affair was filmed indicated another crucial 
development, namely the use of mass media entertainment to promote carefully cultivated 
images of national figures and Thailand’s position in the world.  
 The king and queen’s visit to the US involved a whirlwind tour, including tours of a 
nuclear-powered submarine in Hawaii and a Hollywood film set in Los Angeles, where he met 
Lucille Ball and Bob Hope. On 28 June 1960, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower welcomed 
King Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit at the Washington National Airport. The film emphasized 
Bhumibol’s birth in Cambridge, Massachusetts, while his father studied at Harvard University, to 
show the monarchy personal ties to the United States. In a speech at the White House, King 
Bhumibol expressed his affection for the United States, saying, “I was born here in this country, 
so I can say that the United States is half my motherland. This visit is somewhat of a sentimental 
journey, and this I feel with quite genuine emotion in coming back here. I say ‘coming back 
here.’ I never say ‘come’ or ‘go’ to the United States. I say return to the United States. All that 
emotion gives me the conviction that our visit here will be of great use for the strengthening and 
reinforcement of the bonds of friendship which have existed for a long time already between the 
United States and my country.”148  
 The film went on to highlight other key aspects of the new royal image and Bhumibol’s 
role as the supreme representative of the Thai nation. In various speeches in Washington, the 
king emphasized Thailand’s aim to modernize and eventually become independent of American 
aid. He visited the United Nations headquarters in New York, where he used Buddhist teachings 
to discuss the need for international cooperation. From there he visited his birth hospital in 
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Cambridge, before heading to the Tennessee Valley Authority to examine their system of dams. 
King Bhumibol would make dams and hydroelectricity a major aspect of his development 
program for Thailand and especially for the Northeast. In Colorado, Bhumibol met with officers 
from the United States Air Force Academy for a defense briefing. In all respects, the film 
showed the US and Thailand as partners in development, international cooperation, and the 
military fight against communism. King Bhumibol was portrayed as integral to that effort. 
Moreover, in showing the film in Thailand, the USIA, via the USIS, undoubtedly hoped that the 
reverence for the monarch would provide legitimacy for their own programs. 
 By the time the film was used by USIS, the dynamics of psychological operations and 
propaganda in Thailand were already shifting. With new emphasis on development programs and 
national modernization, mass audiences and especially provincial audiences mattered 
significantly more. These audiences were still not politically powerful, at least not in electoral 
terms. But the imperatives of national development and discourses of national progress and unity 
meant that provincial populations warranted consideration nonetheless. In these respects, King 
Bhumibol and the monarchy network was an important symbolic ally. In the next chapter, I will 
discuss how these programs developed through the mobile film units under the Thai government 
and USIS during the 1960s.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
COLD FIRE: MOBILE INFORMATION AND THE THAI VILLAGE 
In 1965 the USIS-produced Cold Fire (Fai Yen), the first commercial film made by USIS 
for the Thai market.149 Cold Fire was an anti-communist film set in a Northeastern village.150 The 
film focused on one small, poor village in northeastern Thailand. The film opens by telling 
viewers that the story is based on true events that occurred in the Northeast of Thailand (phak 
tawan ok chiang nuea khong prathet thai). The use of the long and clumsy “Northeast of 
Thailand,” rather than its colloquial name, Isan, clearly situated the region and the village within 
the cultural orbit of the Thai nation and political sphere of Bangkok. The village setting itself, 
being fictional and without a more specific geographic location, was meant to represent any 
Northeastern village. The USIS clearly intended the fictional village to be recognizable by Isan 
audiences as similar to their own.  
Despite that, the village in Cold Fire was also an idealized one, imagined from the 
perspectives of those in Washington D.C. and Bangkok. In the imagined village, all the villagers 
knew their place. The most respected man in the village was the school headmaster, Phon. 
Villagers came to him for advice on a range of problems, from issues with livestock to sick 
babies. Phon worked very hard for the village, including with new community development 
projects led by the Thai government and supported by the United States. However, he worried 
about the communist soldiers that were active in the area. The communists were spreading 
propaganda that the government projects were really for military transport and to increase 
taxation. Phon feared that the communists would destroy everything dear to the Thai nation, 
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especially Thailand’s religious culture and reverence for the monarchy.  
 Meanwhile, Bun Nam, a village youth, was confused about his future. While he professed 
to love his nation (rak chat), he despaired over the poverty in the village and saw no way out for 
himself. Bun Nam’s confusion was compounded by his love for Phin, Phon’s daughter. He felt 
that he was too poor to ever marry her. One evening, when communists raided the village for 
food, Bun Nam joined them, hoping for a better life. However, he discovered that they were in 
fact dishonest murderers, with plans to kill Phon and the village monk. Bun Nam escaped from 
the communists, and warned the police of their plans. The police saved Phon just in time, and 
captured the communists. The police and Phon forgave Bun Nam, and he was reunited with Phin. 
Like the beginning, the film ended with the notice that “This film is based off true events in the 
Northeastern Region of Thailand!”  
The idea was the offspring of the USIS and Thai government in order to promote loyalty 
to the Thai government in provincial areas. It was also part of the massive psychological 
operations effort that began in the early Cold War period by the United States and Thailand. 
Psychological operations accompanied the large-scale provincial development and integration 
programs from the 1950s to 1970s. The programs signaled a wholly new relationship between 
Thai citizens and the government. With the support of the US, the Thai government sought to 
physically and economically integrate the periphery to the center in Bangkok through 
transportation infrastructure, such as the Mittraphap Highway between Bangkok and the 
northeast, as well as extensive community development, economic aid, and health programs. 
While those programs linked citizens physically to Bangkok, national modernization was also 
contingent on the psychological integration of all citizens in Thailand. Isan was an important site 
in this effort, particularly because, unlike the largely docile villagers in Cold Fire, Isan was 
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historically a site of resistance and source of critical politicians.151   
From the mid-1950s onwards, the extensive psychological operations in Thailand echoed 
similar efforts elsewhere on the frontiers of the global Cold War. Indeed, psychological 
operations were an integral part of Thailand’s entry into the American-led international order. 
The US and Thai militaries as well as the CIA conducted extensive operations throughout the 
country. However, from the 1960s to the 1970s the USIS conducted comparatively more 
significant programs in Thailand that were formative to the development of government-village 
relations. The USIS program in Thailand was one of the largest in the world, in part because 
Thailand cooperated extensively with the projects.152 With Thailand’s newfound role as 
America’s closest ally in Southeast Asia, the country and its people became important sites of 
ideological contestation. However, US support for Thai authoritarian military governments 
demonstrated the tensions between rhetoric advocating democracy and socio-economic mobility, 
on the one hand, and the interests of the Thai political and social elite, on the other. Thailand 
provides a unique case study for how the operation of US objectives interacted with regional and 
local interests in the context of the Cold War. These interactions resulted in the creation of a 
modern Thai national identity that, for the first time, was mapped onto the mass body of Thai 
citizens.  
 A major program undertaken by the USIS, in cooperation with the Thai government, was 
the Mobile Team program. The teams were comprised of one USIS officer, Thai civil servants, 
politicians, and, eventually, doctors and midwives. Travelling to far-flung and tiny villages, 
usually in Isan, the team would talk with village leaders, assess the needs of the village, and 
provide medical care. In the evenings, they put on a film show.  
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 Film was a critical medium through which the two governments worked. One 1960 US 
government study, for example, highlighted why film became a favorite medium in Thailand.   
Under ordinary circumstances motion pictures lead all media in effectiveness. Keenness 
for motion pictures is universal in Thailand; in the words of a Thai graduate student in the 
United States, ‘If we didn’t like the movies, we wouldn’t be Thai.’ This is substantiated 
by practical experiences. In 1954-1956, by request of the Thai Government, USIS 
Thailand cooperated in a psychological indoctrination program carried to the village 
level. The media tested included speeches, posters, pamphlets, leaflets, and movies; and 
of these, movies had the greatest impact. Since the Thai expect movies to be 
entertainment, it is not known whether they would respond to direct appeals presented by 
this medium; however, movies would supply a ready-made audience and might also be 
useful in creating good will.153 
 
This analysis predicted aspects of the mobile team films shows, which often drew thousands of 
viewers from surrounding villages, and sometimes even from across the Mekhong River in Laos. 
The films, most of them short documentaries, featured government development efforts, 
community projects, royal activities, and cultural affairs. Villagers were invited to imagine 
themselves as members of a developing nation, working together to build the national 
community. For many, it was the first time that they saw the king or the prime minister, or even a 
film.  
The mobile program and the film screenings reinforced the nationalist and developmental 
agenda of the central government. Sarit forcefully advocated for Thailand’s development 
(patthana), and in so doing created a civilizational discourse that bound Thailand’s position in 
the global order to its ability to develop the country’s economy and infrastructure. Sarit also 
adopted the concepts originally promoted by King Vajiravudh of “nation, religion, monarchy” as 
the pillars of a Thai identity, but Sarit added the military as defenders of this trinity. In 
advocating images of national identity, moreover, films like Cold Fire, produced gendered forms 
of participation in the national community. Men like Bun Nam were potential leaders in 
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modernization efforts, but also threatening in the potential as communists. Women like Phin 
could never be communists, and were the bearers of social values and cultural tradition. 
However, the productive nature of the programs worked in two directions. The focus on 
provincial audiences was made possible by the specific dynamics of Cold War ideologies and the 
decision by the Thanom and Sarit governments to pursue relations with the US. With the global 
fight against communist, the village became a major site of Cold War contestation. These 
circumstances meant that, in the midst of authoritarian rule and absence of electoral freedoms, 
the Thai masses nonetheless took on immense importance in national discourses of development, 
progress, and civilization.  Villager loyalties, and the potential for the loss of loyalties to the 
communists, suddenly mattered in concrete terms. Even as these audiences had little political 
power, they assumed importance as sites of contestation between “Thai” national identity and 
communist subversion.  
The programs also opened up new spaces for public participation and expressions of 
needs. As with the sympathetic portrayal of Bun Nam’s conflict, the members of the mobile 
teams recognized, often uncomfortably, the fact that communists spoke to real village needs and 
frustrations. While early government efforts focused on spreading information, they also resulted 
in additional development and aid programs, thereby impacting the material lives of rural Thais. 
Programs like the mobile teams dramatically expanded the modern role of the central 
government in providing for common Thais across the nation.  
In key respects, Thailand during the 1950s to 1970s was part of what political scientist 
Peter Katzenstein termed the “American Imperium.” Specifically, the American Imperium was 
based on the formation of both territorial and non-territorial power. The containment of 
communism was not simply a matter of geographical containment or economic, diplomatic, or 
 68 
military policy. A people’s way of life, culture, and “civilizational values” become key to Cold 
War conceptions of security.154 Moreover, the conception highlights America both as an actor, 
but also part of an American “system of rule in world politics.”155  The system of US rule as well 
as the territorial and non-territorial dimensions of power in Thailand, and Southeast Asia more 
generally, has been under-theorized. Only rarely, moreover, do cultural studies intersect with 
military, economic, or developmental studies, except through passing observations.156  
In Thailand, military bases were linked to the development of infrastructure, especially 
roads, which then enabled easier transportation and exchange of communications, including 
films. Their development reflected the underlying logic of the American Imperium: that 
increasing the access of American entities to the resources and populations of developing 
countries was of greater significance than seeking direct political control over them.157 American 
film studios were some of the most significant transnational corporations that were central in the 
spread of non-territorial US power.158 A key element of this chapter is to show how those 
processes were intertwined. Due to the fact that military bases and economic aid have largely 
shaped analyses of the American intervention, moreover, taking the circulation and production of 
film seriously highlights the non-territorial dimensions of the system that drove modern Thai 
social, cultural, and political development. 
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It is also instructive of another key aim, namely to situate the changes occurring across 
Thailand firmly within an international, rather than strictly domestic, context. At the same time 
that I wish to emphasize the necessary role of domestic politics in the broader American-Thai 
relationship, internal dynamics alone provides an insufficient explanation of cultural and social 
shifts. My argument therefore emphasizes the layered and negotiated nature of changes taking 
place. To use Katzenstein’s phrasing for Japan, Thailand’s experience was “distinctive” but not 
“unique.”159  
This approach informs my perspective on the system of cinema in Thailand from the 
1950s to the 1970s. Cinema was a critical tool in the construction of a Cold War consensus by 
both the United States and the Soviet Union from the 1945 through 1990. Since the Cold War 
threat was often more existential than real, films were part of a necessary campaign to make the 
conflict imaginable to the masses.160 The communist party in Thailand was never strong enough 
to threaten Thailand’s structure (whether political, economic, or social). While the war in 
Vietnam, (and later the spread of that conflict into Cambodia and Laos) concerned the Thai 
government, such threats reached their apogee in 1975, by which point Thailand had already 
negotiated a withdrawal of American forces. For the bulk of the American period, the threat was 
stronger in the mind’s eye than in reality. The psychological threat was in large part the result of 
extended and pervasive psychological operations and propaganda by the Thai and US 
governments. 
A hard line, negative approach characterized American anti-communist propaganda from 
1946 to 1953. However, from 1953 through to 1978, the US led the way in pivoting to a softer 
propaganda line, which sought to portray the positive aspects of capitalist, democratic societies 
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as exemplified by American life. This pivot coincided with greater American intervention in 
Thailand, and was combined with idealized depictions of cultural and religious (meaning 
Buddhist) traditions. Changes in infrastructure networks and cinematic technologies that allowed 
for movies to be shown at minimal expense to villagers in remote villages expanded the reach of 
the state into the social lives of citizens. Similar patterns characterized US cultural diplomacy 
that was a major factor in US geopolitical power in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. United 
States Information Agency (USIA) and USIS propaganda, including film, radio, and printed 
materials, positively promoted US interests in Southeast Asia and helped build networks with 
local actors.161  
As the 1960 study noted, film was well suited to depict the positive aspects of capitalist 
society and development programs. Jack Valenti, the president of the Motion Picture Association 
of America (MPAA), commented in 1977 that “We dominate world screens not because of 
armies, bayonets, or nuclear bombs, but because what we are exhibiting on foreign screens is 
what the people of those countries want to see.”162 Of course, it also allowed the people to see 
what the MPAA wanted them to see. Films featuring developing cities or infrastructure projects 
meant that people could imagine a future where progress would come to them. It also created 
expectations of what the government would and should achieve. 
Indeed, the film units intentionally took a positive tone. They combatted communist 
influences by portraying the positive features of Thai culture, society, and American-backed 
development. As such, it had a productive impact on depictions of Thai society and culture. The 
American Cold War articulation of culture emphasized it as both a “way of life” and as a “range 
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of productions,” not least of which was film. In this way, cultural programs and products were 
critical to shaping millions of people’s experiences and perceptions of the conflict.163 Likewise, 
social and cultural products, such as film, shaped how state efforts were communicated to Thai 
people and defined the stakes of the conflict. Criticisms of economic inequality and social 
hierarchy, for example, were transformed into attacks on the fabric of Thai society and heritage. 
Utilizing the conception of the American Imperium, moreover, situates Thailand within 
international dynamics, and avoids an over-determination of American-Thai relations. Thailand 
was not alone in experiencing a deluge of American cultural products. Victoria de Grazia wrote 
extensively on the global American “Market Empire,” which she described as “the rise of a great 
imperium with the outlook of a great emporium” in the second half of the twentieth century. In 
Europe, de Grazia argued that American-introduced mass consumption:  
…did far more than step into the gaps created by the failed diplomacy, military 
overreach, and travailed liberalism of the European great powers, failures that are well 
known. It also established an alternative to the foundering effort of European societies, 
both to satisfy their own citizens’ mounting demands for a decent level of living and, 
building on the legacy of earlier revolutionary traditions, to champion such a standard for 
the larger world.164 
 
Portrayals of American material prosperity, and the promise of the same, were remarkably 
effective not only in Thailand, but in diverse settings across the world. However, because the 
role of the state in Thailand was arguably less developed than in Europe and because the growth 
of modern commercial markets much more rapid, it provides an important case to examine the 
role of psychological operations and national identity in Cold War era development, nationalism, 
and international relations.  
 However, the visits by USIS mobile information units to Isan villages were also 
predicated on dynamics of central-periphery social and political relationships in Thailand that 
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had evolved since the nineteenth century.165 Siamese civilizational discourse was established 
through a sort of proto-ethnography conducted through nineteenth royal travel throughout the 
Siamese kingdom, especially by King Chulalongkorn.166 The travelogues and stories published 
after these journeys produced an “ethno-spatial discourse” of the Thai elite that regulated the 
social, political, and special hierarchy of Thailand from the lowest chao pa (wild forest people) 
to chao bannok (villagers/peasants) to chao krung (city people) to farang (Westerners).  
 Thongchai defined chao bannok, the category with which the mobile teams were most 
concerned, as “the multi-ethnic villagers under the supremacy of Bangkok.”167 He argued that the 
designations placed the urban Bangkok elite in a superior position, but were also part of a 
“temporalizing practice, locating and juxtaposing peoples, including the elite themselves, in a 
new linear (progressive, temporal) cosmic order called civilization.”168 While the chao pa were 
characterized as wild, frozen in time, and incapable of civilization, the chao bannok were 
portrayed as the familiar subjects of the Bangkok elite—civilizable, but also less advanced.169  
 The same hierarchy perception was evident in the movement of information during the 
1950s-1970s period. The mobile information teams treated villagers as subjects caught in the 
past. Teams commonly highlighted their reliance on “traditional” lifestyles and the backwardness 
of their standards of living. They focused on the villagers’ astonishment at modern technologies 
such as cars and motion pictures. However, the teams also expressed the desire to bring the 
villagers forward in time to become developed subjects in the modern Thai nation. That desire 
signaled an important shift in the core-periphery relationship, even as it was tempered by social 
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and political hierarchies. Indeed, the entire premise of the anti-communist propaganda was that, 
one day, the villagers would have the same lifestyle as those in Bangkok or, even better, in 
America. In terms of development and material prosperity, chao bannok were, at least in the 
propaganda, placed on the temporal path not only to chao krung, but also to farang. 
 However, as the opening to Cold Fire indicates, the villagers also held another identity 
within national frameworks as “northeastern Thais.” The political and cultural position of the 
peoples living in “northeastern Thailand,” or the locally favored term Isan, has long been 
contested. In terms of population, 1960s Isan accounted for nine million of Thailand’s 
approximately 26.3 million citizens, making it the most populous region in the nation. 
Geographically, the region is defined by the Khorat Plateau and drainage into the Mekhong 
River. The river also forms the region’s (and Thailand’s) modern (after the 1893 and 1904 
treaties with France) boundary with Laos.170 Meanwhile, the Phetchabun, Dong Phaya Yen, and 
Sankamphaeng mountain ranges separate Isan from the central plains.  
The division of the Khorat Plateau area along the river, rather than based on ethnic or 
cultural grounds, resulted in the modern period in tensions between Lao and Thai identities for 
the people in Isan. Previous to the 1894 and 1904 divisions, these people were often called Lao, 
whether by Siamese, French, or by those living in the region. Indeed, the population was in large 
part there due to the deportation of the Vientiane population from Vientiane to the Khorat 
Plateau (as well as part of the central plains) following Chao Anu’s rebellion against Bangkok in 
the 1820s. The people shared more cultural practices in common with people in modern Laos, 
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and spoke Lao (rather than central Thai). In the latter half of the nineteenth century and early 
twentieth, the Isan region came under greater Siamese administrative control, especially with the 
formation of a national civil service and other reforms by King Chulalongkorn in the last years of 
his reign before his death in 1910. However, the region remained mostly autonomous and with 
few attempts by Bangkok to exert Siamese cultural models. Even the nationalization of the 
bureaucracy was only completed after the 1932 overthrow of the absolute monarchy.171 
Political centralization was only possible because of modern transportation and 
communication technologies, especially with the construction of railways between Isan and 
Bangkok that were completed in the 1920s and 1930s. During the reign of King Chulalongkorn, 
it took the Ministry of the Interior twelve days to send messages between Bangkok and 
Nongkhai.172 The changes to speed of travel and communication between Isan and Bangkok were 
critical to political reforms. The role of technological innovation in the changing relationship 
between Bangkok and Isan was similar to that found in the expansion of European empires.  
 Educational reforms also profoundly influenced Isan social and cultural life. Primary 
education was made compulsory throughout the nation with the Primary Education Act of 1921. 
Key effects of this reform were the replacement of monks with secular teachers, the expansion of 
educational opportunities for women, and the establishment of schools in even the most remote 
areas of the country. Isan schoolchildren learned national geography, central Thai language, and 
nationalist historical narratives. Moreover, because the national pillars of religion-nation-
monarchy were taught in schools, the new curriculum was instrumental in building respect for 
the Thai king. By the 1960s, reports from the MITs and USIS reports evidence that these 
reforms, from the establishment of secular educators as authority figures and nationalized 
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curriculum teaching loyalty to central Thai values and the Thai king, were successfully imbedded 
in Isan village life.  
 However, there were contradictions in the process of nationalization. Keyes pointed out 
that, 
The educational reforms, like the administrative reforms and the expansion of 
communication and transportation networks, served to bring Northeasterners into much 
closer contact with Central Thai culture and society and to make the Northeasterners 
aware that their future would be affected by the decisions in Bangkok. At the same time, 
these innovations also began to make Northeasterners realize that their local culture and 
patterns of living were considered inferior to those of Central Thai.173  
 
Thus, from the 1920-30s onwards, it is possible to trace the modern arc of both national and 
regional identity formation in Isan. From the 1950s, those tensions were made more complicated 
by the extensive presence of American troops, civil servants, and intelligence officers, amongst 
others, who were part of an emergent international “Thai” identity. Therefore, while efforts at 
building a national identity were significant, their impact cannot be assumed. Rather, the process 
of understanding their identity as Thais likely also made people in Isan reflect upon their position 
in the national hierarchy and their local identities. 
There were also wider forces at play. USIS began operations in Thailand beginning in 
1949, and by 1950 joint US-Thai propaganda had increased exponentially. The strengthening of 
US-Thai relations was part of US Cold War efforts to fight the spread of communism globally. 
With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the US felt the need for allies in Asia to bolster its 
legitimacy in the region. It also provided an opportunity for Phibun, who sought closer ties with 
the US, to demonstrate the Thai commitment to anti-communism. Historian Daniel Fineman 
argued that Phibun had personal reasons for pursuing the US alliance, explaining,  
Phibun aligned himself with the United States more to solidify his shaky position with the 
military junta than out of a desire to protect the country from communist China. By 
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siding with the United States, Phibun won for the military large commitments of weapons 
aid, and earned for himself the invaluable position as foreign aid rainmaker for the 
army.174 
 
The Thai-US alliance was solidified through key moves by Phibun’s government, namely 
recognition of the Bao Dai government in Vietnam and the commitment of Thai troops in Korea. 
The US gained legitimacy and, eventually, a staging ground for troops and equipment. Phibun’s 
government’s decisions made Thailand one of the US’ closest allies in Asia and simultaneously 
solidified the position of the military in Thai politics.175  
 The alliance paved the way for increased anti-communist propaganda and psychological 
operations. Intended to bolster support for Phibun’s government, the US alliance, and an anti-
communist agenda, the government produced news articles, pamphlets, posters, radio broadcasts, 
and films. Richard McCarthy, a USIS Public Affairs Officer recalled that by the late 1950s they 
“had managed to cover most of Thailand with two inches of paper.”176 One 1952 film titled 
Report from Korea, for example, was particularly successful. Voiced over in Thai, the film was 
tailor-made for Thai audiences. USIS surveyors noted the success of the film with pleasure, 
observing that, 
USIS is fortunate in the preference of Thai audiences for films dealing with warfare in all 
its aspects. This preference can be utilized filmwise to further a number of attitudes 
which USIS is attempting to encourage, i.e., that the United States and the non-
Communist world are strong; that the Communist threat is immediate; that the United 
States has been effectively and energetically fighting Communism in Korea; that the 
“Free World” is ready to protect Thailand militarily.177  
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In one of the follow-up interviews, a teacher from Lopburi reported that villagers enjoyed 
Korean War news because many residents had relatives serving there.178 Considering that the US 
presence in Asia would be characterized by military engagements for some time, Thai preference 
for war films was fortuitous indeed. The success of war films also benefited Phibun’s personal 
popularity and political clout. Because through press meetings and public announcements Phibun 
had been personally linked to the involvement of Thai soldiers in the conflict, he gained 
substantially from propaganda efforts. 
 The joint cooperation of the United States and Thai governments created an ideal 
laboratory for Cold War propaganda and psychological warfare. Since Thailand had never been 
formally colonized, the United States was able to work directly with military and royal elite 
without needing to consider the aims of a former European power.179 This also meant that 
Thailand’s elites were able to assert their own interests to a large degree. A major 1952 USIA 
study concluded that, “It is axiomatic that an information program in Thailand must work 
through official government channels. Such a program must not conflict with Thai government 
policies or with the vested interests of key officials if it is to be successful.”180 These same 
groups, namely “well educated, Westernized Thai (military officers, civil servants, businessmen, 
teachers, etc.)” as well as Buddhist monks represented the target groups for USIS propaganda in 
the early 1950s.181  Psychological warfare and propaganda were ostensibly aimed at fighting 
communist influence. In practice they promoted Thai national identity in the countryside.  
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 The 1952 study, for example, recommended highlighting “widely shared and least 
controversial” cultural “ideologies,” including national supremacy and sovereignty, reverence for 
the king, the dangers of communism, the need for development and innovation, and the 
importance of international respect, especially from the UN and US.182 This list evidences the use 
of propaganda to establish a hegemonic national identity, in addition to anti-communist 
sentiment. With the exception of Buddhism, the list characterizes the core elements of the “Thai” 
national identity as advocated by the successive military regimes, hand in hand with the United 
States. 
 On May 9th, 1950 the first mobile health and education units traveled around the 
northeastern provinces, equipped with motion picture projection equipment and USIS films.183 
The various elements that joint US-Thai propaganda would identify as quintessentially Thai and 
the technology needed to promote those elements had come together. The earliest trips to show 
films in distant villages were rough business. As Robert Anderson, a Vice Consul in Chiang Mai 
in 1951, explained, “I was my own USIS officer. My wife and I went out into the jungles with a 
projector…. We showed movies to people out in the countryside.”184 As with other USIS 
projects, the film program in its early incarnation targeted “special audiences” for psychological 
operations, especially educated and Westernized Thai, military officers, civil servants, 
businessmen, teachers, and Buddhist monks.185 
 As the amount of intelligence derived from these programs grew in quantity, the US 
quickly realized it needed a program to collect and analyze the data.186 In the mid-1950s, 
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therefore, the US State Department and USIS worked with the Thai government to develop a 
public opinion survey program. No effort of that kind had previously been attempted in Thailand. 
The early surveys focused on Thai mass media preferences, especially on how audiences 
consumed information and where they received their news. The first survey focused on educated 
elite audiences and their reactions to USIS media programs. More surveys were subsequently 
developed for key target groups, such as the 1958 survey of university student attitudes and 
media habits and a 1959 study of university student attitudes towards American mass media and 
commercial films.187 
 The studies of mass media effectiveness consistently found that motion pictures were the 
most effect medium amongst most target audiences.188 The study further estimated that for every 
ten Thais reading newspapers, at least one hundred were watching films.189 Film was also 
understood to be useful in communicating so-called difficult material to the common Thai. For 
example, USIA officials were concerned over how to communicate the term “disarmament,” 
since it was, in their estimates, “only crudely conceptualized by largely uneducated rural 
elements.”190 To address this segment, an official suggested that instead of the USIA putting on a 
“run-of-mill exhibit,” a “firsthand view [of] modern armaments and description[s] [of] their total 
destructive power” would be more appropriate. Furthermore, the official suggested the use of 
“colorful, mobile, imaginative material, particularly film.”191 
 The subjects of these early studies reflect the fact that through the 1950s both the Thai 
and US governments were primarily concerned with the activities and attitudes of a narrow slice 
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of Thai society, namely urbanized, educated Thais from elite, military, or religious backgrounds. 
After the 1951 “Silent Coup” (or “Radio Coup”), the military’s political dominance of Thai 
politics was solidified. Phibun was forced to accept the coup, and continued to act as Prime 
Minister, although his grasp on power was highly tenuous. With the elimination of the Senate, 
power was consolidated around the Bangkok military elite. There was little incentive for the US 
to focus their efforts on mass audiences, considering how little formal power they had. As a 1960 
study of psychological warfare in Thailand bluntly put it, “the focus was upon those special 
audiences most likely to be able to contribute to the accomplishments of U.S. aims and 
objectives in the event of war.”192 
Overall, efforts in the 1950s were fitful. They often depended on the consensus in 
Washington or who the US ambassador to Thailand was. The main restriction, however, was the 
chilling of US-Thai relations that lasted from 1955 to 1957. This was partially due to Phibun’s 
general suspicion of the dangers of “public opinion.” One USIS official, writing in 1958, claimed 
“the former [Phibun] government cast a jaundiced eye on any suggestion of surfacing public 
opinion, measuring, describing, and interpreting it. Of course, it would have been interested in 
the results of a survey, but there was trepidation lest the survey instrument might open a spigot 
that could not be turned off.”193 That observation highlights Phibun’s tenuous grasp on power by 
the mid-1950s, which also impacted on his attitude towards the United States. Fearful that US 
support was facilitating his rival Phao, Phibun began developing links with communist China 
and the Soviet Union. This included allowing films to be imported from communist countries. 
The US expressed its concern about this unexpected shift, with Walter Robertson, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Eastern Affairs, in 1957 asking the Thai ambassador to the US, Pote 
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Sarasin “why the Thai government has permitted the exhibition of Communist pictures, 
especially those from Communist China.”194  
 But ultimately the US need not have been concerned about Phibun’s policy, as by the end 
of the year he was overthrown in a coup by Sarit Thanarat. The US was initially pessimistic 
about the potential for a relationship with Sarit. His relationship with the USIS likewise got off 
to a bad start, apparently due to rumors that the USIS was conducting a smear campaign against 
him.195 For a time, this cause real problems for USIS operations. A 1959 USIS report detailed the 
difficulties of relations with Sarit: 
One of the single most significant changes in this past year has been USIS improved 
cooperation with the Thai Government. The Prime Minister’s suspicion of USIS… was 
not to be taken lightly. The Prime Minister went so far as to air his views to the 
Ambassador and made the cryptic remark that USIS in other countries had stirred up 
trouble and suffered mob violence as a result. That he was fully competent of taking 
action in such matters was evidenced when he expelled two Soviet information officials 
toward the end of the year for alleged unfriendly activity. Other factors contributed 
toward the situation and USIS found itself unpopular in certain important mass media and 
educational quarters. Since the former are operated directly by or influence specifically 
by government officials in most cases, and as education is almost entirely a government 
province, USIS unpopularity with the government could hamstring the entire program. 
As it was, USIS was attacked by a number of papers, radio and TV stations cancelled 
existing USIS programs and refused to consider new ones, university cooperation was 
curtailed, a Fulbright professor was accused of internal political interference, and 
Thammasart and Chulalongkorn students contemplated an anti-USIS demonstration—it 
was aborted only because the Mission received prior warning. As a result, strong efforts 
were directed toward establishing governmental confidence.196  
 
Indeed, the USIS went on a campaign to repair relations, starting with Sarit. They were 
ultimately successful (although it is unclear what steps were taken), as the report observed that 
“Prime Minister Sarit has borrowed and screened substantially all the films in the USIS film 
library and expressed appreciation of the edification received.”197  
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 The campaign to repair the images of the USIS also involved building a relationship with 
the monarchy. To that end, the USIS produced a “live” television show to promote the Ananda 
Mahidol Foundation, a project of King Bhumibol. According the report, “The King made known 
his pleasure to many high ranking Thai officials. USIS gained a great deal of prestige from the 
show, in addition to showing that the most revered man in Thailand chooses to send his own 
personal scholars to the United States for advanced study.”198 The careful courting of the king 
and prime minister reflected that, more than ever before, the USIS’ ability to operate in Thailand 
was contingent on working with and supporting the initiatives of the country’s leaders and elite.  
 The period following 1957 would inaugurate new levels of US-Thai cooperation, 
including expanded psychological warfare programs. In 1959, the Ministry of Defense started the 
Psychological Warfare School, with a counterpart begun in the same year by the Royal Thai 
Army. Both units used USIS materials, as well as personnel, who taught on public opinion and 
propaganda. The USIS also began formally cooperating with the Public Relations Department to 
work on the production of content for books, presentations, lectures, radio, television, news, and 
other media. In May 1959, Public Relations also created their own “social survey division” in 
order to study public opinion.199 Some of the USIS branches that were closed in the mid-1950s 
under Phibun, such as the one in Udon Thani, were reopened.200  These types of initiatives would 
continue with the build-up of US forces in Southeast Asia through the early and mid-1960s. One 
of the most influential manifestations of the use of film and psychological warfare to promote a 
broad range of government programs, national identity, and the American agenda was the mobile 
film unit program.  
  The expansion of psychological operations in the 1960s, including the mobile films unit 
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program, coincided with US involvement in Vietnam, including the deployment of thousands of 
“advisors” under the Kennedy administration. A similar strategy was adopted in Thailand. In 
1964, the first US combat troops were secretly stationed in Thailand, in part responding to the 
beginnings of civil war in Laos. Thailand became a major base for US air operations, with the 
US presence increasing exponentially after 1964. The US built airfields, from which three-
quarters of the bomb tonnage dropped on North Vietnam and Laos was flown. They also 
expanded military-related infrastructure generally, including deep-water ports and an intelligence 
and communications system.201 With the build-up, US military personnel became a significant 
presence in the country. Moreover, because bases were largely placed in the northeast, troops 
were most commonly stationed there and in Bangkok. 
 As military bases increased, the US presence also expanded in other respects. Although 
US-led film teams travelled in Thailand since at least 1950, the Mobile Information Team 
Program officially began operations in 1962.202 Although the USIS formally ran the program, 
team members were mostly Thais. Only one American USIS officer was ever present due to the 
desire to present a “Thai” face. As one team report noted, “if the objectives of the Mobile 
Information Team Program and all aspects of follow-up are to be successful, it must remain a 
Thai operation with U.S. participation consistently subsidiary.”203 The primary purpose of the 
early units was to distribute various forms of propaganda via film showings, pamphlets, and 
pictures of King Bhumibol and the Buddha.  
 Most of these materials were created in line with the soft propaganda approach. They 
tended to depict positive aspects of Thai society and American aid, rather than negative 
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condemnations of communism, although that was used as well. Handing out pictures of the king, 
which people could then display on their walls, was meant to inspire national belonging and 
pride. As Robert Lasher, the USIS officer who traveled with the teams, reported, the team’s 
“further purpose is to create a stronger feeling of village identification with Thailand and a 
quickened sense of loyalty towards the Thai Government.”204 Anti-communism and Thai 
nationalism went hand-in-hand.  
 The teams traveled to far-flung villages not often visited by central government 
representatives. Their travel was enabled by the expanding infrastructure of roads and 
communication networks in Thailand. US funding to support the construction of roads, such as 
the Mittraphap Highway, were explained in terms of American support for Thailand’s 
development and the need to progress the economic livelihoods of rural Thais. In fact, most of 
these roads were built for strategic and military purposes, such as connecting bases more 
conveniently to Bangkok.205 Bangkok formed the core of the network, with both roads and trains 
connecting provincial cities to Bangkok more readily than neighboring provinces. Bangkok thus 
became an intermediary between the world and the rest of the country. The roads also facilitated 
the flow of information across the country.  
 Lasher described a “typical” day in the field and the early operations of the teams: 
Enroute to a village for the night the Team stopped at villages along the way to talk with 
the people, distribute pictures of the King, (one to a family) eat khao neo (glutinous rice) 
and drink coconut milk when offered and – if the village was not too far away – tell the 
people about the movie showing that night. The Team usually arrived at its “night stand” 
about 4 pm, was greeted by the village headman, teachers and many of the farmers who 
showed us where we were to stay for the night. In every case the Team arrival was 
anticipated and we were put up either at the local school or in open-sided salawat 
[pavilion] at the temple, which also was the village school. After a bath in grass thatch 
shelters or in the Mekong River, the Team brought out bottles of Mekong [whiskey], 
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offering drinks to the headman, school teachers and farmers who had come to see us. 
Dinner – either cooked ourselves or prepared for us by the villagers was eaten about 6:30. 
If there was time between arrival and dinner the Team toured the village talking with 
people and telling them about the evening film show. 
 The film screen was set up in the open area next to the school or sala wat…. The 
show usually began about 7:00 PM with a talk in the Northeast dialect by Mr. Charoen 
Pantong who explained why we were there and introduced, one by one, each member of 
the Team. In several places other members of the Team, including this reporting officer, 
made brief speeches…. Between each film one of the team members, often Mr. Visit 
Bonnilpa, Nai Amphur of Khemma-raj who speaks fluent Northeast Thai, would give 
explanations about the films. The film show usually ended about midnight with team 
members going to bed soon thereafter. Pictures of the King were given out during these 
brief intermissions…. 
 Often before the team left, villagers would gather at the school or sala wat for a 
farewell blessing, called a bai-see, in which strings were tied around the wrists of each 
Team member accompanied by chanted blessings, thanks and wishes for a safe journey 
and for the Team member’s well-being…. Team visits usually ended with the offering by 
members of the Team of tea, cigarettes, tinned milk or other things to the chief abbot of 
the local wat. 
 
As Lasher described, the team made consistent efforts to integrate themselves into the local 
communities. The team attempted to behave in accordance with local practices, recognize local 
hierarchies (especially the school and the wat), and include regional politicians and officers who 
spoke the local dialect. They also behaved as good guests by avoiding taking people’s food and 
handing out gifts at the end of their stay. Just as the USIS was aware of the need to focus on 
“widely accepted” values and to work with national leaders, they also recognized the importance 
of village hierarchies to their local reception.   
 The footprint of the mobile teams was extensive. The first team trip alone visited forty 
villages and, according to the team report, met some 20,000 people. Approximately 9,000 people 
attended the film showings, which were shown for about four hours every night. The teams were 
civilian led, although they sometimes included members of the police and Border Patrol Police. 
The exception was the sixth mobile information team trip, which was a pilot trip for the Royal 
Thai Army’s (RTA) own mobile information team. It was comprised exclusively of RTA officers 
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and non-commissioned officers, as well as one American USIS officer. The civilian teams 
typically included two government bureaucrats (from the Ministry of the Interior and Public 
Relations Department), two chief district officers (nai amphoe) from the Northeast, two USIS 
officers (one Thai and one American), a film projectionist, and a driver.206  
 The teams distributed printed materials to schools, local officials, and religious leaders, 
including maps of Thailand and Southeast Asia, pictures of the Buddha, travel posters, radio 
schedules, and other materials on government agricultural and community development 
programs.207 They targeted villages primarily for their poverty and extreme isolation, as well as 
their proximity to communist-infiltrated zones. Many of these villages were so isolated, the team 
leader claimed, that “many people in the villages… had never heard of the King, the Prime 
Minister or, in fact, the Government of Thailand.”208 By the seventh team trip in December 1962 
at least, the teams were handing out pictures of Prime Minister Sarit as well. 
 The importance placed on distributing visual materials, including photographs, spoke to 
the visual nature of the teams' propaganda. As the team leader indicated in his assessment of the 
villages' remoteness, the ability to recognize the face of the king or prime minister was an 
importance signal of an individual's integration into the nation-state. On the first trip, the team 
distributed 2,000 pictures of the king to each house in the village. Today, images of the king’s 
portrait hanging prominently in Thai homes are widely noted as emblematic of national 
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reverence and love for the monarch. The USIS contributed to that habit.209 Indeed, the team noted 
that the pictures of the king were hung on all the walls of village homes immediately after their 
distribution.210 The RTA team trip in Northern Thailand reported that “the pictures of the 
Phitsanuloke Buddha and of the King were very gratefully received. In most places the people 
had no pictures in their houses of either.”211 Lasher observed the usefulness of distributing the 
portraits, recalling that “Team Captain Charoen made a point of visiting houses where the people 
were reported to be under Communist influence, talked to the families and left pictures of the 
King.”212 With the king looking down upon the inhabitants of a home, it seemed, they would all 
be reminded that to be communist was to be un-Thai. The observation highlights again that fact 
that national reverence for King Bhumibol and the association between him and development did 
not occur wholly organically. Instead, it was at least partially the result of concerted efforts by 
the Thai and US governments. 
 The pictures of the king and the Phitsanuloke Buddha, moreover, were visual reminders 
of the national hierarchy in which the villagers were situation. Likewise, while the teams sought 
to integrate themselves into the village, it was not in an egalitarian sense. Instead, they integrated 
themselves into, and in fact legitimized, hierarchical structures. They typically stayed on the 
grounds of the village temple or school. They selected notable village leaders, monks, and 
teachers to discuss village needs. These individuals were critical mediators of the operations’ 
success, especially since they were able to speak both central Thai and the regional dialect. On 
the team’s trip to Surin province near the Cambodian border, the absence of teachers was 
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strongly felt and blamed for communications problems.213 While working with village notables 
was practical, it also placed those people in the position of mediation between the village and the 
state. By assuming that certain people held “traditional” positions of respect in villages, the 
team’s members ensured that they would hold power in future interactions. Indeed, that was in 
part the intention of the USIS and Thai governments. Discussing radio ownership, Lasher 
reported that, "While radio ownership in remote villages will not be widespread for many years 
to come, it is the people who count for the most who now have them- schoolteachers, abbots, 
village headmen or merchants."214 
 The teams also regularly met with provincial and local leaders. On the pilot trip for the 
Royal Thai Army mobile information team, for example, the team met with the Governor of Nan 
province, district officials, police chiefs, military commanders, village headmen, and school 
headmasters.215 In some cases, regional and local political leaders took part in the trip and made 
speeches during the film program. The Governor of Surin accompanied the seventh team trip.216 
The team captain for the first few trips to the Northeast, Charoen Panthong, became the 
Governor of Nongkhai. In so doing, the teams crawled across the web of provincial politics and 
power hierarchies. 
 Likewise, the teams reinforced gender hierarchies in village power structures and capital-
village interactions. Every team member on all of the trips was male. The teams generally 
interacted with male leadership, as most Thai politicians and all religious leaders were men. 
Perhaps the only occasion for discussion with women in positions of power was with the few 
female teachers. Regarding village healthcare, the team’s male doctor made all the 
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recommendations, despite mentions of the presence of village midwives. Village needs, ranging 
from health services, infrastructure, communication, and education, were determined amongst a 
small group of men. The dominance of men in decision-making positions contrasted with the 
visibility of women in the identification of national issues. From 1970 onwards, for example, 
family planning was an integral part of development efforts. Narratives of Thailand’s ambiguous 
relationship with development and modernization usually focus on women as wives, lovers, and 
prostitutes. Thus, the creation of gender demarcated spaces of power in which those issues were 
discussed (from the school to the wat to government offices) set an important precedent. Women 
became vessels in which the hopes and anxieties of national development were placed.  
 Although the teams' understanding of the national power hierarchy was clearly defined, 
the reports also evidenced ambiguities in villagers' ethnic, national, and regional origins and 
loyalties. In Nongkhai, near the Lao border and quite close to the Lao capital of Vientiane, the 
teams noted that communists crossed the border in order to convince people that they were really 
Lao and not Thai. It was certainly the aim of the teams to convince villagers otherwise. The 
villagers likely adopted a more flexible understanding of national and ethic affiliations, if they 
did so at all. National identification was also prominent in the few descriptions of Vietnamese 
residents. In general, the team reported that Vietnamese kept their distance from the operations. 
One story of Vietnamese graves encountered by Lasher, in which he pondered why the graves 
were dug so far from any village, revealed deep suspicion of any Vietnamese encountered by the 
team members. Regional distinctions were also noted between Northerners and Northeasterners. 
Reports frequently repeated the claim that Northeasterners were more friendly and open. Several 
instances of reluctance by villagers to engage with the team were observed. Each time, however, 
they were attributed to communist subversion, rather than a lack of interest in the team’s 
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activities. Unresponsiveness, especially by villagers in the Northeast, was portrayed as 
subversive.  
 Suspicion of communist influence was not out of place, given that villages were often 
proximate to areas of Pathet Lao activity. Teams commonly reported hearing news and stories of 
Pathet Lao operations, including distribution of aid. In one case, the team heard that the Pathet 
Lao “had come by helicopter to distribute money, medicines and promises.”217 Villages along the 
Mekong River were noticeable for the “lack of young men.”218 Meanwhile, Lasher expressed 
concerns that the display of higher living standards outside the villages, especially as evidenced 
during film shows, would cause dissatisfaction.219 He further stated that “the effectiveness of the 
initial team visit will be entirely dissipated and the people considerably disillusioned if at least 
some sort of minimal assistance is not forthcoming within the next few months.”220 In fact, as the 
trips continued, they repeatedly recommended aid from the provincial and central governments. 
As regional politicians became more involved in team trips, they also contributed to the rising 
importance of aid projects to the teams’ operations. 
 The earliest efforts to include aid focused on public health services. The second team trip, 
for example, included a doctor from the Department of Health, who carried with him medicines 
and vaccines. On that trip, over four thousand people were vaccinated.221 Later, the health 
program was expanded to allow for recommendations on follow-up support. In one village, the 
team doctor recommended that the government provide money for additional midwives.222 
Initially, aid was only given to improve the effectiveness of government propaganda and in 
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reaction to communist competition. Indeed, one of the early recommendations by the team was 
that if the case should arise that aid be proposed for an area, a mobile information team should 
first be given the opportunity to visit the area to clearly link aid with mobile information team 
activities.223 Aid-giving and actual development were not goals by themselves.   
 Recognition of the importance of aid to the villagers was partly led by a growing concern 
that communist groups appealed to a very real need by villagers and an understanding among 
villagers that Bangkok received most of the benefits of Thailand’s rapid development. In one 
report on a 1962 trip with a team led by the Royal Thai Army, Lasher recalled an encounter with 
a beggar: 
This [USIS] writer offered 50 [satang] (2 ½ cents) to a one-armed panhandler in 
[Uttaradit]. The beggar took one scornful look at the coin and walked off saying, ‘I can 
get more than that from the Communists.’ This left the writer with rather mixed feelings. 
Was he stingy? Had he lost a (somewhat drunken) soul to the Communists? Was a cold 
war skirmish lost on the hot streets of Uttaradit?224 
 
Although the aside was clearly meant to be humorous, it seems that Lasher and members of the 
team recognized the need to offer more than information and consultation.  
The World Bank expressed the same view in its 1970 in-house report on the Thai 
economy and society: 
… the majority of rain-fed subsistence rice farmers in the north and northeast, and to a 
lesser extent in the south, have been left out of the economic boom of the 1960s. Their 
real (inflation-adjusted) incomes either stagnated or declined in the past 15 years. One-
third of agricultural households – 9 million people – are living in absolute poverty, and 
many millions more are barely above that line, while the other income groups have 
grown very rich… [I]t is certainly not a coincidence that insurgent activities are most 
frequent in those areas of the country where the bulk of the population has not benefited 
from the growth process.225 
 
Thailand’s “modernization without development” was due to numerous factors, not least of 
                                                
223 US National Archives at College Park, RG 306, “Second Trip,” no page numbers. 
224 US National Archives at College Park, RG 306, Reference, trip 2/RTA 
225 Boonrak Boonyaketmala, “Political Economy,” 153.  
 92 
which was corruption.226 After the construction of the Mittraphap Highway, for example, all the 
lands alongside the highway were given to military leaders.227 I argue that it was also due to the 
primacy of achieving loyalty in village projects. Developmental discourse was part of the model, 
but actual development was secondary. The implementation of projects and aid, however, 
became perceived as a necessary component in achieving loyalty. It also created a new dynamic 
in relations between the state and civil society, as the expectations of what the state would do in 
return for ideological loyalty rose. 
 The films chosen for the programs likewise reflected the primacy of developing loyalty 
and promoting national identity. Lasher explained that “the films, all borrowed from USIS, were 
chosen for the educational value (about activities of the Thai government, community 
development, etc.), and for their usefulness in promoting loyalty to King and country.”228 Film 
titles included Thai State Railways, Day in the Life of a Nai Amphur, Army of Thailand, Thai 
Border Patrol Police, The Royal Tour of the Northeast, and The Sentimental Journey (which I 
discussed in chapter two). As time wore on, films were included on agricultural and irrigation 
projects in the Northeast, Buddhist customs, SEATO-funded development projects, mohlam folk 
music, road construction, and other regional development projects. These films generally fell 
into seven main subject categories, namely culture, development, military, monarchy, 
government, police, and education. Excepting the category of government (which included many 
of the films focused on development projects, royal activities, etc.), films on development and 
the military were the most numerous, followed by those on culture, the monarchy, and the 
government respectively.  
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 The films communicated knowledge not only through visual references, but also through 
narration and soundtracks in local dialects. While early trips relied on team members to provide 
narration in local dialects, by the fourteenth team trip in November 1963, many of the films had 
the soundtrack entirely in Northeastern dialect.229 Team members, many of whom came from the 
provinces visited, felt strongly that inclusion of non-central dialects was critical to the success of 
the teams’ message. 
 While the language was sometimes regional, the content of the films provided visual 
representation of what was “happening” in the Thai nation. They provided powerful images, 
especially if villagers had often never seen a film before. On a visit to remote villages in Nakhon 
Phanom province in January 1963, the team reported that: 
There was nothing equivocal about the village reaction to the USIS movies shown 
(several of which had Northeast dialect soundtracks, the rest in Central Thai). In most 
villages movies had never before been seen, and the people were excitedly enthusiastic. 
One woman, however, reported fleeing in terror as the railroad rushed towards her on the 
screen. Another woman said the movies were so beautiful she wished they could have 
gone all night.230  
 
The films were intended to enable the villagers to visualize national progress and achievement. 
They provided visual representation of projects and people across the nation, thereby creating a 
cohesive narrative for a nation working together.  
The mobile information programs reinforced social and political hierarchies, but they also 
created social opportunities by opening up public spaces through film screenings. This was a 
particularly significant development for women and their access to public information. Women 
were, in general, less likely than men to receive extended education. The numbers of literate 
women were rising in both the elite and middle classes in Bangkok, but opportunities were still 
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limited for women of the lower classes and outside of Bangkok. Women’s lower rates of literacy 
meant, for example, that they were less able to engage with discourses of community and 
identity in literature. Even as literacy rates rose substantially through the 1960s, women were 
still more likely to be illiterate than men. The table below shows the change in literacy rates 
between 1960 and 1970. In all likelihood, the literacy rates in many of the villages visited by the 
teams would have had lower rates than those at the national level. Newspapers also presented 
barriers for the semi-literate and illiterate. However, they were also more accessible than the 
literature of high culture. They also tended to be read in public settings, where people might read 
them aloud for others to hear.231  
 
Figure 2.1 Literacy of Population Aged 10 Years and Over by Sex, 1960 and 1970232 
However, film and its use of images to convey the storyline was a medium that did not 
require a literate audience. Knowing how to read a film is, of course, a learned art in and of 
itself. However, access to the spectacle and affective impact is more immediate. As Barmé 
argued, as early as the 1920s cinema became one of the first public spaces in which both men 
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and women interacted on a mass scale.233  While the educated elite in Thailand (as well as the 
middle-class beginning in the early 1900s) had long read foreign newspapers or novels, film also 
brought access to foreign media to a larger section of the population. Annette Hamilton observed 
that, “Access to film provided for the relatively less educated, and for most women, their primary 
access to fictional narratives on the western model.”234 For women, then, film offered an entirely 
new perspective and social reference point. The potential of cinematic knowledge was highly 
gendered. 
This was true not just in Thailand, but also in Europe. There, women adopted and adapted 
the behavior norms, fashion, and trends in Hollywood films. The increasing visibility of women 
in public places like the cinema demanded renewed attention to women’s behavior and fashion. 
De Grazia described the influence of American films: 
Mainly working-class women… indicated how significant American movies had been for 
the formation of what might be described as a “new-woman” peer culture. More than just 
a distraction, the cinema was a place where women could go unescorted, often with 
female family members or friends; movies were a major subject of discussion and 
memory, influencing mannerisms and fashion. As such, the cinema afforded a kind of 
imaginary space; this, pace mass cultural theorists, offered possibilities of individual 
development practically impervious to the clumsy discipline of traditional state, 
community, or familial authorities.235  
 
Portrayals of women in films thus represented an important reference point with a broad reach, 
regardless of whether the portrayals were accepted, used piecemeal, or rejected outright. Again, 
this suggests the significance of common knowledge. Spectators viewing women on screen in 
public spaces were part of a process of creating common knowledge about what it meant to be a 
modern or traditional woman. Film therefore had the potential to generate solidarity through 
mutual observance of shared experiences.   
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Cinemas likewise became important public spaces in which women went out in Bangkok 
during the 1920s and 1930s. There, they became consumers of modern products and fashion. 
Modern forms of dress, often inspired by the west, were initially worn only by the upper class. 
As the rest of urban Bangkok began to attend the cinema and consume entertainment in print 
media, the middle class became avid consumers of modern fashion and other goods.236 With that 
shift, public spaces like cinemas exposed more women not only to foreign models, but also those 
of different class backgrounds. Understandably, women of the elite class typically received more 
extensive education and opportunities to travel abroad. However, for middle and lower class 
women, media offered important opportunities to view alternate cultural and social models.  
With the 1960s, cinema also became an important source of news and information. News 
segments, for example, would precede commercial films at most theaters. Films was situation in 
the broader spectrum of news sources, such as radio, newspapers, and personal communications 
with local officials, teachers, religious leaders, or neighbors. A 1964 study of news sources in 
three Northeastern villages, moreover, found that gender played a large role in how men and 
women in rural areas received news and information. Figure 1 shows how men were 
significantly more connected to “official” sources of news.237 
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Figure 2.2 Sources of News according to Gender 
 
There were also significant differences depending on socioeconomic status. The study noted that 
“village leaders” were the most likely to get their news from radio and newspapers. For common 
villagers, personal contacts were by far the most widely-relied upon sources of news.  
Men were significantly more likely to hear news via the kamnan and phuyaiban, as well 
as through teachers and monks. Women, by contrast, did so through family members and 
neighbors. The study described the situation thus: 
News concerning events outside the village is learned by village leaders (both formal and 
informal) through radio, publications, government officials or visits to town. [Phuyaiban] 
and [Kamnan] often pass on this information to heads of family in village meetings. 
Other village leaders transmit news through informal contacts usually with men. The 
village men in turn tell their relatives. Naturally, news is transmitted in many other 
manners. For example, village women often pick up bits of gossip [d]uring their visits to 
market towns.238 
 
Likewise, radio and newspapers were generally restricted to those who could afford a radio or 
were literate. While radios were often listened to by groups of people, the dissemination of news 
through radios was controlled by their owners. For example, the mobile information teams 
observed that “[w]hile radio ownership in remote villages will not be widespread for many years 
to come, it is the people who count for the most who now have them—schoolteachers, abbots, 
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village headmen or merchants. Not only do radio owners pass along the word but when a radio is 
turned on any who wish to may pause in the dooryard or on the porch to listen.”239 In practice, it 
appears that men were most likely to participate in direct listening. By contrast, news sources 
available in large public spaces were most accessible to women. 
 They also functioned as opportunities for entertainment. As the communications survey 
noted, “village film shows also serve as an excuse for large social gatherings during which young 
people get together to gossip.”240 While men were by far more likely to see films in towns, they 
were also apparently less inclined to attend films in villages.241 Instead, women, children, young 
people, and “some elderly villagers” were more frequently in attendance.242 This combination of 
a social space for gossip and the opportunity for attendance meant that the travelling village 
films offered women important opportunities for information. Besides the films themselves, team 
members, including doctors, politicians, and officials, would make speeches in between films, 
thereby providing more information on political issues and government programs in villages. 
Furthermore, the film shows attracted villagers from neighboring villages, even sometimes from 
across the Mekong in Laos.243 They would have brought their own news, and heard the latest 
gossip from the host village. Together, they all would watch the films, and in turn know that the 
other knew what they knew. The films events thus facilitated the spread of information in a 
variety of ways.  
 Cold Fire, with which this chapter began, was shown in situations very much like the 
ones described above. True to form, after Cold Fire was produced, the USIS showed the film and 
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conducted a survey in five Northeastern and five Central Thai villages during 1967. Cold Fire 
was shown in the evening, and the survey conducted the next day.244 The writer of the report on 
the film and survey explained the purpose as follows: 
Because of the difficulty of obtaining Northeast dialect speaking actors, this film… was 
produced in Central Thai dialect although it was set in a Northeast village. The film is 
designed to alert villagers to the objectives and tactics of Communist subversives 
operating in Thailand. It also contains messages relating to what the Thai Government 
and Thailand’s allies are doing to help Northeast villages, and messages intended to 
counter what the communists are saying about this help. The survey was designed to find 
out whether or not the film can be understood by Northeast villagers and whether, after 
seeing a film in which both the Communist line and the counter-fact are presented, 
audiences absorb the counter-fact or are left merely having heard and understood the 
Communist line.245  
 
From this, it is clear that Cold Fire was an important test of USIS strategy and how its core 
messages, like the nature of US aid, were understood by villagers. 
 The villages visited included two provinces in the Northeast. These included Ban Noan 
Yai (Amphoe Khuang Nai), Ban Na-Rai Yai (Amphoe Amnat Charoen), and Ban Hua-tapan 
(Amphoe Amnat Charoen) in Ubon. In Nakhon Phanom, the team visited Ban La-kham and Ban 
Paloo-kha, both in Amphoe Mukdahan. In central Thailand, the film was shown in two 
provinces. In Nakhon Pathom, the team visited Ban Tham Sala (Amphoe Muang) and Ban 
Nongkrang (Amphoe Kamphaeng Saen). In Kanchanaburi, the trip included Ban Loomhin 
(Amphoe Phanom Thuan), Ban Khao-rak (Amphoe Phanom Thuan), and Ban Wai Neo (Amphoe 
Tamaka). While none of the villages were particularly central, the team chose those of varying 
levels of remoteness. Ban Noan Yai, for example, was two kilometers from the nearest highway, 
while Ban Na-Rai Yai was just half a kilometer away. Ban Hua-tapan and Ban Paloo-kha were 
the most remote, twelve and sixteen kilometers away from any main roads. These differences 
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would have had an impact on audiences’ exposure to various forms of propaganda, such as radio 
and film, and perhaps dialect differences.  
The effectiveness of the film, at least in terms of comprehension, was considered to be 
high. The team reported that: 
• Three out of four could tell who in the film were helping the villagers (and how 
they were helping) and who were threatening or harming them (and how); 
• 76% identified the terrorists in the movie as “communist terrorists” or 
“guerrillas”, 81% knew that all of them were Thais; 72% knew that they were 
acting on orders from outside Thailand (half said that these orders came from 
North Vietnam or Communist China); 
• 86% recognized that these men were deceiving the villagers and most understood 
why; 
• 81% were aware of the Communists’ intent with regard to the young village men 
and 86% recognized some of the ways in which the Communist presence affected 
the women of the village; 
• Over three fourths showed an understanding of Communist objectives in 
Thailand and most gave knowledgeable answers concerning their methods.246 
 
These numbers indicate high levels of effectiveness, if not only of the film itself, then of broader 
propaganda efforts in which the film was imbedded.   
Specifically, the survey found that whether or not a person was a frequent film-goer was 
highly correlated to comprehension of the film. In fact, the difference was often as high as 20-30 
percentage points.247 In Ban Lao-kham, for example, no films had been shown in the village for 
the last four or five years. Comprehension of the film hovered around 58%, versus in the eighties 
for central areas with film exposure.248 When the surveyors tested the credibility of the film, 
meaning if villagers found the film believable or thought that similar events might happen in 
their own village, they once again found that familiarity with film and radio offered a distinct 
advantage.249 Furthermore, education was correlated with better comprehension of the films 
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intended message. These findings make sense, considering that similar pro-government, anti-
communist messages were propagated in film, radio, and educational materials throughout the 
country. Increased exposure to other forms of information, whether through news, education, or 
entertainment, meant that respondents either understood the intended messages more rapidly or 
at least knew how to respond appropriately.  
The benefit of previous exposure to films, radio, and education favored men over women 
in tests of comprehension. As discussed, men were significantly more likely to receive higher 
levels of education, listen to radios, and see films. Indeed, the survey revealed intriguing results 
in terms of the correlation between gender, geography, and comprehension. In central villages, 
men were only somewhat more likely to comprehend the film’s messages. Out of the thirty-five 
questions that were evaluated based on gender, men and women understood the same amount in 
seven, women understood more in another seven, and men understood more in the remaining 
twenty-one. Clearly, men understood the films better than the women, or at least we able to give 
the expected answers more often.  
However, in the northeast, these differences were far more pronounced. Women only 
understood a question better than men once, and in all other cases the difference in 
comprehension favored men. Looking at median numbers, northeastern men averaged higher 
than women by twelve percentage points. Central men were higher than women by only six 
points, or half the amount in the different between northeasterners. Central men were higher than 
northeastern men by just four points. By contrast, central women scored higher than northeastern 
women by ten points. Clearly both geography and gender mattered. But the combination of 
gender and geography for women in the northeast impacted their comprehension severely.  
Furthermore, the survey report writer noted that the most important factor in film 
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comprehension was whether or not people sat through the entire film. In this respect, it is 
difficult to assess what factors drove people away or distracted them. But some of the reasons 
that were given included falling asleep, walking around, taking care of a baby, or rain.250 It is 
difficult to assess whether these reasons negatively impacted women’s exposure to the film, but 
child-rearing almost certainly would have fallen on women. Because most of the people 
surveyed were of child-bearing age, it may well have been a compounding factor. 
In the representation of the communist threat to men and women, the film and survey 
maintained gendered boundaries. While the film was clearly supposed to send the message that 
village women would suffer under communist infiltration (with the survey questions “Were lives 
of women affected?” followed by “Who?” and “How?”), the primary focus was on the 
communist desire to recruit young men. Women only suffered indirectly as a result of the 
decisions made by their male relatives and directly when communists raided villages. The 
themes of women’s suffering were clear in a scene where Phin comforts Boonnam’s mother, 
Nang Nuan, after he ran away. The two women sit and cry together, praying for Boonnam and 
wondering how he might ever return. Nang Nuan is deep in grief. Already a widow, she believed 
that she had lost her only son.  
 In this respect, the production of film and portrayal of gendered aspects of the communist 
agenda appears to have differed significantly from those in Vietnamese films (both North and 
South), and American films about Vietnam. In those films, women are just as likely as men to 
take up armed struggle, although their characters are still more likely to be involved in 
melodramatic stories. In the South Vietnamese film Chúng Tôi Muốn Sống (We Want to Live, 
1956), the female protagonist, Lan, is driven mad by the conflict between her dedication to the 
communist struggle and demands that she sacrifice romance to become a cadre. As a piece of 
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anti-communist propaganda very much in the vein of Cold Fire, the differences between the 
personalities and choices available to Phin and Lan are notable.  
Annette Hamilton, writing about gender in Vietnamese socialist films, also argued that 
the figure of the self-sacrificing mother was important in films during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Hamilton wrote that Vietnamese films “portrayed the need for women to be given recognition 
not just for their role in the war and independence struggles, but also in the development of the 
new socialist society.”251 Furthermore, in American films about Vietnam, Vietnamese women are 
often depicted as suspicious and threatening, especially if they are from the north.252 By contrast, 
Cold Fire makes it clear that women are not susceptible to communism.253  
Thai female communists were, according to Cold Fire, impossible. Of course, that 
representation flew in the face of reality. As I will discuss in chapter five, women were active in 
radical and leftist movements as well. However, in denying the possibility, the film obscured the 
attractions of radical movements for women frustrated with their position in the social order. Not 
only were women active in political movements, but they were punished for their activities in 
gendered ways. Sociologist Sudarat Musikawong argued that activist women were, for example, 
subjected to sexual violence.254 She also observed that their participation was obscured in 
memorial works by male radicals.255 That women were so uniformly denied the possibility of 
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radicalism, and by extension political sensibilities, indicates that more clearly demarcated gender 
dynamics influenced political rhetoric in the Thai case. 
While the communists in Cold Fire were all male, they were also all Thai. In the film, as 
well as in popular and political discourse, communists were traitors to the nation, or khon khai 
chat (literally “people selling the nation”). In the survey, several questions focused on the group 
of communists and their affiliations, including: 
To what group did they belong? 
Were all three Thais? 
Were they independent or on outside orders? 
If on outside orders, from where or whom? 
 
The last two questions demonstrate the importance for the US and Thai governments to 
demonstrate that, even if the communists were Thai, they had been indoctrinated by foreigners. 
For the US and Thai governments, the connection between communism and foreignness, 
specifically with Vietnam, China, or the Soviet Union, was an important one to emphasize. In so 
doing, they could also make the argument that communism was anathema to Thai cultural and 
social values. Communist foreigners, even if only by suggestion, were also portrayed as engaged 
in an attack on the major tenants of Thainess: nation, religion, and monarchy.  
Some of the viewers surveyed were sympathetic to the Thai communists, say, for 
example, that “the Communists don’t have anything to eat.” However, most gave responses that 
communists were a threat to Thailand as a nation and the Thai way of life.256 For example, in one 
response to the survey question, “What did [the communists] do to (harm) the village, one 
respondent said that:  
He was a Communist agent who persuaded the villagers to join the Communists. He/they 
incited the villagers to overthrow the government and destroy the religion and the King; 
incited the villagers to misunderstand and set the villagers against the government. 
                                                
256 US National Archives at College Park, RG 306, United States Information Service, Film Study: “Cold 
Fire.”Appendix Table XIV-A. 
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He/they fooled the villagers, induced the villagers not to believe Kru Porn. They aimed at 
getting our country. They would overthrow the government. They destroyed the future of 
the nation.”257 
 
Another person responded to questions about why the communists wanted to deceive villagers 
that “They regarded Buddhism as meaningless (unimportant). They wanted no religion and said 
that they would give tractors.”258  
Yet another respondent linked nationalistic understandings of history to the reasons why 
America was supporting Thailand, claiming that they were there “in order to preserve Buddhism; 
because they recognize that Thailand has never abolished religion; because they saw that the 
Thais are honest; Thailand is the land of honesty, and has never betrayed any countries; because 
we asked them for help; because Thailand has never made war with other countries.”259 Many of 
these statements are factually incorrect. But they are important because the reveal both the 
content of the propaganda that people were taught, as well as, in some cases, what people knew 
they were supposed to say.  
The statements also reveal the importance of psychological operations broadly and film 
specifically in the production of Thai Cold War common knowledge.260 The mobile teams’ visits 
or Cold Fire screenings were major events in the villages, as evidenced by the large crowds they 
drew. Since everyone, potentially, would have seen the films, the films would have represented a 
point of common knowledge with regard to any of the themes that they touched upon. The film 
screenings were a common experience, and therefore so were the messages. That the experience 
was shared does not inherently indicate that the intended message was effectively received. 
Indeed, as I discussed in chapter one, audiences collectively not behaving as intended, as in the 
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case of the royal anthem, posed a significant danger. Regardless, the films became common 
reference points by which villagers would have engaged with Cold War national issues.  
For its part, Cold Fire, in its didactic connections between nationalism and anti-
communism, evidences a fusion of national loyalty (especially according to the love of 
nation/religion/king formula) and anti-communism in US and Thai propaganda. This fusion was 
clear, for example, in references to the band of communists near the village. The group was 
repeatedly referred to as phuak jon communit, or the communist bandits. After a report of 
communist activity, the police visit the village and lecture the villagers on what to do about the 
danger. They emphasize that, “There are bandits coming to raid the village. But these are not just 
any bandits. They are communist bandits!”261 Similarly, when Phin explains to Nang Nuan that 
Boonnam likely cannot return, she tells her that Boonnam did not join just any group of bandits, 
but a communist group. Nang Nuan asks Phin to explain what the difference is. Phin responds 
that, “they are much more evil. They are brutal, heartless, and kill others very easily (phuak ni, 
man lai kwa phuak jon tamada mak na. hot hiam, tharun, lae kha khon ngai ngai.).” Upon 
hearing this, Nang Nuan despairs, and asks the gods to help her.   
Notably absent was any description of political ideology held by the communists. Clearly 
it was meant, on the one hand, to inform villagers who were thought to not understand 
communism as a political and economic ideology. On the other hand, the message was intended 
to connect the communists to criminal and subversive legacies. However, bandits, especially 
nakleng, have a long history of almost Robin Hood-like status. As anthropologist David Johnston 
argued, “Crime and banditry persist in rural Thai society, they continue to enjoy a degree of 
popular tolerance and acceptance, and attempts to suppress them can result in heightened 
tensions between the central government and local peoples and, in the short run at least, in 
                                                
261 Mi jon khao plon mu ban ni. Mai chai phuak jon tamada. Tae wa pen phuak jon communit! 
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increased violence.”262 Regardless, the message connecting communists to banditry, and 
positioning them as a dangerous form of banditry was clear. Just to be sure that the point was 
taken, one of the survey questions asked “Did the communists act as ordinary bandits?”  
In contrast to the portrayals of the communists and their foreign allegiances, the Thai 
government’s alliance with the Americans and American aid was shown positively. Responses 
once again may have indicated both a comprehension of the message and an awareness of the 
appropriate response. One respondent, when asked about what the Thai government was doing to 
help rural villagers, replied that “Because now the Americans have come to help, so the Thai 
government must help too.”263 Another, in response to a question about foreign aid, said it was 
“Because of the SEATO treaty; because America is our ally and is on the free world side; 
because we are on the same free world side; because they wish Thailand well and are allies; 
because they are not with the Communists; they are neighbors, relatives; (because we are) of the 
same blood; (we) love each other.”264 Nonetheless, others displayed confusion, or perhaps snark. 
One person responded that American supported Thailand because, “Thailand is their colony; 
they would make Thailand a colony as the Communists said.”265 
At the same time, Cold Fire was likely one of the earliest productions set in a rural 
village in Thailand. In terms of the audience’s connection with the film, this was an important 
move. Previously, the films viewed by provincial audiences were geographically distant from 
their own lives. The clear majority were foreign films, and therefore set abroad. But even Thai 
films were generally produced in Bangkok studios. The Thai ambassador to Japan’s speech about 
                                                
262 David Johnston, “Bandit, Nakleng, and Peasant in Rural Thai Society,” Contributions to Asian Studies 15 (1980): 
90–101. 
263 US National Archives at College Park, RG 306, United States Information Service, Film Study: “Cold Fire.” 
Appendix Table XII. 
264 Ibid. 
265 Ibid. 
 108 
filming Santi-Vina gave some indication as to the difficulty of filming movies in rural areas, not 
least the result of transporting technology and people and the impact of climate on the celluloid. 
Moreover, because Bangkok audiences were previously viewed as the most profitable, it was 
their tastes and interests that drove film content. But with the expansion of rural markets, 
provincial settings became more common. 
Even then, films dealing with contemporary social and political issues did not become 
common until the 1970s “Thai New Wave” generation. Cold Fire, therefore, was one of the first 
instances in which rural villagers were able to view their own lives through the lens of a feature-
length film. Given the prestige of motion pictures among rural audiences, the very fact that their 
lives were being broadcast in this way would have granted the film some legitimacy and 
popularity. This fact made the assertion that the film was based on real events, a claim that was 
not proven, all the more significant in terms of viewer psychology. Indeed, the film’s follow-up 
survey found that 85% of audiences believed that the story really happened in Northeastern 
villages. 
However, the survey never addressed the issue of whether villagers’ comprehension 
could be tested in the first place. It was assumed that survey questions formulated in Washington 
and Bangkok had relevance for what communism, development, the United States, and social 
hierarchies meant to villagers. The surveyors never accounted for the potentially vast differences 
in the perspectives and world view of people so removed from the context in which the surveys 
were produced. Ultimately, the surveys are more useful for revealing what the state wanted the 
villagers to comprehend and the extent to which villagers knew how to engage with the demands 
of the state.  
Benedict Anderson noted a similar dynamic with a contemporary film, Aphichatphong 
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Weerasethakul’s Sat Pralat (Tropical Malady, 2004). While urban Bangkok bourgeois found the 
film “difficult” or “abstract,” people with experience in the rural, jungle settings showcased in 
the film understood it more readily.266 The difference in understanding came from distinct 
relationships that people had with the environment, animals, and film. Chao ban understood the 
film in part because it was produced from within the world in which they grew up.267 In contrast, 
the messages in a film like Cold Fire wouldn’t have been naturally understood, but might have 
been learned. Thus, it is perfectly possible that the villagers comprehended the task at hand very 
well. Whether and how they understood the film in the way that an American or a Thai 
Bangkokian would have is another matter.  
Nonetheless, the mobile team program and Cold Fire were viewed as successes in the 
1960s. However, by the early 1970s the programs fell out of favor. The market was changing. As 
the 1960s wore on, films became available through provincial theaters and commercial traveling 
film circuits. Villagers were also exposed to government-generated films more frequently, since 
the successes of the USIS teams spawned imitations by the Royal Thai Army, Border Patrol 
Police, Public Relations Department, and US-Thai Mobile Development Units.268 The USIS 
teams were no longer the sole source of film entertainment for villagers. Moreover, as radio 
frequencies expanded, so did ownership and the importance of radio (which was already the 
most common source of news). The expansion of radio in Isan was also due to the popularity of 
regional broadcast stations, such as Radio Khonkaen.  
The US State Department ended the mobile team program in 1971, although the various 
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domestic iterations remained.269 Ironically, while assertions of Thainess were once viewed as 
critical to anti-communist efforts, the role of USIS programs in promoting those values also 
contributed to the program’s defunding. One US diplomat recalled changing attitudes in the early 
1970s:  
We had a program which had been instituted with the purpose of solidifying the ties 
behind their king. This… had been pretty well been scotched by Washington because 
they didn’t feel that this was the kind of thing we should be doing. We were in effect a 
PR (public relations) unit for the Thai government.270 
 
Nonetheless, the teams operated during a brief, but important, moment in Thailand’s modern 
development and the emergence of its cinematic public sphere. For a time, the imperatives of 
national development meant that the village increased in significance at the same time that the 
government largely controlled the flow of information into villages. This was especially true of 
film, due to the expense of cinema technologies. But by the 1970s, the moment was over. 
Despite that, the efforts of the programs proved more durable. In 2011, Cold Fire was 
placed on the list of Thai National Heritage Films. The list, created that same year, annually 
registers twenty-five Thai films. Created by the Thai Film Archive and the Ministry of Culture, 
the project is part of broader efforts to improve knowledge of Thai filmmaking and to preserve 
old films. In 2011, a diverse range of films were included on the list, from Cold Fire to 
Thongpan (a “communist” film banned in 1976 after the military coup) to a documentary film 
about the 1942 Bangkok floods.271 In 2012, Cold Fire was again viewed by Thai audiences in a 
special film series titled “Films Seen by His Majesty the King.” Since then, it was also shown at 
the Sixth Bangkok Experimental Film Festival in 2012 as part of the theme “Raiding the 
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Archives.” While the film was produced by the USIS in order to support the agenda of a joint 
American-Thai anti-communist, military scheme, the film continues to have life in modern 
Thailand.  
However, the film, like the surveys and the mobile information team reports, highlights 
the layered influences on the production and consumption of propaganda during the Cold War 
period. While the influence of the US was clear, it was filtered through Thai political and social 
discourses and conceptions of hierarchical and gendered relationships. Likewise, although 
central Thai interests were prominent in development schemes and information presented to 
villagers, local politicians and village leaders were instrumental in how they reached Thai 
villagers. The circulation of information in provincial Thailand and knowledge of the “nation” 
was a messy amalgamation of conceptions of the historically situated, but newly modernizing 
“Thai” village. The end result was not just the development of anti-communist sentiment, but 
also the troubled beginnings of incorporating provincial citizens into public discourses of 
national belonging.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE ADULTERER: CENSORSHIP, MORALITY, AND FOREIGN FILMS 
“The film depicts adultery (kan khop chu) between a woman, who has a family already, and her 
husband’s male friend. The story violates the good morality (sinlatham) and customs (prapheni) 
of the Thai people. Not only does the depiction of the adulterous relationship (khwam samphan 
thang chu sao) show behavior contrary to morality, but it has characteristics that will arouse 
sexual desire (yuayu kamarom).” –Board of Film Censorship banning The Touch272  
 
On February 24th, 1972, the Appeals Committee of the Board of Film Censorship of 
Thailand met for an official screening of Ingmar Bergman’s latest production, The Touch.273 The 
censors had banned the film, about a violent romance between a Swedish housewife and her 
American lover, the previous December.274 The adultery-centered storyline was found to violate 
Thai morality.275 Just three months before the Appeals Committee met, Prime Minister Thanom 
dissolved the constitution and parliament and returned the country to military dictatorship.276 In 
light of these upheavals, we might expect the censors to have found the saga of an unhappy 
Swedish housewife to be beneath their concern. But they did not. The rapid urbanization, 
modernization, and visibility of the sex trade in the city, much of it brought by the changes 
inaugurated under American Cold War intervention, arguably made the censors more sensitive to 
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issues of family and sexual relationships. The Committee, composed of senior bureaucrats from 
many of Thailand most important government institutions, upheld the decision to ban The Touch 
from playing in Thai movie theaters. 
 By the early 1970s, foreign films from non-communist countries occupied an 
uncomfortable space between Thailand’s modernizing initiatives and cultural nationalism. 
American films dominated the commercial film market in Thailand, and particularly in Bangkok. 
However, as the decline of US psychological operations highlighted, American intervention was 
ending. At the same time, state officials exerted a modern form of Thai nationalism characterized 
by gendered cultural difference with the West. Banning The Touch was defensible, and indeed 
necessary, in order to protect Thai culture and to enforce Buddhist morality. Indeed, the status of 
women and the preservation of feminine morality had become a national security issue. If the 
mobile team program’s promotion of feminine, rural authenticity evidenced the confluence of 
Thai and US interests in combatting anti-communism, censorship of foreign films, many of them 
American, highlight the ambivalences that characterized the “American Era” and Thailand’s 
engagement with the social and cultural entailments of American Imperium. The United States, 
despite being Thailand’s most important ally, presented a threat to the security of Thailand’s 
cultural state. 
The decision on The Touch also reflected the state’s growing reliance on prohibition to 
control film exhibition. It came after more than a decade of increasing film censorship under 
Sarit and Thanom, with the greatest increase occurring between 1962 and 1972. The significance 
of censorship evidences the authoritarian state’s concern with cinema as a productive site for the 
construction of societal mores. It underscored the significance of the bureaucratic censorship 
regime’s efforts to affect the constitution of the modern Thai social imaginary, the dynamic 
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interplay of worldviews and practices that define how people “fit together” within society.277 
Film censorship in Thailand was used for the seemingly contradictory purposes to promote 
middle class modernity and, at the same time, to assert social hierarchies based on notions of a 
traditional, Buddhist moral order. From this perspective, films provided a venue for the depiction 
of deviant social practices. To not censor risked the mass consumption of alternative models by 
Thai audiences. Censorship of morality in films was thus a particularly salient aspect of broader 
state efforts to regulate norms of social appropriateness. While propaganda films promoted Thai 
culture as the antithesis of communism, censorship of Western films asserted the same in 
response to Americanization. 
Intriguingly, and contrary to most conceptions of Cold War-era censorship in Thailand, 
the censors were not primarily occupied with criticisms of the government or portrayals of 
communism.278 Instead, they most often focused on depictions of sexuality, intimacy, and 
marital relationships. The censors clearly perceived films as having a sensory impact on 
audiences. The majority of censored films were deemed to be “arousing sexual pleasure” (yuayu 
kamarom) and “violating morality” (khad to sinlatham). As foreign films included more 
controversial depictions of sexuality and intimate relationships following the decline of 
censorship in the United States and Europe, Thai censors often objected to their content.279 In 
censoring these stimulating films, moreover, the members of the Board displayed a clear concern 
about the types of feelings and thoughts aroused within the population. 
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Among the films censored for sexual indecency, a large number of films were banned 
due to prominent displays of adultery.280 In 1971, for example, records are available on twenty-
seven of the thirty-nine total films banned by the censors, revealing that (at least) ten films were 
banned for adultery that year.281 The use of morality (sinlatham) by the censors reveals ongoing 
attempts by bureaucrats and the urban middle-class to define Thai culture as simultaneously 
modern and traditional, and to cultivate a Buddhist ethical framework for the nation. Adultery 
became a major site of debate in that process.  
The censors’ focus on adultery was connected to contemporary changes in global film 
censorship, the rise of domestic women’s rights movements, and legal challenges to family law.  
It also evidenced anxieties regarding public expressions of sexual intimacy by the bureaucracy. 
By the 1950s, the bureaucracy was firmly ensconced at the apex of the Thai middle class.282 
Public adherence to key social norms of sexual behavior, especially the image of heterosexual 
marital monogamy, was fundamental to urban Bangkok middle class and bureaucratic identities. 
However, scandals over the extramarital affairs of government officials frequently made the 
news, generating tensions with middle-class ideals. As adultery became an act simultaneously 
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regulated and committed by the bureaucracy, it became a critical issue on which concerns 
regarding middle-class, urban identity centered.  
Despite the censors’ evident concern with depictions of sex and sexuality in public 
media, academic discussions of how Thai governments conceptualized threats to the state during 
the Cold War period dwell largely on political and economic issues.283 Instead, I argue that 
regulation of sexual morality was critical to responses to changing social dynamics and 
internationalization in the 1960s and 1970s. The developmental and international strategic 
priorities of the Thai state during the “American Era” introduced goods and infrastructure 
required by modern capitalist consumer societies, including sensuous Hollywood films. But 
these developments, as I detailed in chapter two, also reinforced conservative notions of a Thai 
cultural and social order. Moreover, the connection between the visibility of the sex industry in 
Bangkok and areas surrounding US bases reinforced women’s sexual behavior and feminine 
morality as a site of vulnerability to the Thai nation.284 The censors dealt with those 
contradictions by appealing to, and thereby reinforcing, so-called traditional norms of “Thai” 
behavior and morality. Once again, those constructions were mapped on to the female body.  
While foreign films with prominent displays of adultery were banned, domestic 
productions operated within a different set of constraints. Domestic films were produced within a 
regime of self-censorship enforced by both the state and middle-class, educated filmmakers. I 
explore the differences in the production and reception of foreign and domestic films through a 
comparison of a Thai production, Piak Poster’s 1972 The Adulterer (Chu), with a foreign film, 
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Bergman’s The Touch (1970).285 As a domestic film director, Piak had the social and cultural 
knowledge necessary to produce a film that drew on the appropriate moral framework. The 
Adulterer simultaneously depicted typically controversial subjects, while still operating within 
mainstream discourses of Buddhist moral decency and karma. The Touch, by contrast, was 
produced in a different social and political context. When the film crossed national borders, the 
implications of its message changed. I use the comparison to explore dynamics of social 
regulation that were masked by domestic self-censorship. The gendered regulation of sexuality in 
particular was cloaked in concepts such as “morality” and “tradition.” Or, as the censors might 
say, “This depiction of adultery violates all of the beautiful and good standards of morality of the 
Thai people.”  
This chapter examines the social and political implications of censorship of sexuality 
broadly and adultery specifically in Thai cinema. I focus on censorship of films from the early 
1960s through 1972, when the most complete records are available.286 These years also spanned 
the period of authoritarian rule under the military dictatorships of Sarit and Thanom. As film 
censorship increased, so too did the censorship of depictions of adultery. I begin with an 
overview of the history of censorship in Thailand from the 1930s, before discussing the 
implications of censorship practices for the 1960s-1970s. 
“I’m evil! I’m a very bad person. I have a lover! This whore is dirty. I should die! I 
should die. I should die! I have a lover! I should die!” So proclaims Riam, the female lead in 
Piak Poster’s 1972 hit film The Adulterer (Chu). At the start of the film, Riam survives a boat 
crash and washes ashore on a remote and idyllic island off the coast of Thailand. Choeng, the 
lone inhabitant of the island for many years, finds her. Choeng rapes her, after which the two live 
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together as husband and wife although they are not legally married. Riam becomes pregnant 
shortly after with their child Daeng. Jumping ahead to four years later, the family appears happy 
in the island paradise. However, disaster strikes when Choeng is blinded after getting fish poison 
in his eyes while diving. When Riam calls on the nearest doctor, she finds instead his new 
assistant, Thep, Riam’s former lover. She asks Thep to help treat her husband, showing him a 
bag of pearls that Choeng gave her to pay the doctor. Instead of treating Choeng, however, Thep 
gives him a sleeping drug. Thep reveals to Riam that he intends to find Choeng’s secret stash of 
pearls, which Riam understands to be enormous. He threatens her that he has her husband and 
child at his mercy, and rapes her. After this turn of events, Riam colludes with Thep to drug 
Choeng.  
 However, after Choeng fails to take the pills one night, he discovers the intrigue and 
affair between Thep and Riam. Pretending to still be blind, he convinces them that he would like 
to share his pearl stash with them. He tells them that he hid the pearls off the shore of another 
isolated island. Once there, Choeng reveals that he can see and that he knows everything. 
Choeng holds the two at gunpoint, and forces Thep to tie Riam’s hands together. It is then that 
Riam so dramatically admits that she has a lover. In a surprise twist, however, she claims that her 
lover’s name is “Choeng” and that Thep was in fact her original husband. Choeng decides to let 
the two go free. But Thep is still determined to find the pearls and initiates a gunfight with 
Choeng. While attempting to defend Choeng and Daeng, Riam is shot and killed by Thep. 
Furious at the loss of Riam, Choeng beats Thep unconscious. He gathers Riam’s body and brings 
her along with Daeng into the boat to return to their home. Thep awakens alone. Unable to swim, 
he is left stranded to die on an island where no one ever goes.   
 119 
While The Adulterer opens with luxurious scenes from Thailand’s southern islands, the 
opening scene of Ingmar Bergman’s The Touch features the rapid juxtaposition of a corpse’s face 
and the wedding rings on the dead woman’s hands. The images are seen through the eyes of 
Karin, the daughter of the dead woman. The loud ticking of the clock on the woman’s hospital-
bed side table and the chimes of Big Ben in the background provide the soundtrack to the scene. 
As Karin leaves the hospital room after a last kiss goodbye, her departing glance returns again to 
her mother’s hands. But before she can leave, a nurse stops Karin to ask if she would like her 
mother’s wedding rings. The nurse retrieves them before Karin can answer, and gives them to 
her. Karin flees to a coatroom, and sobs while cradling her mother’s rings. It is in this state that 
Karin first meets her future lover, David.  
If The Adulterer blurred the lines of what constituted marriage and adultery, The Touch 
immediately makes it clear that the story is about the bonds of formal marriage. Karin has a 
seemingly wonderful life with her husband, Andreas, and her two children in a large home in a 
small Swedish village. Her daily life is portrayed early on in a sequence following the daily 
chores—making beds, vacuuming, and so on—that fill her day. The cheery music, reminiscent of 
1950s commercial pop music, links Karin’s activities to those of any housewife in any 
American-style suburb, perhaps a nod to the international audience of the film. Although the 
scenes establish a type of tediousness to Karin’s life, her reasons for the affair with David, a 
visiting anthropologist, are unclear. David suffers from severe depression, and emotionally and 
physically abuses Karin. The affair continues for years. Aware of the affair, Andreas waits for 
Karin to end it herself. Finally, David leaves Karin, just as she discovers that she is pregnant. In 
the end, the future of Karin and Andreas’ relationship is unresolved. David’s return in the last 
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scene of the film is met with Karin’s clear resolve not to reinitiate the affair. But her future and 
the future of her unborn child is left unclear.  
Despite the inclusion of repeated rape scenes, violence, murder, adultery, and attempted 
robbery in The Adulterer, the film had no problem passing the film censors nor was it received 
with any controversy by critics once it began showing in theaters. By contrast, both the 
Censorship Officials and the Appeals Board unanimously voted to ban The Touch. Rather than 
citing David’s abuse of Karin or the inclusion of nudity, the censors clearly stated that the 
depiction of adultery justified the banning of the film. The differing reactions to the films is 
made comprehensible by contextualizing them first in the history of film censorship from the 
creation of the first Film Act in 1930, and second in the social and political climate of the 1960s 
to 1970s period.  
King Vajiravudh was the first of the Chakri monarchs to consider formal regulation of the 
film industry. As the size of the industry increased, the government grew concerned over its 
potential impacts on citizens. It is also likely that the broader context of political opposition and 
criticisms of the monarchy increased Vajiravudh’s consideration of regulation of the public 
sphere more generally. Furthermore, censorship was increasingly common in colonial Southeast 
Asia more generally. Indeed, Siam was relatively slow to institute any formal policies. 
Europeans and Americans had increased their efforts to censor films played in their Southeast 
Asia colonies. The American-colonized Philippines, Act. No. 3582 created the first Board of 
Censorship in 1929. American commercial films were often targeted due to the perception that 
they would propagate notions of independence and revolution.287 
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Before the institution of formal censorship, informal censorship operated through the 
1920s, with royal approval needed for all activities related to cinema, from participation as an 
actor to exhibition.288 This oversight has often been attributed to the desire by royal parties for 
Siam to appear civilized in the eyes of Western viewers. In 1928, for example, Amnat Mut 
(Black Power) became the first domestically produced film to be banned due to its portrayal of 
prostitutes and Chinese gangsters.289 After news that Henry Macrae had filmed an execution 
scene in his 1930 Suwanna of Siam, Prince Kamphaengphet set up a committee to censor the 
film prior to its release. The motivation, by most accounts, was to protect the image of Siam. As 
one newspaper commented, “I would like to blame the local officer who did not save the honour 
of the country by forbidding them to [film the execution]. The execution will represent the 
barbarism of Siam.”290  
Indeed, anxiety over inappropriate portrayals of Siam in films abroad is clear. A 1931 
letter from the Siamese Legation in London, for example, was sent to Bangkok after a film 
showed in a London theater depicting Thailand in an inappropriate manner. The author pondered 
whether or not the legation should respond by showing films more favorable to the nation.291 A 
similar attitude is revealed in reactions to the production and exhibition of the 1927 silent feature 
Chang: A Drama of the Wilderness. Produced by Americans Ernest B. Schoedsack and Merian 
C. Cooper, the film chronicled the life of a Northeastern farmer in the Siamese jungle, complete 
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with man-eating tigers and marauding elephants. The film was shot in Nan province. After the 
filmmakers received the assistance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Prince Damrong in 
the production of the film, they wrote to Damrong requesting official recognition of the film. 
Apparently, they were under the impression that the international success of the film would be 
viewed favorably by the Siamese government.  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs thought otherwise. In a letter to Damrong (to which 
Damrong subsequently agreed), the Chief Minister wrote that, rather than ask for further support 
and recognition from the Siamese government, Schoedsack and Cooper should instead be 
thanking them for their assistance.292 Ultimately, the filmmakers had to made do with the public 
favor of Prince Rangsit, who wrote that,  
I am delighted that this, the best picture of its kind, is made in Siam and gives 
information about my native country, which I adore mostly, to the world. This picture 
wins praise for Siam and its population. Such a picture broadens the horizons of the 
public. 
The Lao farmer, in his hard struggle for existence, is a pioneer of Siamese culture 
and civilization in the jungle. The film itself I would like to call the High Song of human 
working power, energy and ability. Its hero, the Lao farmer Kru, is in this picture the 
symbolism of Siam. 
 
Ironically, it was this very content, and the depiction of the Lao farmer as representative of Siam, 
that offended the officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the letter denying the request for 
recognition, the Chief Minister complained that the film portrayed the people of Siam in the 
same way that the people of Africa might be.293 
However, it is also likely that, given the realities of Siamese film distribution, the 
authorities were concerned with domestic, as well as international, audiences. Certainly, 
censorship operated informally based on what was considered appropriate. For example, 
although the Prajadhipok expressed dissatisfaction at the portrayal of Siam in Amnat Mut, he also 
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granted the filmmaker the right to screen the film for as long as it took to recoup the cost of 
production. However, after news leaked regarding the king’s opinion, the police banned the film 
altogether for its inappropriate depictions of Siam. Even after the filmmaker cut the offending 
scenes and released the film under a new title, Bangkok theaters refused to play it.294  
Amidst ongoing rumors of formal censorship legislation, a debate broke out in the Thai 
press over the appropriateness of that action. In 1919, the subject came up in a column for Siam 
Ratsadon. In it, the author explained the subject of film regulation: 
Film inevitably gives knowledge to its diverse audiences, and the films that 
various companies order into Siam all pass the censor. But now there is news that the 
Ministry of the Interior intends to institute censorship in Siam of another layer, due to 
their understanding that films are the “teacher” that instructs criminals. Regarding this, if 
this is true, it would be agreeable. 
On our side, we have the opposite view, which is that we think that films 
inevitably teach audiences not to be criminals. Because in each and every film that shows 
stories about criminals or bandits, the criminal is always the one to lose. Even if film is a 
“teacher” of the finesse and method of many things for criminals, film will also teach the 
method for police to catch them in the same way, no? And if we believe that film as a 
“teacher” of criminals must be banned, the police will never have the opportunity to 
study ways to catch them either. At this time, the Gulf of Siam is not shut. If those 
bastard criminals that study films creep in from outside—even just one or two people—
will we all be destroyed because we will not have that knowledge? Will they easily eat us 
raw?295 
 
While clearly intended in jest and to poke fun at the concern over the impact of films, the article 
captured the early opposition to film censorship. Yet the debate continued for many years.296  
In part, the debate concerned whether the Thai censors should be regulating foreign films 
at all. As a writer in Thailand’s first cinema magazine, Siam Phapphayon, argued, films 
produced in other countries, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, were already 
censored for their domestic markets. Therefore, it didn’t make sense for Thai censors to, in 
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effect, double-censor those films. Films arrived in Thailand already labeled with the country of 
origin’s censorship approval seal. When films were exported and imported amongst free nations, 
such as the United States and England, the receiving country felt no need to review the film’s 
status.297  
Furthermore, as one newspaper argued, in “countries like Singapore, Burma, and India, 
that have censors cut films again, it is because those are colonial states… that don’t allow 
subjects to know about the outside world or capitalism. That they slash American film is because 
the censors in those countries are very strict with American films, which are currently 
flourishing.”298 By implication, Thailand was a free country, and therefore did not need colonial-
style censorship. Double-censorship, that is to say, was a mark of a colonized nation. Therefore, 
the newspaper claimed, it was only domestic productions that needed to be censored by Thai 
officials. 
But even at this early stage, national differences in what was considered morally 
acceptable to show on screen played a role in considerations of censorship. On 28 September 
1923, the author “Trident” (Drisun) argued in Siam Ratsadon that censorship was necessary to 
protect Siam from the threat of foreign film content. In outlining what needed to be screened by 
the censors, the author included, “All films that companies or individuals import to show in the 
country must pass the censorship representatives first. If they include stories involving criminals 
committing robbery, murder, and shameful stories of adultery as well. The censors should 
remove them, force the distributors to send them out of the country, or ban them from exhibition 
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in the country definitely.”299 Even in the earliest discussions of film censorship, adultery figured 
prominently. 
In an April 1930 article in the newspaper Nang Sanuk, or Film Fun, a writer by an author 
with the pen name Suwan Dara, or “Heavenly Star,” discussed film censorship in Germany and 
France. After explaining the concept of censorship to the readers, the author criticized the 
practice, writing that censorship boards had more khwam-soe, or silliness, than khwam-sen, or 
sense.300 This play on the Thai adoption of the word “censor” used the similar sounding words 
soe and sen in opposite order, suggests how ridiculous the word must have sounded to Thai 
speakers’ ears in 1930. That the author felt the need to explain censorship indicated that most 
readers either did not know about the concept as applied to film and/or did not know the 
borrowed English word “censor.”  
The discussion of censorship was a timely one, since from 1923-1930 the Siamese 
government under the absolute monarchy considered legislation to regulate the film industry. 
Finally, in 1930 the King Prajadhipok’s government passed the Film Act. This broad law aimed 
to regulate every aspect of the film industry, from production to advertising and exhibition. The 
most commonly used part was section four, which stated that: “It shall be unlawful to produce or 
to exhibit in a place of public entertainment any motion picture or advertisement which, by itself 
or by its probable consequences, is or is likely to be, contrary to public order or good morals, or 
to export any motion picture or advertisement of such nature produced in the Kingdom.”301 In 
every document banning films from Thailand from the 1930s through the 1970s, the censors 
used section four as their mandate. The law also created the Board of Film Censorship. Board 
members followed official guidelines produced by the Ministry of the Interior that prohibited 
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insults of religion, pornography, insults to the monarchy, content that might create distrust in 
government, and “presenting an example of bad habits,” among other categories. While the 
guideline’s language framed censors’ decisions, its ambiguity allowed the censors broad control 
over what was deemed “inappropriate.” Decisions were made through a combination of 
institutional and individual motivations.  
The guidelines are critical evidence in understanding the fate of films such as The 
Adulterer and The Touch. While the guidelines provided the framework for asserting “Thai” 
morality, they were also clearly modeled on the guidelines used by the Official Censor of 
Cinematographs in the British-controlled Straits Settlements.302 Similarities may be seen in the 
censorship of cruelty to animals, offenses to religious feelings, depictions of famous criminals, 
and sexual indecency.303 Thai censorship was also similar to the top-down censorship practices 
employed in Southeast Asian colonial states. David Newman observed these differences between 
the colonial frameworks in the Straits Settlements, Shanghai International Settlement, and Hong 
Kong, which were enforced by the police and legislated by governing institutions, and Britain 
and the United States. In those two former cases, censorship was institutionalized by bodies with 
little or no legal or legislative powers to enforce or regulate them.304  
Early censorship legislation in Singapore also impacted the Thai film market, as 
Singapore was the major hub through which films were imported into Thailand prior to World 
War II. In fact, Britain instituted one of the earliest colonial film censorship systems in the Straits 
Settlements, with ordinances introduced in 1908, 1912, and 1917 that created a strict system of 
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regulation and enforcement over film distribution and production.305 Newman described the 
guidelines regulating film content as including “restrictions on scenes showing a variety of 
criminal activities such as hold-ups, safe-breaking, and murder, as well as dignity-related scenes 
such those where “women do not conduct themselves in a proper manner,” scenes showing 
Europeans under the power of natives or being persecuted in some way, or scenes likely to 
provoke racial or religious animosity.”306 But at that stage, the vast majority of films were 
banned for inclusion of violence and crime.307 
Much as with the colonial territories of Asia, Thai state authorities, rather than 
institutions related to the film industry, determined and enforced the policy and practice of 
censorship. Violation of these rules could result in punitive action or fines. The formulation of 
the Film Act was indicative of the layered hierarchies of power in operation during the period in 
which the Act was conceived. The influence of Western imperial censorship models reflected the 
desire of Siamese elites to assert the nation as thoroughly modernizing and civilized, often 
according to notions imported from and, at times, imposed by the West.  
The double-censoring of foreign films and the use of colonial censorship frameworks, 
moreover, recalls Tamara Loos’ observation that Siam engaged in “competitive colonialism” 
with European powers as the leaders sought to define their own authority and territory in a 
climate of imperialism.308 The regulation of foreign films highlights competition, protection, and 
control over managing the psychologies, loyalties, and pleasures of the Siamese people. Related 
to this, Ann Stoler established the ways in which European colonial regimes in Southeast Asia 
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perceived the family and intimate practices as “sites in which state authority could be secured or 
irreparably undermined.”309 Similar forces may be observed in Thailand, where nationalist 
impulses asserted so-called “national” patterns of public expressions of intimacy in order to 
demarcate the borders of Thainess. Indeed, censorship of film increased at the same time that 
Thailand was rapidly opening to American consumer goods and cultural models, such as 
Hollywood films. Whereas Siamese elite polygyny was defended at the beginning of the 
twentieth century as a facet of Siamese culture, by the middle of the century the argument 
reversed to contrast Thai sexual morality with the Western sexual revolution. 
From the 1920 onwards, Hollywood films dominated the Thai film market much as they 
did in the rest of the world. The market share of American films only increased after the end of 
World War II, as the US government and international business community actively promoted 
the cause of American abroad. In the 1960s and 1970s, the median percentage share of the 
market held by the US was close to 32%.310 In Thailand, this coincided with the development of 
transport and communications infrastructure and, after 1950, the strengthening of the Thai-US 
alliance. Similar trends were apparent in Europe in the 1920-1950s, where governments’ fears of 
Europeans becoming “temporary citizens” of the US prompted protectionist attempts and the rise 
of “national” cinemas.311 In part because Thailand’s cinema industry developed more slowly, 
these tensions emerged only after the 1950s. 
But anxieties over the models offered in American cinema also emerged with the massive 
infusion of US consumer goods and military personnel during the 1960s, as Thailand became an 
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important bulwark against communism and major base of US operations during the Vietnam 
War. Indeed, Benedict Anderson termed the period from the 1950s to 1970s Thailand’s 
“American Era,” based on the pervasiveness of American political and cultural influence.312 The 
US worked closely with Thailand’s government to promote an anti-communist, capitalist way of 
life. In that respect, Thailand’s censorship guidelines and those of the US, namely the Production 
Code, sometimes called the Hays Code, enforced by the Hollywood studio system, worked 
together to enforce an anti-communist, consumer-friendly cinematic environment. With so much 
of Thailand’s film imports coming from the United States, domestic American censorship very 
much impacted the types of films screened in Thailand.  
This synergy was also true for the regulation of sexuality and morality in cinema. Under 
the Production Code Administration (PCA) of the US, films could not portray explicit sex 
scenes, interracial relations, or non-normative intimate relationships, including adultery, amongst 
a range of other restrictions. American film scholar Thomas Doherty has noted the general 
consensus that “Hollywood under the Code was variously, cumulatively, and intractably racist, 
patriarchal, misogynistic, homophobic, capitalistic, and colonialist” and upholding “bourgeois, 
heteronormative, American-centric values…”313 Indeed, there was very little in the Thai 
censorship rules that were not already covered in American ones. While critiques and scholars of 
censorship in Thailand have generally viewed the operations of the censorship board as existing 
within nationally delineated boundaries, in fact the censorship process was a transnational one. 
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But through the 1960s, and especially after 1964, films increasingly flouted those 
rules.314 European cinema in particular challenged the sexual normative structure that guided and 
was reinforced by the censors to construct politically and socially relevant storylines. French 
New Wave filmmakers used new film styles in editing and narrative structure to challenge both 
mainstream cinema and contemporary social and political issues. Jean-Luc Godard, for example, 
used an adulterous married couple trying to kill each other to critique bourgeois society in his 
iconic Week-end (1967). Within the United States, censorship codes were repeated struck down 
in favor of free speech protections, especially with the 1960s.315 As in Europe, furthermore, 
sexuality and changing views in the US towards the role of sex in public contributed to changes 
in the regulation of film.316 In recognition of this pervasive opposition, the code was finally 
replaced with a ratings system in 1968. For the first time, American films, as well as European 
films, presented Thai censors with starkly different depictions of morality and sexuality in 
society.  
The only other site of film production and distribution that came close to competing with 
the United States was Hong Kong and Taiwan.317 Most of the films came from or through Hong 
Kong, which implemented censorship laws very much in keeping with other British colonies (as 
well as via the British Board of Film Classification [BBFC]), with especially strict regulations 
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implement from the 1930s onwards.318 Furthermore, film historian David Newman argued that, 
“whereas the BBFC had a more direct impact through the content and form of censorship in the 
different colonies and dominions, the PCA potentially had an indirect impact through the pre-
production vetting of scripts in the United States, contributing to the decrease in the level of 
offensive scenes in films arriving in Asia.”319 In any case, it appears that there were either very 
few or no cases in which films from Hong Kong or Taiwan were censored (for 1969-1970 see 
chart below). 
While the importation and circulation of Chinese-language films is important, and still 
relatively unexplored in studies of the Thai film industry, the influence of Hollywood loomed 
largest in the minds of Thai officials and censors. Intriguingly, the very bureaucrats that worked 
in Thailand’s government to promote joint US-Thai interests also served on the censorship 
board, and in that capacity worked to censor American films from exhibition in Thailand. This 
was in part, as discussed, due to the changing environment of transnational film censorship, 
especially in the United States. But it also evidenced a deep ambiguity on the part of Thai 
bureaucrats, as well as the Thai population at large, with regard to the alliance with the United 
States and role of American culture in Thai society. That tension only increased with the 1970s. 
In the cinema industry, Thai filmmakers lobbied the government for protection of the domestic 
industry. Finally, in the 1977 the Thai government raised tariffs on foreign films, resulting in a 
four-year boycott, from 1977 to 1981, of the Thai market by Hollywood film distributors.  
Ironically, at the same time that criticisms of the foreign films were increasing, the 
government began supporting the revival what would become the Miss Thailand beauty pageant. 
The pageant had its origins in the Miss Siam pageant, which ran from 1934 to 1940 and again 
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from 1948 to 1955.320 That iteration was cancelled in 1955, in large part due to immoral 
behavior on the part of the participants.321 While beauty contests were popular, they were also 
controversial for the way they displayed women’s bodies in public. It was revived with the 
support of Field Marshal Praphat Charusethian, the minister of the interior, Thanom’s deputy 
prime minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army. When Miss Universe, Inc. 
visited Thailand in 1961, the same year that the first national development plan was put in place, 
the organization convinced the Vajiravudh College Beauty Queen Costume Contest to change its 
name to the Miss Thailand Pageant.322  
However, it would need the government’s permission to do so. Praphat supported the 
move, arguing that it would provide a model of proper feminine behavior. Specifically, “To 
honor Thai women Miss Thailand never does anything inappropriate. They are properly married 
and work properly. Beauty Queens with other names are sometimes misled to become minor 
wives. We must select someone who can guard her own name.”323 Although the idea was to a 
large degree imported from abroad, therefore, the contest would serve to reinforce Thai 
femininity and, importantly, moral sexual and marital behaviors. Praphat’s distinction between 
appropriate pageants like the Miss Thailand one and others was the women’s future marital 
position. Miss Thailand participants would go on to be wives. Thus, even at a time of growing 
anti-Americanism, an American institution could nonetheless provide an opportunity to 
showcase Thainess. The pageants remained controversial, however, as many, including student 
activists, saw them as putting women on display for the pleasure of men. Very much like foreign 
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films, therefore, pageants as public displays of femininity and the sexualized feminine body took 
on ambiguous and controversial meanings.  
As with the pageants, film was increasingly subject to state intervention. While the laws 
regulating film determined the relationship between the censors and imagined audiences, the 
structure of Thailand’s censorship board also faced legislative change. The censors themselves 
were typically highly ranked bureaucrats. The institutional and social background of the censors 
contributed significantly to their judgments. Although the earliest censorship boards were 
comprised mainly of royal and noble men, after the end of the absolute monarchy membership 
increasingly included bureaucrats and police officers.324 By 1958, a year after Sarit’s coup, the 
list of bureaucratic representatives had expanded to include those from Public Relations, 
Religious Affairs, Public Health, and Foreign Affairs, amongst others.325  
The two major changes to the board during the Sarit-Thanom years were the 1962 
creation of the Censorship Representatives, and the 1972 transfer of the board to the Department 
of the Police. The two events bookended the intensification of censorship under the Sarit-
Thanom governments.  In 1962, the board was split into two sections, with the Censorship 
Representatives responsible for initial decisions and the Censorship Appeals Board for 
appeals.326 While the appeals board maintained its membership of elite bureaucrats and police 
officers, the representatives included a variety of bureaucrats, members of the film industry, 
journalists, and foreign language experts, amongst others who at a high point totaled a 
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remarkable 177 individuals. If a film distributor wanted to show a film at a public theater, they 
were first required to submit the film for examination by the representatives. If the film did not 
pass, the distributor or filmmaker could request an appeal. The resulting decision by the appeals 
board was final.  
It is very difficult to find complete data on film censorship during any period of 
Thailand’s film history. The only systematic information available is on the number of films 
passed by the censorship, as Figure 1.1 shows between the years 1961 and 1979. This data has 
been used to support a number of arguments, most of which are questionable. Some of these will 
be discussed in subsequent chapters. To begin with, it is unclear if the data is based on the 
nationality of the film distribution companies or the nationality of the films themselves (although 
with co-productions, even that is problematic). This is particularly significant in the US category, 
as the censorship documents clearly show that US distribution companies imported significant 
numbers of non-American films into Thailand. It is also unclear what caused the gradual decline 
in US films passed between the years 1968 and 1971, followed by the jump in 1972. That 
momentary increase was then followed by another decline from 1973 until1974. Indeed, looking 
at the numbers, it is clear that the number of US imports rose and fell in cycles. Therefore, it is 
difficult to distinguish any patterns in terms of importation.  
The statistics on films passed by the board fails to support arguments that the years 
between 1973 and 1976 saw less censorship and more freedoms (although they also are not 
complete enough to refute it). The numbers of films passed between 1973 and 1976 were on 
average lower than previous years, including during years of strict censorship. While that may 
have been attributable to a number of factors, including anti-American sentiments with the 
closing of the Vietnam conflict or market insecurity, it’s also clear that there wasn’t a dramatic 
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flourishing of cinematic freedom. The argument may be more valid for Thai films, which did see 
a rise in those years of about ten films per year. But again, that may be more evidence of 
increasing domestic production, rather than greater freedoms.  
 
Figure 3.1 Censorship of Films from Major Import Countries327 
It is quite clear that in the 1960s and early 1970s the government devoted great resources 
to censoring films. Just as the numbers of censors increased, so too did legislation regulating the 
content of films. The regulations were so extensive that, in 1968, Rat Pettanyi complained that, 
“The censors in Thailand are terrorizing the producers. If they persist in their present attitude it 
will involve a loss of several million baht for the Thai industry.”328 New restrictions banned 
inappropriate music (especially rock and roll) and any negative portrayals of state officials and 
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institutions. By 1970, the list of items to be prohibited in films had nearly doubled.329 A 1971 
law, meanwhile, cracked down on screenings of uncensored films in provinces outside 
Bangkok.330 Hollywood distributors also supported the regulation of up-country screenings, 
which they viewed as a black market for foreign productions.331 
Finally, in 1972 Thanom transferred the board to the Police Department. The order 
specifically referenced the problem of theaters screening films that “induce or promote the 
violation of morality.”332 The Chief of Police was given the right to appoint all members of the 
Officials and the Appeals division. Subsequently, the representation of police increased in both 
bodies. The chief also had the right to cancel the application for public screening of any film. 
The police controlled the Censorship Board from 1972 until the reform of film censorship laws 
in 2007.  
Even as the government refined its regulation of the film industry, in 1970 film 
advertisers began to use sexual imagery in film posters. This trend accompanied attempts by the 
film industry to attract larger audiences for domestic productions. The placement of sexualized 
depictions of female characters in advertisements proved particularly successful. Wimonrat 
termed the strategy “Films Selling Sex.”333 Even the female leads, whose characters portrayed 
morally upright sexual and gender norms, were sexualized in promotional materials and films.  
After the October 14, 1973 popular uprising against the authoritarian government, 
filmmakers and advertisers increased their use of sex to sell films substantially.334 In some cases, 
the use of sex in films transformed from advertising strategies to, in some cases, serious 
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engagement with social and political issues.335 Prince Chatrichaloem’s 1974 Theptida rongraem 
(Hotel Angel), a sympathetic portrayal of a prostitute, is an example of this.336 I will discuss 
Chatrichaloem’s filmmaking further in chapter five. However, it is not possible to accurately 
assert the rise or decline of censorship after 1972 due to the inaccessibility and incompleteness of 
documents on censorship decisions during that period.  
To a large extent, as will be discussed in greater detail in chapter five, the “social 
activist” films of the 1970s were inspired by the “Art for Life” movement popularized amongst 
leftist and progressive circles. But film censorship found support in those circles as well. As 
early as the 1950s, Jit Phumisak, under the pen name Sinlapa Prechacharoen, wrote that for the 
Phibun government, “the most urgent task of our film censorship committee at this time is to 
screen the ethnically disagreeable influences from the American imperialist films from poisoning 
the minds of our people any further.”337 The statement, while not about sex or sexuality per se, 
indicates that both anti-Americanism and arguments for censorship was, for different reasons, 
shared by both conservative and radical elements. 
The question of obscenity, and what qualified as obscene, was also debated in 1950s 
Marxist and progressive literary circles, specifically in the Writers Club.338 These discussions 
included such “classic” works as Khun chang khun phaen, which included multiple sex scenes 
and an adulterous love triangle between the three lead protagonists, one female and two male. 
One of the formative writers of the Literature for Life movement, Atsani Phonlachan, not only 
viewed many classics of Thai literature to be feudalist works of obscenity intended to 
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indoctrinate the people, but also evidence of the privileging of content over form.339 While these 
debates related to obscenity and pornography broadly, they seem to indicate a rejection by both 
government representatives and influential progressive groups of sexuality as a form of 
legitimate artistic or political expression. They also show a willingness on all sides to support 
some form of censorship.   
Regardless, censors continued to regulate depictions of sex in films and advertising. All 
depictions of sex scandals or inappropriate sexual behavior by officials or police continued to be 
taboo. The 1967 American film Carmen Baby was banned in 1974 for depicting a police officer 
involved with a prostitute.340 Authorities specifically targeted film promotion in a 1976 
regulation prohibiting pornography (broadly defined) from use in public advertisements. A 
policy adopted in September 1976 sought to monitor language used by live film narrators. As 
May Adadol Ingawanij has discussed, film narrators, called nak phak, narrated films live (instead 
of using the original soundtrack), often with original scripts and improvisation.341 However, by 
the 1970s they were scorned by middle class audiences and increasingly isolated in a rapidly 
changing film industry. In an interview with Thai Rat in November 1976, Major General Praman 
Adireksan, then the deputy prime minister, reported that efforts to increase regulation of content 
in films were aimed at films that presented a “danger” to youths and those that “violated Thai 
culture.”342 After the 1976 military coup, the police department replaced the guidelines 
established under the Ministry of the Interior with four prohibited categories, including those 
films encouraging sexual abuse, depictions of cruelty against humans and animals, presenting 
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political issues (domestic and international), and violating “established moral, cultural, and social 
values.”343  
The new regulations in turn resulted in less willingness by Thai filmmakers and 
distributors to rely on sex as a tool to promote and sell films, leading to a major decline in the 
“Films Selling Sex” trend.344 Thus, the intensification of censorship from 1962 to 1972 created 
new tensions between the film industry and the Thai state. The resulting struggle between the 
film industry and the state highlighted sexuality as an important site of debate over social 
hierarchies, nationally bounded notions of tradition, and Thailand’s engagement with modernity. 
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, these forces had reached a critical point.  
On 9 November 1971, the Censor Representatives decided to ban The Todd Killings, a 
Warner Bros. film about an older man who seduces and murders teenage girls. In their decision, 
the Representatives wrote,  
This film depicts a lifestyle of young American men and women in which they seek 
happiness through illegal methods, including drugs and the use of drugs to arouse illicit 
sexual feelings, that violate the beautiful morality and culture of the Thai. Examples 
include closeness between youths of different sexes; joking between sexes that goes so 
far as to take their clothing off in each others’ company for fun and results in 
pornographic imagery; depiction of relationships between the sexes that arouses sexual 
feelings, etc. In addition, [the film] normalizes the mass murder of women by a mentally 
ill man, thus reflecting an image of society that is not concerned about mass murder. This 
depiction is bad for Thai youths and should therefore not be spread. We find that the film 
is violates the morality-culture (sinlatham-wathanatham) and peace (khwam sangop) of 
the country.”345 
 
The language used derived from the official guidelines, especially “morality” (sinlatham) and 
“peace” (khwam sangop). The justification of “peace” was typically invoked to justify 
censorship of political or criminal issues. Films containing that type of content were accused of 
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violating the “peacefulness” of Thailand. The violation of “morality,” by contrast, was deployed 
to justify censorship of films with inappropriate sexual context.  
The language used originated specifically from the opening statement of the 1931 
guidelines that declared that, “It is forbidden to make or show or exhibit motion pictures or 
announcements having characteristics that violate peace and order or good morality.”346 Censors 
“must examine whether or not the content will cause wickedness (khwam chua rai) towards 
government administration and the people everywhere and damage morality or not.” The exact 
meaning and application of the terms “morality” and “wickedness” lacked specificity or 
definition. Ultimately, the censors had the power to apply the guidelines as they saw fit. But, as 
shown in the history of censorship, the guidelines asserted a discursive and institutional 
framework that dictated a focus on the ambiguous concept of “morality.” As anxieties over 
public depictions of adultery demonstrate, those institutional and individual motivations 
intertwined in conflicting and productive ways. 
In their deliberations on the morality of films, the censors constantly referenced the need 
to think about how audiences would consume and react to the films. In their 1970 decision to ban 
the erotic ninja film Shinobi No Manji (1968), for example, the Board of Censor Officials found 
that the sexual depictions in the film presented a “danger” to juveniles. The 1969 Swiss film The 
Doctor Says was banned for its inclusion of abortion. Officials wrote that while the film may 
serve an educational purpose for adults, it was not appropriate for juveniles with “insufficient 
knowledge” (of what they did not specify) and who might imitate the behaviors seen in the 
film.347 These judgments evidence the censors’ paternalistic concerns that audiences would view 
films as models for behavior and imitation, not simply entertainment products. In the fight over 
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which cultural models Thai audiences would have access to, these tensions became most notable 
in the question of morality.  
The modern Thai state was very much concerned with the “morality” of its citizenry. The 
idea of morality is usually expressed with the word sinlatham. Although the word framed the 
censors’ decisions, it was never explicitly defined. Scholars of Thailand have noted the role of 
concepts such as civility (siwilai), Thainess (khwampenthai), and culture (watthanatham) in 
modern Thai constructions of nation and identity.348 But morality has been only implicit as an 
historical framing concept. In the modern period, the idea of Buddhist morality more broadly is 
relevant for political framings of legitimacy and the ways in which elected governments have 
been delegitimated and coups justified. In his discussion of the development of hyper-royalism 
since the 1970s, Thongchai observed the class-based notions of “good people,” which deployed 
dharma-based notions of merit to argue that goodness and righteousness was developed over 
time.349  
While these notions emerged as part of the sacralization of the monarchy under King 
Bhumibol, they have also had an impact on the idea of morality of political discourse more 
generally.350 Aim Sinpeng found that discourses on the corruption of Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra’s government leading up to the 2006 military coup, especially as expressed by the 
urban, middle-class, and ultra-royalist coalition People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), 
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“centered around three main issues: (i) state capture; (ii) morality (Buddhist); and (iii) 
nationalism/royalism.”351 In terms of electoral politics, this discourse and notions of merit were 
used to imply that “the majority (and supposedly less educated) Thais were incapable of 
identifying a good person.”352 What these contemporary views establish is that the deployment 
of morality of social and political discourses is deeply class-based. Contemporary forms are 
imbedded in in historical processes since the Cold War period.  
Censors frequently appealed to notions of morality, at times in combination with culture 
as with the hyphenated morality-culture in The Todd Killings decision. They used morality not as 
a universal ideal, but rather as a concept specific to the Thai nation, as in the “good and beautiful 
morality of Thais.” A nationally specific version of morality was used to censor the depiction of 
foreign behaviors in foreign films. Thus, the regulation of morality in cinema became a 
simultaneous process of protecting Thai morality from foreign influences and of constructing a 
specific morality for Thai citizens. 
Thanaphol has shown that modern understandings of pornography and sexual indecency 
were formed from the early- to mid-twentieth century. He observed that from 1917 to 1947 
politicians, artists, and journalists engaged in public debates on the subject.353 While 
Thanaphon’s examination centered on literature, the formation of a discourse on indecency had 
an impact on all forms of public imagery and expression, including film. An important element 
for the censors in deciding whether or not an image or narrative was “indecent” was the extent to 
which it was understood as erotic. More specifically problematic were any depictions of female 
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eroticism. Rachel Harrison showed through her examination of eroticism in Thai literature that 
strong taboos exist with regard to any public discussion of female sexual desire.354  
A comparison between the imagery allowed in newspapers and in film further illustrates 
this point. While nudity and sexual imagery was strictly controlled in films, provocative images 
of Thai women were commonplace in newspapers.355 One 1974 issue of Thai Rat led the cover 
with images of naked prostitutes, with only the tips of their nipples and genital areas covered by 
black boxes.356 That same imagery would certainly have been cut entirely from a film, or 
resulted in a film being banned. But that incident illustrates Samson Lim’s observation of the 
dual purposes served by crime news stories, specifically that they were both entertaining and 
educational on “social transgressions and punishments.”357 Those two functions were certainly 
evident in newspaper imagery used in reporting on prostitution. The naked female bodies acted 
as titillating evidence of the masculine power of the state. 
The censors’ concern with “inciting sexual desire” evidenced the importance of 
eroticism. In both Western and Thai films, women’s bodies were used to empower male 
counterparts and to appeal to the male gaze. However, with the decline of the PCA in the US and 
sexual revolution in global cinema in the 1960s and 1970s, women in many Western films were 
portrayed enjoying sexual acts as autonomous individuals. Because cinematic sex acts and 
sexuality were displayed as pleasurable, film offered important depictions of female sexual 
agency in the public sphere. Censorship of Thai cinema was aimed at regulating pleasure and 
sexual enjoyment, not simply nudity. A woman committing adultery and enjoying it, as in The 
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Touch, was a radical act of female sexual pleasure at the expense not only of the male marital 
partner, but also of the state that officially sponsored the marriage.  
Indeed, the mere inclusion of sex in films was not in itself cause for banning a film, as in 
the case of Easy Rider (1968). The censors demanded that the distributor cut offending scenes, 
including characters taking drugs, exposed female breasts, naked petting, and characters in bed 
together.358 The film’s portrayals of violence and murder, by contrast, were not censored. It is 
striking that while legal sexual acts were censored, illegal acts of violence were not. Film 
censorship was not a matter of ensuring that films reflected the contemporary criminal code of 
Thailand, but rather the social and cultural normative structure as understood by the censors 
themselves.  
Even just the act of cutting scenes was usually sufficient to interrupt the narrative of a 
film. As the Bangkok Post’s Harry Rolnick observed,  
Bangkok movies have rarely had much in common with movies anywhere else in the 
world. The reasons are simple enough: the West produces films appealing to the tastes, 
prejudices, vices, virtues and dramas of the 1970s, while audiences in Thailand prefer 
more conservative productions. Then, too, certain originally-decent films like 
“Woodstock” and “Get Carter” have been maimed beyond repair by the Board of 
Censors, a fact of life that will presumably increase of the next year.359 
 
Even when the censors did not ban a film, Thai audiences experienced the film 
differently than audiences elsewhere in the world. Global cinema challenged the sexual 
normative structure that guided and was reinforced by the censors. Thai censorship of those acts 
was not just about preventing audiences from witnessing the affairs of illicit lovers. By removing 
scenes, the censors intervened in the very language of cinema and logic of films’ narratives. 
They obscured the social and political power of sexual and intimate expressions. Through this 
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process of removal, Thai censorship practices fundamentally impaired the role of film as a site of 
debate, contestation, and representative in the public sphere. 
In contrast to the erasure of female pleasure, censorship was highly visible. The 
guidelines by which the censors operated and made decisions were well known. Newspapers 
commonly reported on censored and banned films. All films exhibited at theaters were required 
to show the stamp of approval by the censorship board in the opening moments. Reports of the 
activities of the censors and their decisions were commonplace in newspapers. Audiences would 
have been aware of censorship as they attended the cinema, particularly in cases of heavily cut 
films. The jumps that resulted from the cut celluloid must have been jarring. Everyone in the 
Thai film industry knew the broad topics that might result in censorship, but that there were no 
clear lines bounding them. The situation made domestic cinema owners and film producers 
extremely cautious, thereby inhibiting the originality and creativity of the Thai cinema scene.360  
There was plenty of evidence to justify risk averse behavior. When the Board of Appeals 
met on 16 July 1970, the officials were faced with assessing a hat trick of banned adulterous 
content. Bob & Carol & Ted & Alice (1969) followed the affairs of three of the titular characters, 
and the ultimate consideration of partner swapping between the four. The Reckoning (1969) tells 
the story of wealthy Mick, who cheats on his cold-hearted wife with his dead father’s nurse, a 
mother to two small children. Another film, Loving (1970), climaxes with the main character 
cheating on his wife at a work party in a children’s playhouse, an act that is caught on security 
cameras.361 The censors justified their decisions much as they did with others that depicted 
adultery. The films portrayed their characters committing adultery, kan chu or chu sao, or taking 
on lovers, mi chu. The same term, chu, likewise described the guilty parties that could mean 
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adultery, lover, or adulterer. In one instance, the censors used another term to signify adultery 
luang praweni, literally meaning to overstep or exceed sex. Sometimes, these villains were 
specified according to gender, as in chu sao (female adulterer) or chu chai (male adulterer). 
These people and their acts were labeled “promiscuous,” or sam son. They were guilty of 
violating Thai tradition (phit prapheni), morality (khat tao sinlatham), and occasionally even 
peace (khwam sangob). Even more seriously, the films held the potential to incite sexual feelings 
or desire (yuayu kamarom) in Thai audiences, a result that board members considered essential 
to avoid.  
Of all the films censored for adultery, the vast majority involved married women cheating 
on their spouses. In each case, the women were legally married, often with children. In their 
adulterous relations, the women violated their state-sanctioned marriages in pursuit of sexual 
pleasure with another person. With the rise of depictions of sexuality, sex, and nudity in Western 
films, the portrayals of adultery were less likely to rely on insinuation or ambiguity. The sex 
scenes involved would have made their sexual pleasure evident. The women often faced minimal 
consequences for their affairs. In 1965’s Kiss Me Stupid, the wife’s adultery was not punished, 
and actually helped her husband’s professional aspirations. Certainly, not all Western films 
portrayed female sexual pleasure, nor would the vast majority of films have been considered 
progressive for women’s equality or feminist causes. However, I argue that the portrayal of 
women explicitly enjoying sexual relations in non-marital contexts offered a controversial and 
non-normative model of sexual pleasure. Moreover, in a state actively engaged in redefining and 
standardizing definitions of marriage, those models were significant. 
The censorship of female pleasure was contemporaneous with two major public debates 
in the 1960s and 1970s, first about prostitution and second about women’s rights. Prostitution 
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has a long history in Thailand, much as it does elsewhere in the world. In the contemporary 
period, moreover, domestic factors, including patronage and economic inequality, play the most 
significant role in the continuation of the industry. However, during the Cold War period, 
prostitution came to be associated with the American-backed developmental agenda and military 
bases stationed in Isan.362 By one estimate the numbers of prostitutes expanded from 
approximately 20,000 to 171,000 between the late 1950s and 1964.363 Leslie Ann Jeffrey, a 
political historian of prostitution, observed that: 
The symbolic importance of women, and women’s sexual behaviors, in maintaining 
national culture and identity made the growing sex trade around American air force bases 
in the Northeast a central subject of social and political debate. At the same time, the Thai 
military and conservative bureaucrats worked to pacify the countryside and to inscribe a 
Thai identity, based on “Nation, Religion, and King,” upon a rebellious peasantry. In the 
reconfigured politics of the post-democracy era, the peasant, too, became a symbol and 
an anchor of Thai culture. Peasant women, therefore, were doubly marked with national 
identity; and those who entered the growing prostitution industry were the source of a 
great deal of social anxiety in the following years.364 
 
Prostitute, moreover, were clear reminders that women, like men, participated in work-related 
migration and the wage-earning economy. They were by no means necessarily the victims that 
images of the prostitute in popular criticisms portrayed.  
The image of rural women participating in the capitalist economy by selling sex also 
functioned a clear rebuke, intended or not, of elite forms of feminine morality and sexual 
decency.365 In other words, the expansion of prostitution in Thailand during the 1960s and 1970s 
was not simply a threat to Thailand’s national culture because women were selling sex. It was 
threatening in part because the women could be seen as rejecting the official and elite discourse 
on proper feminine behavior. It revealed, domestically and internationally, that the Thai woman, 
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and by association Thai society, was not uniformly conservative, but rather could be 
conservative or sexually open according to context. In popular portrayals of prostitution, 
northeastern and northern Thai women were prominently featured, but their Thai male customer 
rarely made an appearance.366 Instead, it was the American GI who formed the prostitute’s 
counterpart. Despite the reality of active participation in the prostitution industry by Thai men, 
prostitution became a particularly Thai female contribution to national cultural decline.  
The prostitute as part of a cultural decline was supported by official and elite 
condemnations of the industry. The Thai government officially responded to concerns by 
formally outlawing prostitution with the 1960 Prostitution Prohibition Act. However, the impact 
of the law was mitigated in 1966, when the entertainment Places Act created the legal category 
of “special service girls,” which allowed policemen ignore prostitution guised as 
entertainment.367 The combination of laws formally condemned the practice, while creating 
sufficient loopholes to allow it to continue. Meanwhile, elite women’s organizations likewise 
condemned the expansion of prostitution. For example, students’ organizations portrayed 
prostitutes as “fallen” women.368 The popular luk thung folk music likewise asserted similar 
themes of prostitution as connected with foreign patronage, moral decline, and the problems of 
development.369 While Thai women became the victims, Americans became the aggressors. 
Nationalist organizations from both the left and the right attacked American intervention for its 
immoral impact on traditional Thai culture and values.370 In each case, Jeffrey argues that 
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prostitutes were spoken for, but never given the opportunity to express their own thoughts or 
experiences.371 
In some cases, particularly amongst student and women’s groups, concerns over 
prostitution intersected with growing attention to women’s rights. The movement to progress 
women’s rights reached a high point with the 1974 constitution. Passed in the aftermath of the 
1973 mass protests, it is generally viewed as one of the most liberal of Thailand’s many 
constitutions.372 It included a guarantee of equal rights for men and women. Explicit equal rights 
were one goal in the larger effort to reform laws that were discriminatory and exclusionary to 
women. The movement was primarily led by groups of elite women, intelligentsia, and labor 
activists. Despite differing interests and motivations, the women were part of a growing 
movement advocating for changes in a range of issues, including family law, property rights, 
political representation, and labor rights.  
Writing in 1997, Sanitsuda Ekachai described the gendered understandings of infidelity 
that persisted in Thai family law, writing that  
The Thai language is rich with expressions of men’s unfaithfulness. Men can stray or nok 
jai. They can have “another woman” or [mi phuying] uen. They can have a mistress or 
[mi] mianoi. But they can never, never [mi chu], or commit adultery, because, 
linguistically, this expression is used only when a married woman has an extramarital 
affair.373  
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Within the women’s movement, the Women Lawyers’ Association of Thailand, formed under 
Khunying Suphatra Singholaka in 1948, were particularly influential.374 The group of largely 
elite women focused on family law. In 1970, the Association submitted a proposal for the 
amendment of the Commercial Code in the areas of marriage registration, requirements for a 
husband’s consent before a wife could take up an occupation, marital assets, grounds for divorce, 
and alimony.375 All these issues pivoted on the definitions of marriage and adultery. Contesting 
the juridical framing of adultery was central to the movement for women’s rights in Thailand. 
This point emphasizes the mobilization of contradictory political agendas around the subject of 
adultery in a broader contestation of political control and women’s  
The guarantee of equal rights was supposed to result in a dramatic revision of Thai laws 
to be less discriminatory towards women. This included the problematic law related to divorce 
on grounds of adultery, which stated that, “If the wife has committed adultery, the husband may 
enter a claim for divorce.” That gendered reading of adultery was a legacy of polygyny, which 
had been practiced by Siamese elite and many officials until the 1935 civil code restricted 
individuals to one registered marriage. However, polygyny was neither criminalized, nor was the 
law well implemented. Furthermore, male extra-marital sex alone did not constitute adultery. As 
the 1950 dictionary of the Royal Institute described adultery, “A man who has sex with (another 
man’s) wife is called a lover (pen chu, literally being a lover), a woman that has a husband 
(sami) already, who has sex with another man is called an adulterer (mi chu, literally having a 
lover).”376  
The definition of adultery had serious legal implications. It prevented women from 
divorcing their husbands on the basis of adultery, even if their husbands engaged in extra-marital 
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affairs. If a woman did leave an unfaithful husband, she would remain legally wed to him and 
unable to gain financial independence or remarry. She would also not be guaranteed custody of 
her children. Meanwhile, the continued registration of multiple marriages by men resulted in 
legal disputes regarding property and inheritance in cases of the death of the man.377 The issues 
of multiple marriages, adultery, and resulting property disputes were thrown in the national 
spotlight rather spectacularly with the 1964 legal dispute between the last wife of Sarit Thanarat, 
who had died the previous year, and his seven children from previous marriages. While he was 
not married to the women at the same time, Sarit had children by multiple women. The difficulty 
his offspring from previous marriages encountered in collecting their inheritance reveals the 
challenges presented in contemporary family law. Sarit’s affairs were made all the more 
scandalous by revelations that his estate was estimated at some $140 million Baht and that he 
had kept dozens of mistresses. Despite his obvious philandering and engagement in corruption, it 
was Sarit’s last wife, Thanphuying Wichitra, and not Sarit himself who emerged as the villain in 
popular reports.378 
The 1974 constitution was short-lived. The October 6, 1976 military coup rendered it 
void. The new version removed language specifically guaranteeing equal rights for women. 
Meanwhile, the new 1976 Civil and Commercial Code changed the language regarding divorce 
to state that, “If a husband financially supports or recognizes another woman as his wife, or if a 
wife commits adultery (mi chu), the partner can use this grounds for divorce.” This change in the 
pertinence of adultery to divorce cases conflated two similar, but different issues. The definition 
of female adultery continued to be very broad and contingent on sexual acts. Men were still not 
legally guilty of adultery through extramarital sex alone. Men were only capable, legally and 
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discursively, of adultery if they committed polygyny, or financially supported another wife. Male 
extra-marital sex remained legally invisible.  
The centrality of property inheritance issues revealed the prominence of elite interests in 
debates on marriage and divorce law. Control of property and wealth formed a major reason for 
elite men to oppose reform. This was made evident when in 1955 Khun Orapin Chaiyakan, the 
first woman to be elected to the Thai Parliament, proposed amendments to the Civil and 
Commercial Code in the area of family law. The bill would have given women control over joint 
property and the right to divorce husbands if they lived with and paid expenses for another 
woman. Commenting on the opposition, the Siam Rath Weekly Review concluded that they 
“opposed the Bill for political reasons or in political interests more than in the interests of the 
country and the people.”379 For the same reasons elite men held vested interests in the laws, elite 
women were the majority amongst those advocating change. The 1976 legal reform addressed 
aspects of those class interests, but not of gender.  
The class-based nature of the issue of adultery impacted film censorship, since the 
censors themselves were drawn from a social class of men likely to maintain mistresses. The 
tendency for senior officials to keep mistresses was an ongoing source of newspaper scandal and 
Bangkok gossip. One colorful description of the issue in Chao Daily reported that  
These so-called “social girls” are dragging down Government officials of all ranks and 
positions by alluring them with their charms, thus being directly responsible for 
embezzlement of state funds, which is money provided in the form of taxation by the 
people. It is generally known that the majority of present-day officials have bad women 
as their secret wives, but the style in which these women are kept depends on the rank 
and position of the official.380   
 
That men drawn from the same group of officials were also responsible for censoring images of 
adultery on cinema screens suggests an intriguing power dynamic intrinsic to cinematic 
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regulation.  
My analysis of the censorship of adultery in film challenges key aspects of the literature 
on the Thai regime of images. Scholars argue that the Thai state is primarily concerned with 
regulating actions and discourse in the public sphere, but leaves the private sphere relatively 
autonomous.381 Discussing public portrayals of monogamy, Jackson wrote that “the dual 
character of the regime of images is institutionalized in a split between those aspects of Thai law 
that govern the construction of images of public propriety (legal monogamy) and other aspects 
that govern actual cultural practice (the commonness of polygyny).”382 This stance shares 
similarities with attempts to define a public/private segregation in areas outside Thailand.  
However, Lauren Berlant offered a powerful feminist critique of how public and private 
constructions of sexuality and sex acts operates to empower heterosexual culture.383 As Berlant 
so aptly wrote, “Intimate life is the endlessly cited elsewhere of political public discourse, a 
promised haven that distracts citizens from the unequal conditions of their political and 
economic lives, consoles them for the damaged humanity of mass society, and shames them for 
any divergence between their lives and the intimate sphere that is alleged to be simple 
personhood.”384 The censors repeated references to audiences parroting behaviors in films 
suggests concerns with private behavior, and the intersection of the supposedly separate spheres 
of private and public life. The censors clearly and repeatedly justified banning films on the basis 
that they would influence private behavior.  Moreover, censorship of foreign films intended for 
Thai audiences also contradicts Jackson’s argument that the Thai state cared less about material 
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intended for “Thai eyes.” The censors cared not just about how “Thailand” was portrayed to 
Westerners, but also how the “West” was portrayed to Thais.  
Furthermore, while adultery was expunged from cinema, officials’ extramarital dalliances 
were widely discussed in newspapers. Officials may have wished to control the circulation of 
images and stories in the public, the press and popular opinion thought otherwise. The 
differences between official control of cinema, when contrasted with the press, emphasizes the 
uniqueness of film regulation, as the high costs of filmmaking and film studios made it 
particularly vulnerable to government intervention.  
Certainly the censorship of adultery in films restricted public discourse on the issue. 
However, the background of the censors and contemporaneous debate on adultery in family 
suggests a deeper personal conflict of interest. Important power dynamics were imbedded in the 
regulation of adultery specifically, and sexual morality generally. Censorship was far from a 
mere face-saving device to avoid embarrassment at the mention of “private” affairs. It 
contributed to the perpetuation of a class and gender-exclusionary status quo. The relegation of 
certain matters to the “private” sphere largely serviced specific interests.  
Indeed, adultery could at times be represented appropriately. The differences between the 
acclaimed film The Adulterer and the banned film The Touch reveal the tensions between the 
moral framework of Thai bourgeois society and that of many Western films. The space in which 
this friction occurred may be understood through the censors’ use of violation, as in phit 
sinlatham, and concepts of social and moral appropriateness. The concept is an important way to 
frame the ambiguities and apparent contradictions in censorship practices, as well as the complex 
layers of self-censorship and censorship that track a film from its production and censorship in a 
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foreign country, export and import to Thailand, passage through censorship in Thailand itself, 
and, in some cases, sale for exhibition and consumption.  
 As we saw with the film, The Touch, foreign films were more likely to violate Thai 
notions of appropriateness and morality because they were not produced in the socio-political 
context that informed domestic productions. Knowledge of censorship practices resulted in 
widespread self-censorship in Thai filmmaking, but also informed filmmakers’ approaches to 
sensitive subjects when they were broached. While a foreign film might be banned, a Thai film 
depicting the same subject might pass by the censors due to the filmmaker’s understanding of 
how it might appropriately be portrayed and contextualized. By comparing banned productions 
with successful domestic films, the dynamics of local self-censorship are made clearer. Likewise, 
it is possible to understand the nuances in censors’ decisions to ban foreign films.  
The content of the films and the agendas of the filmmakers contributed to the different 
rulings. The representation of sexual relations between the film’s characters was particularly 
notable. In The Adulterer, the characters used informal terms for husband and wife, phua and 
mia respectively. Those slang terms are often used colloquially in Thai to refer to a sexual 
partner, in contrast to the formal sami and phanraya that indicate legal husbands and wives. 
While Riam slept with both Choeng and Thep, neither relationship was formalized with a public 
marriage ceremony. Use of informal terms recalled pre-twentieth century understandings in 
Siamese society that sexual relations constituted some form of marital arrangement. It was also 
informed by contemporary class-based language. As linguist Amara Prasithrathsint pointed out, 
phua and mia “are considered vulgar if used among the educated and in formal situations…. the 
terms [phua] and [mia] have negative connotations of something illegal, sexual, dirty, and 
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sinful.”385 Informal union by sex was emphasized in Riam’s final assertion that it is Choeng, not 
Thep, who is her lover. By contrast, the adultery in The Touch occurred against the boundaries of 
formal, state-sanctioned marriage.  
Karin’s adultery was not, as with Riam, contextualized with competing claims to marital 
and sexual authority, but instead was motivated by a range of possible explanations from 
boredom to sexual desire to love. While Riam was raped into her sexual affairs, Karin willingly 
engaged in sex with two men and usually enjoyed it. One might imagine the censors discomfort 
at the ambiguities offered by Bergman in The Touch. The lack of any clear moral lesson in that 
film contrasted with The Adulterer, where Riam and Thep died as a clear consequence of their 
decisions. While The Adulterer may have approached issues that were typically contentious for 
Thai censors, it did so by operating within the moral universe of modern Thai bourgeois values. 
The Touch, on the other hand, was produced entirely apart from the context that informed 
censors’ understandings of what constituted sexual authority, marriage, and adultery. The 
censors were unable to rehabilitate the film through cutting, so they banned the film from the 
country.  
 These films inhabited the interstices of the commercialization of global cultural exchange 
between Thailand and the world. By analyzing that space, Thailand’s experience of the Cold War 
period becomes less of an “American Era,” but instead one characterized by ambivalence and 
negotiation. Furthermore, the censorship of adultery highlights the personalized nature of the 
regulation of cultural expression and the public sphere. The censors may have justified their 
decisions as protecting “Thai culture,” but those decisions also protected the gendered power 
dynamics of elite and middle-class Thai society. The social nature of censorship of important 
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cultural industries highlights the contingencies of Thai history during an important period of 
changing social dynamics and globalization. 
However, to say that the films provoked the censors’ anxieties is not to say that the films 
were not fascinating to the censors nonetheless. In fact, it appears that the films most likely to be 
subjected to the censors gaze were the ones considered most entertaining. The Ministry of the 
Interior raised this subject in early 1970 in a memorandum sent to all of the departments and 
ministries that normally provided censorship representatives, asking for new appointees. The 
request was unusual, however, as it highlighted some recent difficulties facing the board: 
[These representatives] have served on the board since 1962 with the purpose to 
have multiple representatives help each other with the scrutiny of films, including those 
films on any topic or set in any time that violate the peace or good morality of the people, 
as well as those that incite sexual feeling should also be banned or cut according to 
official policy. 
It appears that, at the present, representatives from some government agencies 
that received an appointment as a censor do not regularly attend meetings according to 
official policy. Thus there is news from the newspapers and public critics regarding some 
stories or instances where some films were inappropriately released for public viewing. 
Aside from this, some official representatives like to go to screenings only for 
entertaining films. Any film that they are not interested in will not have representatives 
attend.386 
 
It is clear from the memo that the failure of censorship representatives to attend meetings 
consistently was resulting in a worrying number of “inappropriate” films passing the board. Even 
as the censorship officials participated in the regulation of film and construction of a moral 
regime over the industry, they clearly preferred to reap the benefits of the position (enjoying 
illicit foreign films) and avoid the drudgery.  
One might imagine the censors’ pleasure at films that simultaneously caused them 
enough anxiety to censor. Or perhaps, if a film’s description seemed too boring, the resulting low 
attendance may have given the film a better chance at passing. It is intriguing to think, then, that 
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the most compelling or entertaining films were also the most widely viewed and scrutinized by 
the censors. Perhaps the censors knew that, just as the storylines had intrigued them, Thai 
audiences might also flock to see the immoral films. This conception of the censors as 
individuals and the ways that they engaged with films disrupts the idea that they were merely 
passive enforcers of Thai moral standards intent on destroying the artistic integrity of the 
domestic cinema scene.  
The Board of Film Censors was primarily interested in film as it acted as a medium of 
communication, or a conduit through which social and moral behaviors were expressed or 
propagated. They weren’t merely regulating films, but rather the gaze of Thai cinema audiences 
and their ability to engage with a diversity of ideas and cultures in public. Extensive regulation 
of sexual morality in films, especially through formal censorship of foreign films, provides 
evidence of the censor’s concern with depictions of sexuality in the public sphere. However, as I 
have established, inclusions of sex were not by themselves necessarily problematic, nor should 
we consider sexual displays revolutionary by default. It was only when those depictions violated 
middle class, bureaucratic social and cultural normative structures that films were banned. 
Depictions of adultery proved a major violation of those norms.  
This particular concern is notable, considering that adultery amongst the official class 
was an ongoing source of popular scandal. It was also a major component in the middle class and 
elite women’s fight for legal guarantees of equality, given the impact of family law on women’s 
ability to control wealth and property and to obtain a divorce. Regulating public portrayals of 
adultery worked to simultaneously maintain the veneer of middle class sexual propriety, at the 
same time that it removed discussions of the issue from the public sphere. Regulation of 
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sexuality was not simply about policing surface appearance, but was deeply tied to operations of 
power in Thai society.  
Social analysis of film censorship provides an important perspective on how authoritarian 
state regulation of cultural policies and morality impacted social development during the 
“American Era” from the 1950s to the 1970s. Far from evidencing a unidirectional trajectory 
towards modernity and equality, analysis of the development of the Thai middle class and 
women’s rights movement in the context of cultural regulation reveals important power struggles 
in the midst of rapidly changing economic, political, and social realities.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
HOTEL HELL: RAT PETTANYI AND THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL FILM 
INDUSTRY 
 
On August 17, 1970 the well-regarded filmmaker Rat Pettanyi, now considered the 
“father” of contemporary Thai film, was scheduled to give a speech to members of the film 
industry and government representatives at the Montien Hotel in Bangkok as part of a discussion 
of government support for the domestic film industry.387 Following the economic restructuring 
from 1958 to 1962, the Thai government had sought to promote specific domestic industries in 
line with suggestions from the World Bank’s 1957-1958 assessment of Thailand. As part of this 
program, Rat and the Thai Motion Picture Producers Association had appealed, thus far 
unsuccessfully, for government protection of the growing domestic film industry. Only a few 
sentences into his speech, however, Rat faltered and collapsed on the floor.388 Hours later, he was 
declared dead due to coronary failure. Within days of this traumatic event, the Thai government 
agreed to support the industry and established the Thai Film Promotion Board.  
Only two months after the death of Rat Pettanyi, Thai cinema saw another death that 
would have major consequences for the industry. While filming a stunt for the film Insee Thong, 
popular Thai actor Mitr Chaibancha fell from a helicopter to his death. Mitr was overwhelmingly 
considered to be the most popular star of the time and the main draw for audiences who went to 
see Thai films.389 Together, these two deaths brought about a third demise – that of the sixteen 
millimeter film era in Thai domestic film production. Sixteen millimeter film was developed in 
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the 1920s as a cheaper alternative to the more advanced thirty-five millimeter, and became 
popular with domestic Thai filmmakers after the Second World War. However, sixteen 
millimeter was associated with amateur filmmaking. As Hollywood films became dominant in 
the Thai market, comparisons between the technological sophistication of the two industries and 
perceptions of industrial progress encouraged filmmakers like Rat Pettanyi to use thirty-five 
millimeter film. The establishment of the Thai Film Promotion board, which included a clause to 
support only film studios using thirty-five millimeter, and the death of Mitr Chaibancha, whose 
star was seen to hold up the sixteen millimeter industry, thus heralded the end of an era in Thai 
film production.390 
These two deaths underscore through their symbolism the significance of the transition in 
Thai filmmaking from sixteen to thirty-five millimeter. Academic and popular discussions of 
Thai film have depicted this change as precipitating the rise of the Thai film industry out of nam 
nao, or stagnant water. Originally used to describe the political atmosphere of the 1960s and 
1970s, nam nao began to be applied to Thai films. The phrase nang nam nao, or stagnant water 
cinema, was formulated to refer specifically to domestic films that were seen to be 
technologically backward, shot in sixteen millimeter, and thought to appeal to rural and lower 
class Thai people.391  
An important element of this transition was the rise of discourse centered on 
“professionalism” with regard to official support of the domestic industry and filmmaking 
activities in the 1970s. I argue that with the end of the sixteen millimeter era and the advent of 
official government support for the industry, the discourse of professionalism and amateurism 
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created new boundaries for illegitimate and legitimate filmmaking. Because these concepts 
typically relied on markers including formal education in filmmaking, association with formal 
film studios, and the use of modern film technologies, the result was a class-based demarcation 
between those who could and could not afford to study abroad, form their own business, and buy 
the latest technological tools. Moreover, the new standards focused not on the popularity or 
commercial successes of films, but rather concepts such as artistry and the political and social 
awareness evident in the films’ messages. In key respects, the concerns over professionalism, 
artistry, and the need to create authentically Thai, yet international standard films form the 
foundation of modern anxieties and debates over the contemporary industry.   
The tension within the domestic industry and between domestic and international films 
was the result of the social, economic, and political context brought by Thailand’s participation 
in Cold War discourses and development. Modernity (than samai), development (phatthana), 
and progress (charoen) were the watchwords of the day. They all signaled the need to move 
forward and catch up with the industrialized, capitalist countries. Moreover, as I have discussed, 
Thailand was developing in real terms, with more roads and infrastructure. The government, 
whether through the mobile team programs or in the five-year economic plans, was asserted its 
central role in modernizing the nation. This meant that at the same time that filmmakers 
expressed the need to institute progress in the film industry with the help of the government, the 
role of provincial markets became critical to domestic films’ economic success. Thus, the state of 
the film industry became a marker not only of Thailand’s modernity, but a site of class and 
geographic contestation for power.  
Furthermore, the debates over reforming the industry were profoundly influenced by the 
nature of the United States’ Cold War intervention and the significance of US cultural exports. 
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As I detailed in chapter two, cultural diplomacy and psychological warfare were a critical 
element of US policy in Thailand. Internationally, US consumer goods, including Hollywood 
films, were foundational to US soft power. However, these efforts, as I showed in chapter three, 
were not without contestation as films moved across national borders to enter the social and 
cultural context in Thailand. Criticisms of the influence of the US went beyond cultural threats. 
For Thai filmmakers, US film studios presented an unfair economic and technical advantage, and 
dominated the Thai market through exploitative monopolies. The men also saw the Thai 
government as complicit, particularly in the unfair trade and import policies that made it 
economically challenging to produce films locally in Thailand. Thus, the debate over building a 
national cinema of Thailand was deeply concerned with the nation’s international relationships 
and trade policies. In turn, representations of gender and sexuality and class were connected to 
Thailand’s modern conceptions of nationalism and its international relationships. 
For Rat Pettanyi, however, the main issue was method. In 1962, Rat published an article 
titled “The Thai Film Industry” in the journal Khwam ru khue prathip (Knowledge is Light). In it, 
he described the importance for Thai filmmakers to make the switch from sixteen millimeter to 
thirty-five millimeter film stock. In the article, Rat wrote that, “The production of a sixteen 
millimeter film requires very little budget, because it is a film that has no sound, that uses very 
little equipment aside from a camera and a few lights. And any home at all can be used as a 
studio. Sixteen millimeter film like this can only be shown in Thailand. For this reason, the 
sixteen millimeter film market is extremely narrow, and must ultimately meet with the 
unfavorable competition.” This description captures many of the perceptions of the sixteen 
millimeter industry that informed attempts at modernization and, eventually, official efforts to 
incentivize the development of the film industry.  
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Film scholars have designated the period in Thai cinema from the end of the Second 
World War to 1970-1972 as the “sixteen millimeter era.”392 In pre-World War Two Thailand, as 
in the rest of the world, the professional industry favored the larger thirty-five millimeter film 
that resulted in better image quality. Sixteen millimeter film, by contrast, was reserved for non-
commercial or amateur productions. The destruction of the war years, subsequent economic 
depression, and shifts in the regional economic system in meant that sixteen millimeter film 
sourced from Japan was much cheaper and easier to access. However, while the designation 
“sixteen millimeter era” emphasizes the technological features of filmmaking, it is also used to 
reference two other significant characteristics of the period.  
First, it evidenced the post-WWII growth of non-elite filmmakers and Sino-Thai 
entrepreneurs who came to dominate the domestic production and distribution, respectively.393 
Second, sixteen millimeter films relied heavily on the appeal of celebrity pairs in the phra-ek 
(male lead) and nang-ek (female lead) style.394 Audiences flocked to see films not based on the 
film’s directors, but to see their favorite celebrities. The most famous of these pairs were Mitr 
Chaibancha and Phetchara Chaowarat. The demand for these stars was great and Mitr himself 
starred in as many as 262 films in just thirteen years.395 For critics of the sixteen millimeter style, 
this meant that audiences prioritized celebrity over the quality of the artistic production. 
Sixteen millimeter films were also characterized by specific exhibition and production 
practices. They were derived from traditional forms of theatrical performance, such as with likay, 
that drew content and inspiration from interactions with the audience, as well as their setting and 
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context.396 In Western cinema, immobile, silent audiences sit in darkened theaters to view films. 
It also relied on narrative continuity and perfected editing. All of this contributed to audiences 
forgetting that they were watching a film and the cinematic image of the “more than real.”397  
By contrast, Thai cinematic behaviors included mobile spectators. The audiences viewed 
films within a festival-like atmosphere in which shouting at the screen or performers was not 
inappropriate. There was no expectation that the spectator should never interfere with the screen. 
This worked in both directions. Actors and film narrators posed as a medium between the screen 
and the spectators.398 Due to this, actors and narrators skills were valued according to their ability 
to improvise, often by drawing inspiration from the local surroundings, thereby not only 
connecting the performance with the audience’s own reality, but also negating any serious 
possibility of reproduction and repetition.399 
Sixteen millimeter productions also used the stock characters familiar from theatrical 
forms. The included primary characters phra-ek (main hero) and nang-ek (main heroine), the 
supporting characters, phra rong (supporting hero), and nang rong (supporting heroine), and the 
villains tua kong (male villain) and tua itcha (female villain, or lit. the jealous character), and the 
tua talok (the comedian).”400  The tua talok was a spontaneous character, who interacted with the 
audience through teasing and jokes. The tua talok might provoke the phra ek or provide 
reflective narration. This reflective device was performed in cinema through comedic character 
roles within films as well as in live film narration by nak phak.401  
The narrative structure of sixteen millimeter era films also featured disaggregated 
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structures and less attention to polished scene transitions. Continuity and perfect editing, so 
important in Hollywood films, was not a priority of sixteen millimeter productions. Again, this 
was because the construction of reality for audiences was less important. Sixteen millimeter 
productions also lacked the point-of-view (POV) or shot-reverse-shots that contributed to 
narrative structures, editing continuity, and pull audiences in to internal psychological 
experiences of film characters.402  
They instead favored long or wide shots that created a frame similar to what a stage 
audience might see. For example, Thai film scholar Mary Ainslie described this style in the film 
Nang Phrai Tani (The Nymph of Tani):  
A scene… running for 4.30 minutes depicts four characters in a café buying and 
eating coffee and noodles… Despite its considerable length, this scene does not contain 
any POV shots or corresponding structures, there are very few one-person reaction shots 
and no direct point-of-view shots…. The scene begins with a frontal long shot containing 
all the characters. The camera is positioned almost directly in front of the action and, 
although it obeys the 180 degree rule of continuity editing, it largely… remains in this 
long shot.403  
 
The impact of this style is to emphasize the collective image and character actions, rather than 
character emotions and psychologies. Editing and cinematography, and by extension film editors 
and cinematographers, played a far less important role than in contemporary national film 
industries.  
Furthermore, the sixteen millimeter era was characterized by blending genres. Whereas 
Hollywood films followed typical patterns derived from the standards of musical, western, or 
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other genres, Thai filmmakers mixed them up. As Dome Sukwong commented to film scholar 
Patsorn Sungsri, “Thai film is like Thai food, which blends a lot of flavor in one meal. The 
conventional Thai film blends emotions and emotional states such as melancholy, excitement, 
arousal and romance.”404 This is perhaps the common feature between all Thai films, whether 
sixteen or thirty-five millimeter.  
 Thai film and cultural critic May Adadol Ingawanij suggested that Tom Gunning’s 
concept of the “cinema of attractions” is useful for considering sixteen millimeter films.  This 
concept refers to the non-narrative style of cinema that was dominant until 1906-7 featuring 
mainly “actuality” films, such as travel shows. Such cinema based its quality on the “ability to 
show something”; it is, in other words, an “exhibitionist” cinema.405 Gunning writes that, “[f]rom 
comedians smirking at the camera, to the constant bowing and gesturing of the conjurors in 
magic films, this is a cinema that displays its visibility, willing to rupture a self-enclosed 
fictional world for a chance to solicit the attention of the spectator.”406 This form of cinema relies 
on the spectacle and uniqueness of the event itself to draw audience curiosity and deliver 
sensorial pleasure. Furthermore, the “cinema of attractions” was at its essence a form of mass 
culture consumed by audiences “not acculturated to the traditional arts.”407 In much of the world, 
however, the “cinema of attractions” fell out of favor between about 1906 to 1907 as narrative 
continuity and darkened rooms became popular. The visibility of the camera became taboo.  
Using this framework of the “cinema of attraction,” May termed the sixteen millimeter 
cinema the “plebeian Thai cinema dispositive.”408 May argued that by the 1960s, however, 
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sixteen millimeter cinema was delegitimized in Thailand. By that time, a cinematic hierarchy 
favoring Hollywood films and a discourse deriding the low quality, amateur Thai productions 
had gained strength. The state of Thai cinema had become a source of anxiety and 
embarrassment for Thai elites and intellectuals, as evidenced by the term nang nam nao.409  
Indeed, the characteristics found in the sixteen millimeter film industry were criticized as 
part of a growing discourse about the low, amateur quality of domestic Thai film production, as 
well as audience behaviors at cinemas. On the one hand, the preferences of rural audiences drove 
film content. As one film wholesaler noted in the 1970s, “from the standpoint of film production, 
it is necessary to produce films on a low budget that appeal to the public in both cities and rural 
villages. As a result, their material is so full of different elements that the overall point becomes 
unclear.”410 The association with provincialism was linked to poor quality. 
On the other hand, filmmakers were blamed for the deficiency of national cinema. 
Insufficient knowledge of film production and editing, rather than Thai performance traditions, 
was thought to account for the lack of continuity editing. These complaints simultaneously 
recognized the widening market for domestic film and the implications of that growth for 
cinema’s role as a symbol of the national project toward development and progress in a 
globalizing landscape. It was in part out of a rejection of prevailing film practices and a desire to 
see an aesthetically and politically sophisticated national cinema that the debates over Thai film 
evolved and took shape.  
Meanwhile, as established in chapters one and two, the development programs of the 
1960s facilitated travelling film shows and permanent cinema construction through the 
expansion of roads, infrastructure, and electrification, and were accompanied by increased 
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importation of foreign films, especially from the United States.411 Urban and, to a lesser extent, 
provincial audiences had a greater ability to self-select their viewing spaces, increasingly based 
on language, class, and the reputation of the cinema. The development era in Thai film raised 
new and pointed challenges for the industry. The expansion of Thai film production, foreign 
importation, and cinema infrastructure not only resulted in increasing audience differentiation, 
but also created a hierarchical discourse of film spectatorship based on those choices.  
 This shift also had important implications for the ideological impact of cinema in 
Thailand. Film theorist Abraham Kaplan argued that audience interactions with popular art (in 
the style of Hollywood films) might be understood to be something similar to the differences 
between exhibitionism and voyeurism, but also between response and reaction on the part of the 
spectators, with popular art favoring the latter of each. Kaplan called popular art “predigested,” 
to describe how, with the illusion of reality, the audience stops doing work and becomes a 
passive body.412 That is to say, that perception, an important dynamic that filmmakers have long 
sought to manipulate, is replaced by recognition.  
Likewise, Gunning explained those processes in the cinema of attractions: 
It is the direct address of the audience, in which an attraction is offered to the spectator by 
a cinema showman, that defines this approach to film making. Theatrical display 
dominates over narrative absorption, emphasizing the direct stimulation of shock or 
surprise at the expense of unfolding a story or creating a diegetic universe. The cinema of 
attractions expends little energy creating characters with psychological motivations or 
individual personality. Making use of both fictional and non-fictional attractions, its 
energy moves outward towards an acknowledged spectator rather than inward towards 
the character-based situations essential to classical narrative.413  
 
This dynamic has additional implications on an affective level: rather than eliciting a meaningful 
emotional reaction to art, what Kaplan called popular art relies on sentimentality lacking in 
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meaning and depth. As Kaplan notes, “The tears are real enough, but they have no reason—only 
a cause.”414  
The first major success of the sixteen millimeter era was Prince Sukrawandit’s 1949 
Suphapburut suea Thai (Criminal Without Sin).415 The film depicted “gentlemen” fighters styled 
after the popular reputation of Prince Chumphon, or Prince Aphakon, the “father” of the modern 
Thai navy. It proved an enormous success. Dome summarized its influence thus: “It had the 
impact of awakening the film industry. People leaped to join the industry in large numbers at 
once, as may be seen in the numerous films that were produced in the next year.”416 Whereas 
only ten Thai productions were made between 1947 and 1949, after 1949 the numbers grew to 
between fifty and sixty films per year. Over the whole period until 1972, approximately 1,384 
films were made locally (in both thirty-five and sixteen millimeter).417  
Suphapburut suea Thai was made using sixteen millimeter color-reversal film. Reversal 
film produces a positive image on a transparent base, rather than using negatives and prints, 
which are more expensive due to the additional processing required. This type of the film was 
the preferred variety for amateur or home filmmakers in the west from the 1930s through to the 
1970s. In Thailand, it was useful for filmmakers who had neither the financial resources nor 
access to foreign production facilities required for thirty-five millimeter negative film. It also 
allowed these filmmakers to use color relatively cheaply for the first time. Suphapburut suea 
Thai, like most other films, was also narrated live.  
In the early 1950s, the broader context of the Cold War and decolonization meant that 
new policy issues and unprecedented changes were arising, including in Southeast Asia. To think 
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about those issues on a large scale, American scholars articulated was came to be called 
modernization theory. In basic terms, modernization theory proposed a “common and essential 
pattern of ‘development,’ defined by progress in technology, military and bureaucratic 
institutions, and the political and social structure.”418 To a large degree, modernization theory 
was premised on the idea that the United States provided a model for the world.419 It came to 
dominate US thinking about America’s role in the world and change in postcolonial societies. 
This was true as well in Thailand, although as I have discussed “tradition” and “modernity” were 
deployed with positive and negative meanings, depending on the context. While modernization 
theorists downplayed the individuality of so-called underdeveloped countries, Thailand 
uniqueness was more openly utilized.420 In other words, there remained a time and place for Thai 
tradition. However, in other cases, modernity was the order of the day. As I will show, the film 
industry was one sphere in which modernization was celebrated. 
The World Bank was an important institution internationally for promoting many of the 
key aspects of modernization theory, and for institutionalizing development as an ideology more 
generally. A core aim of the World Bank, and of the post-Bretton Woods perspective, was to 
facilitate “global integration through free trade.”421 The World Bank Mission spent between July 
1957 and June 1958 in Thailand. Afterwards, it released a “program” for national development, 
in which it made development recommendations for the next five years. That program was the 
primary inspiration for Thailand’s first six-year National Economic Development Plan, which 
covered the years from 1961 to 1966. At the time, Thailand’s economy was dependent on a few 
agricultural exports, mainly rice, rubber, and tin. Meanwhile, previous governments’ attempts at 
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industrialization were not successful.422 The new plan called for growth in the industrial and 
agricultural sectors, as well as an increase in electric power generation, particularly through 
dams. It also provided for significant expansion and improvement in modes of transportation and 
communication, and education “geared to development requirements.”423  
External factors alone were not responsible for the ascendance of development discourse 
in Thailand. In the early and mid-1950s, as I discussed, Phibun to a large degree led efforts at 
development and the alliance with the United States. However, in October 1957, in the midst of 
the World Bank Mission’s visit in Thailand, Sarit successfully led a coup against Phibun’s 
government. In part to legitimate his government, Sarit forcefully backed development programs 
for the duration of his regime.424 Under Sarit, moreover, development and progress also became 
linked to broader ideas of “environmental cleanliness (khwam sa-ad), properness of things 
(khwam riaproy), and material well-being.”425 The two concepts, development and progress, thus 
became part of a national behavior and aesthetic.  
Even as modernization and development discourses were becoming more influential, 
sixteen millimeter films were gaining in popularity and commercial success. One of the first 
films to gross more than one million baht was Rangsi Thatsanaphayak’s 1959 Mae nak pra 
khanong (Nak of Pra Khanong). While this film featured key technical aspects of the era, such as 
sixteen millimeter format and live narration, it also utilized key aspects of sixteen millimeter film 
form, especially moments of “attraction” and genre-blending. Discussing Mae mak pra khanong, 
Ainslie observed that: 
Throughout the film there are plenty of horrific elements…. However alongside this there 
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are also numerous scenes of comedy, such as slapstick numbers performed by the fool. 
Together with these comedic and horrific numbers there are also heavily exaggerated 
romantic numbers such as the early shy and flirtatious courting and then marriage of Mak 
and Nak. These diverse ‘numbers’ are also accompanied by the opening action-packed 
joyous communal temple celebrations, at which Mak and Nak meet and the unrestrained 
mass fist fights which ensue from fighting gangs after the celebrations. Finally, the film 
ends in a tragic separations scene… This final scene in particular is drawn out to include 
the two lovers calling to each other from across the divide, extending the tragic moment 
into a number that elicits strong sympathetic emotions from the viewer.426 
 
Several scholars, including Dome’s reference above, have related this genre blending to the idea 
of rot, or flavor.427 A common advertisement at the time was “bursting with all possible flavors 
(khrop thuk rot).”428 
Dok Din Kanyamal produced the most popular films of the sixteen-millimeter era. Dok 
Din first worked as a comedic actor in stage plays before transitioning to filmmaking in the 
1950s, where he initially played the tua talok.  He made some forty-three or more films in 
approximately thirty-one years, many starring Mitr and Phetchara. Dok Din films were ever 
present on the popular cinema scene until his last film in 1983.429  
In 1964, for example, he made Nok noi, which starred Mitr and Phetchara. The film was a 
story about Nok, a young girl who lives with her adopted mother and abusive adopted father. 
After her mother dies, she is forced to live off the streets, occasionally finding places to sleep 
and eat. She meets Jak, who falls in love with her. But she runs off to Isan, where she finds her 
parents. The film was hugely successful, earning over one million baht. In fact, “A Million 
Already! A Million Already! Black Dok Din!” became the slogan for the film. The film also 
received royal support, first in being granted permission to use King Bhumibol’s Chada Chiwit, 
or H.M Blues, as its theme song. King Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit watched the film at a 
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screening at Dusit Palace.  
In 1967 Dok Din made Julatrikhun, once again starring Mitr and Phetchara.430 In key 
respects, Julatrikhun represents exactly the type of film that critics of the style, including the 
TMPPA, advocated against. The film was quickly made using sixteen millimeter film and, as 
mentioned, starred Mitr and Phetchara in the leading roles, alongside a secondary couple played 
by a second famous pairing, Sombat Mettani and Naowarat Wachara. Based on a popular novel 
of the same name, and therefore already a familiar story, the film told the love story of Princess 
Dararai and King Ariwat, each from two mythical warring kingdoms in the distant past. The film 
ends tragically with both of their deaths, but, happily, the pair is reunited in a heavenly state 
where they are free from earthly concerns and may forever enjoy their love. The music of the 
film was almost entirely from an already well-known song of the same name, Julatrikhun.  
In terms of editing, the film suffered from shaky camera work, and rough transitions 
between different shots and scenes. All of the character voices were dubbed over to give them a 
stereotyped character, with deep, masculine voices for most of the men, high-pitched, nasal 
voices for the comedic characters, and high, feminine tones for the females.431 It also featured 
numerous tua talok, including a comedic third romantic pairing whose role was little more than 
to elicit laughs from the audience. In terms of narrative, numerous scenes are included that 
contribute little to plot progression, such as extended dancing and scenes between the comedic 
love pair.  
These characteristics are important to evaluate in terms of their effect on spectator 
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experience. Rough editing and the unnaturalness of the character voices both distract viewers 
with the constructed nature of the film. While this film does follow the narrative style, it featured 
many moments similar to those described in the cinema of attractions. Certainly the structure of 
the film and familiarity of the story would have lent itself to the atmosphere of an outdoor 
screening with a mobile audience. By way of example, a considerable amount of time is spent on 
two back-to-back episodes in which the two lead men, along with their cronies, are captured and 
jailed. This is followed by their escape, made possible by the cunning seduction and distraction 
of the jail guards by their female romantic companions. The redundancy of these events serves 
more to provide comedy at the guard’s gullibility, pleasure at the bodily displays of the women, 
and excitement at the ensuing action scenes.  
The film also contains explicitly sexualized scenes. That recalls another aspect of the 
cinema of attractions, in which eroticized scenes that have no purpose in plot progression are 
included solely for the subject’s pleasure. A highly puzzling sequence of scenes begins with two 
female members of the court in a large bath, being massaged by servants and chatting with each 
other. The two begin tickling each other in the bath, during which time a great deal of their 
bodies may be seen (though presumably stopping just short of what the censors would allow). 
The film then jumps to the two in bed together, clothing in sparkly bras and harem pants, where 
they discuss their disgust at the concept of love. The two women fall asleep, after which 
Sombat’s character randomly enters the room, wakes one of the women. She quickly forgets her 
alarm and allows Sombat to seduce her into a kiss. The second woman, who has also woken, 
secretly watches. After he leaves, she reacts with jealousy and anger.  
This scene does nothing for the narrative of the film, beyond character development in 
showing the attractive powers of the manly Sombat. It more clearly acts as stimuli for the 
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pleasure of the audience. One might imagine the types of vocal reactions the scenes would have 
elicited from the audience, and certainly would have provided great material for any narrator. 
The scenes don’t so much present narrative as much as a series of images to form a spectacle and 
provoke the viewing body.   
When compared to the popular sixteen millimeter films, Rat Pettanyi’s films appear to be 
from a different universe. Rat is generally viewed as the ultimate Thai “auteur.” The term auteur, 
which means author and connotes the idea that a director’s creative vision is reflected in his film 
style, may truly apply to Rat, as he was involved in so many aspects of his film production, from 
business, script-writing, cinematography, production, and more. His status as the ultimate Thai 
film auteur, moreover, contrasts with filmmakers of the sixteen millimeter period, who were 
often overshadowed by celebrity actors and live narrators. Indeed, the director-as-auteur would 
be a major element of his critiques of the domestic industry and focus of reform in his work with 
the TMPPA.  
Rat was born in Bangkok to an Iranian family in 1908. His grandfather migrated from 
Iran long before Rat’s birth. But that heritage, and Rat’s distinctively non-Thai name, apparently 
frequently caused people to think he was Indian. He did end up spending time studying in India, 
where he apparently demonstrated his nature ability with visual arts by winning a prize in India’s 
first national photographic competition at the age of twelve.432  Rat then moved to England, 
where he trained in engineering at the University of London. It was in the Great Britain that Rat 
made his first forays into filmmaking, although what inspired the move is unclear. He made his 
first film in 1937, a short called Taeng.433 Rat entered the film into the 1938 Scottish Amateur 
Film Festival (SAFF). Alfred Hitchcock presided over the ceremony. A newspaper recounted 
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Hitchcock’s appraisal of the film: 
“[Taeng],” an account of a day in the life of a poor Siamese widow and her little son, the 
adjudicator said had a human atmosphere, and an emotional effect which was difficult to 
ignore. There were too many captions, he added: scenes of the actual accident could have 
been substituted for a caption stating that the dog had been run over—though it might 
have used up too many dogs.434 
 
Taeng was awarded the prize for “Best Film from a British Subject Abroad” along with an 
Australian film.  
Oddly, however, the award didn’t recognized Rat as being Siamese. Instead, he became a 
“British Subject Abroad.” Thai film critic Chalida Uabumrungjit attributes this to the 
classification system, with only two categories: British films and British subjects abroad. 
Apparently, Siam was included in the latter category.435 It was a strange choice, considering that 
Siam was never a British colony. Despite this, however, Chalida commented optimistically that, 
“Even though today the film Taeng is still in the book of lost films, but at least the film made the 
word “Siamese” appear in foreign newspapers.”  
The screening of Taeng, as well as Rat’s next film, Ruea bai si khao (White Boat), at the 
1939 New York World’s Fair, together serve as evidence of Rat being amongst the first Thais to 
exhibit their films abroad.436 However, quickly afterwards, Rat returned to Thailand, where he 
quickly began building a reputation for himself domestically. Simultaneously, Rat cast off his 
amateur roots and entered into the world of “professional” filmmaking. Rat worked for Nai Loed 
Company and Ditham Company for several years. His big break came when Prince Phanuphan 
Yukhon asked him to be the cinematographer for Phanthai norasing (Oarsman Norasing).437 He 
made one sixteen millimeter production, Tukata ja (Dear Dolly), before founding his own studio, 
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Hanuman Film Inc., in 1953. Thereafter, Rat worked exclusively with thirty-five millimeter film 
stock.  
That choice was directly opposite to the mainstream trends of the 1950s. As a director, 
Rat used not only advanced technologies, but also more innovative techniques than other 
directors of mainstream cinema. Chalida described this difference in Rat’s most “mainstream” 
efforts, writing that, “He never became a mainstream director, not even when he tried to make 
his last film, Sugar is Not Sweet, as a popular formula musical-romance-comedy. He put in 
commercial ingredients like stars, songs, dances, sex, etc., but it came out as a parody of the 
genre.”438 These stylistic features led to his films being critically acclaimed, but typically 
unpopular in the box office. Indeed, most of Rat’s films lost money.   
It is strange, then, that the rise of a respectable national “Thai” cinema is so closely 
linked to the activities of one man who, by all accounts, not only did the opposite of what the rest 
of Thai filmmakers were doing, but also never produced a domestically popular film. The 
characterization is all the more interesting, considering that in fact, rather than presenting 
aberrations to domestic filmmaking, Rat’s films represent something of a middle ground between 
the styles of indigenous Thai filmmaking. Use of both song and spoken words, for example, are a 
feature of many of his films. However, Rat’s films engaged with these characteristics through 
careful editing, high quality image, and continuous story editing.  
Because so many of Rat’s films were seen as symbolic of positive progress at the time of 
their production, as well as forming the backbone of the modern Thai film canon today, they are 
worth discussing in detail. Analyses of these films will make clearer the directions that the 
industry subsequently took with Rat at its helm. I will focus on two of his films released 
commercially for the Thai market. Rat’s commercial films included Chuafah din salai (Forever 
                                                
438 Ibid, 19. 
 179 
Yours, 1955), Rongraem narok (Country Hotel,1957), Sawan mued (Dark Heaven, 1958), Phrae 
dam (Black Silk, 1961), and Namtan mai wan (Sugar is Not Sweet, 1964). The two films that 
have arguable done the most to place Rat in Thai film history are Rongraem narok and Phrae 
dam. 
Rongraem narok, which I discussed in the introduction, was a blend of innovative 
camerawork and humorous ribaldry. The story took place at a tiny country hotel, which had only 
one room, a bar, and a small lobby/dining area. Noi runs the hotel and acts as the barman. Chana, 
a young man, is the hotel’s only guest. But his place is threatened with the arrival of Riam, a 
young woman who, as noted in the introduction, claims to be an opium smuggler. She attempts 
to claim Chana’s room, but is firmly rejected by Chana. Riam is forced to make do with the sofa 
in the lobby.  
Chana’s presence at the hotel is explained when rumors surface that local bandits, 
including the famous Suea Din. Apparently, they discovered that Chana, who is an accountant 
for a large company, is about to make a substantial cash transfer. The bandits intend to steal the 
money. But before Suea Din arrives, some other bandits led by Suea Sit take over the hotel first. 
As Chana and Riam attempt to escape the bandits, they also develop feelings for each other. 
Then Suea Din arrives, and challenges Suea Sit to a form of Russian roulette. Instead of playing, 
however, Suea Sit shoots and kills Suea Din. Just at that moment, however, the police arrive and 
capture Suea Din. It is then revealed that Riam is in fact the daughter of the owner of Chana’s 
company. Chana at first assumes that this means that they cannot ever be together, but Riam acts 
offended and demands that they get married immediately!   
Rongraem narok was the first film in which Rat served as director, and was the first over 
which he had almost complete control. He also served as the creative director, scriptwriter, and 
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cinematographer. The film was made in black and white, with thirty-five millimeter film stock. 
Apparently, the decision to film entirely in black and white at a time when more and more films 
were made in color was made to allow the entire production of the film to stay in Thailand (color 
films had to be sent abroad for processing). It also saved on production costs.439 
Rongraem Narok was filmed entirely on a single set, the lobby of a small hotel. In 
addition to using the small space, Rat only used one camera. This meant that often times the 
camera would not follow the movements of characters, but instead allowed them to move on and 
off camera, resulted in many non-diegetic features. This also meant that the film used medium 
shots, and very few close-ups or POV shots. The strategy has been compared to Alfred 
Hitchcock’s Rope (1948). But Rope is famous for the use of long shots (usually of about ten 
minutes), whereas Rongraem narok makes ample use of cuts.440  
In addition to these cinematographic features, Rat also drew on the spontaneous traditions 
seen in other Thai films, but to very different effect. Rongraem Narok is full of elements similar 
in some respects to the cinema of attractions. The owner of the hotel and barman, Noi, also 
engages in periodic arm wrestling challenges. A marching band occasionally comes through and 
practices in the lobby of the hotel. Midway through the film, Flor Oriente performs Dahil sa Iyo. 
One of the women drinking at the bar introduces herself as Yupphadi. In fact, the actress played 
the character Yupphadi in Rat’s earlier film Chua fa din salai. But these features are linked to the 
film, as they contribute to the character of the hotel as a place in which anything can happen. 
During Oriente’s song, for example, the various characters go on with their business, revealing 
importance aspects of their personalities and relationships. The scenes are simultaneously 
attractive and critical parts of the broader narrative. 
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In the time between the production of Rongraem narok in 1958 and that of Hanuman 
Film’s 1961 Phrae dam, a great deal had changed in Thai politics and the Bangkok sociopolitical 
order. Sufficient time had passed for Sarit to institute not only his policy priorities, but his style 
of leadership as well. Sarit relied on a paternalistic, father-child (pho-luk) style that drew on 
notions of traditional authority and kingly charisma.441 In this thinking, the benevolence of a 
leader (phokhun) legitimated any severe actions and meant that the leader could “never become a 
tyrant.”442 To a large degree, Sarit’s relationship with Luang Wichit Wathakan influenced his 
thinking about political development. Luang Wichit was earlier a major player in the Phibun 
government, particularly influencing the hyper-nationalist cultural campaigns of the 1930s. The 
cultural, militaristic nationalism of Luang Wichit that claimed origin in historical political 
traditions combined with Sarit’s authoritarian style to produce a particular style of Thai political 
order.  
Sarit viewed the new order as a revolution, but also a return to past greatness. First, as I 
discussed in chapter one, the monarchy was revitalized as a symbol of national unity and 
identity. Second, Sarit sought to return the country to a state of khwam riaproy (orderliness).443 
This meant advocating proper social behaviors and personal hygiene. It also meant ridding the 
country of drugs and anthaphan (hoodlums). Indeed Sarit’s campaign against anthaphan, which 
included mass arrests, interrogation, and executions, became a major demonstration of Sarit’s 
will to institute his authority. It was also related to his belief that young people, particularly those 
in Bangkok, needed to return to a traditional lifestyle. Accordingly, the government banned rock 
and roll music, the “twist” dance, and detained youths who went out to night entertainment. He 
also aimed to rid the streets of prostitutes, pedicabs, beggars, and stray dogs, all part of what 
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Thak called a “program for social purification.”444 Third, Sarit’s government was the first to take 
seriously the needs and welfare of Isan.445 Sarit’s personal origins in Isan, combined with the 
regions strategic significance, meant that Isan became critical to Sarit’s vision of national 
development. Thus, Sarit managed to institute lasting and deep changes in the space of just a few 
years.  
Many of the features of Sarit’s new order were depicted in Phrae Dam. Indeed, as I will 
discuss, the film was a clear product of the specific time in which it was made. However, for all 
its inclusion of domestic issues, Phrae dam was explicitly intended to appeal to the international 
audience at international film festivals.446 The title refers to the lead character Phrae, a widow 
with a young baby to take care of. She always wears black, in mourning for her late husband. 
The film begins with Phrae at a Buddhist ceremony, where a priest gives a sermon about the 
consequences of karma. Phrae is a devout Buddhist and works as a weaver. She has an admirer, 
Thom, but refuses to advance their relationship. Thom works for a troubled nightclub owner and 
gangster, Seni, who is heavily in debt. After Seni’s brother dies and leaves him a substantial 
inheritance, Seni comes up with a plot to trick his debtor, Wan. But as part of the trick, Thom 
must bring Phrae along, so that she can pretend to buy land from Wan. Thom agrees, believing 
that Seni will give Thom enough money afterwards in order to allow him to marry and settle 
down with Phrae.  
But when the con goes awry and results in Wan’s death, Seni comes to fear that virtuous 
Phrae will betray their secret. So he has his workers kidnap her baby to secure her silence. Thom, 
after being offered 20,000 baht to cooperate, pretends to be dead. Phrae is led to a disturbing 
room, cast in red light, where Thom pretends to be dead in a coffin. Seni, shown only as a 
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shadow in the light of a bamboo slated door, tells her that he is the father of the dead man. He 
claims to have taken Thom’s life as retribution. He threatens that if Phrae ever tells the police, he 
will kill her child. Phrae runs away, terrified. Her abbot advises her to ordain, and find peace in 
life as a nun. Phrae shaves her head, and ordains. Her costume changes from her mourning black 
to the white robes of a nun.  
Sometime later, Thom visits the clinic, where he has left the sick baby. He discovers that 
she is very ill, and requires surgery. Thom decides to find Phrae in order to have her see her baby 
before the surgery. He convinces Phrae to disrobe, and brings her back to his house to pick up 
money for the doctor. But one of Seni’s gang sees them, and alerts Seni. Thom tells Phrae that he 
is remorseful. He offers her all his money, and vows to ordain as a monk. But Seni interrupts 
them, and tries to kill Phrae. After a fight, Thom shoots Seni to death. Thom and Phrae are 
arrested by the police. While in prison, Phrae is informed that her baby did not live. The two are 
put on trial, but only Thom is found guilty and sentenced to death under the rules of martial law. 
In an extended execution scene, he is put to death. Phrae, meanwhile, re-ordains as a nun. The 
film ends with the same sermon with which it begins.  
The film is mainly highly regarded for its striking use of color and sharp editing. Pen-Ek 
Ratanaruang once recalled that “If I could choose, I would love to remake Prae Dum (Black 
Silk). It is so, so, so atmospheric and film noir. The shot when the camera pans from the coffin to 
the pair of sandals on the floor still gives me a chill. That shot would have made Hitchcock 
proud.”447 But it is strange that the film has so often been termed a “film noir,” even by those 
with extensive knowledge of international cinematic history and film theory. Not only does 
terming Phrae dam a film noir ignore the historical context in which the genre emerged in the 
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United States in the 1940s to 1950s, but it also lacks key defining features. Specifically, film noir 
is typically characterized by black and white low-key lighting, absence of a happy ending (or 
even the promise of one), seedy locations, murderous and seductive women (particularly in lead 
female characters), and highly stylized costumes. While not all of these features are universal in 
film noirs, filmmaker Paul Schrader suggested that the films emphasize “loss, nostalgia, lack of 
clear priorities, insecurity; then submerge these self-doubts in mannerism and style.”448 While 
Phrae Dam has a distinct style, it is not clear that it would fit into the style of film noir. 
Furthermore, the film lacks some of the defining characteristics that Schrader identifies, 
particularly nostalgia and a lack of priorities. In the end, the film maintains some hope for the 
heroine. 
The focus on the quality of the film and suggestions of its status as one of Thailand’s 
“firsts” also distracts from the content of the film. In fact, Phrae dam is a fascinating depiction of 
political and social life in Bangkok during the military years under Sarit in the early 1960s. On 
the one hand, the film includes various scenes from Bangkok’s daily life, during boat trips in the 
canals, various temples, and nightlife entertainment. Like Rat’s other films, songs are featured 
throughout the film, usually presented as an act at Seni’s club. A real sense of 1960s Bangkok 
social life emerges from these scenes. 
The film depicted several controversial aspects of Bangkok life. On the one hand, 
gangsters (anthaphan) are at the heart of the film. In a sense, all the problems faced by Thom and 
Phrae arise from gang warfare and competition. Their activities more broadly are depicted as 
troubling for Bangkok authorities. And when punishment is passed on Thom, it is made explicit 
that the laws imposed by martial law under Sarit allow, and indeed demand, his execution. The 
trial and subsequent execution take a full twenty minutes of the film.  
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The execution is particularly drawn out, with all of the notable features of Thai 
executions shown clearly, from Thom being tied into a wai position to the stabilized machine 
gun used by the executioner. Whereas in the 1920s the portrayal of an execution was cause for 
censorship, there is no evidence that Rat faced any troubles for the depiction. Indeed, the 
execution of gangsters was a point of pride for the Sarit regime.449  
Furthermore, it is interesting that one of Thai national cinema’s most renowned films 
features such a non-“Thai” cast of players. I’ve already discussed Rat’s own birth, and distinct 
identity within central Thai bourgeois circles. The film also starred his daughter, Ratanawadi 
Ratanaphan, who had distinctly non-Thai features, although of course she was still beautiful. 
Sinthip Siriwan, who previously played the lead in country hotel, played the secondary role of 
Phrae’s faithful friend. She was also clearly intended not to be like the bombastic stars of the 
celebrity system. Indeed, she spent much of the film with a shaved head, a striking difference 
from Phetchara’s dramatic hairstyles. 
The depiction of Phrae was indicative of Rat’s distinctive approach to female characters 
more generally. None of them were stereotypical in the sense of the typically helpless and 
passive sixteen millimeter characters. Phrae and Riam both, for the most part, made their own 
decisions about their lives and were demonstrated to be independent figures. The fact that many 
of Rat’s films were based on love stories didn’t prevent the female leads from being complex 
characters. Indeed, they were often deeply flawed, as with Yupphadi in Chua fa din salai, who 
engaged in an adulterous relationship with her husband’s son. But she was also portrayed 
sympathetically, even if in the end she had to face the consequences of her actions and died. In 
part, the complexity of female characters in Rat’s films speaks to his ability to communicate 
human emotions. They also offer a sharp contrast to depictions in later domestic films in the 
                                                
449 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Despotic Paternalism, 121. 
 186 
1970s, which I will examine in the next chapter.  
 In 1963, the government once again took up the issue of official support for the domestic 
industry. This issue, long advocated for by filmmakers and Rat Pettanyi, had previously been 
approached by the Phibun government.450 But the troubled final year of his government and 
ultimate ousting put off the issue for an additional six years. By that point, censorship was on the 
rise. So too was the development of government propaganda in coordination with the United 
States, which was in the early stages of the Vietnam War expansion. The year 1963 also 
approached the halfway point of the national development plan. Thus, it may have seemed 
logical for the government to fund domestic film production both as a way to foster nationalistic 
film production and as part of its broader modernizing mission. Thus, between August and 
November 1963, notable members of the government and the film industry met together to 
discuss the formation of an official policy on domestic film production. While this effort would 
also prove unsuccessful, the basic ideas that emerged out of the 1963 discussions would inform 
the reforms instituted in the 1970s. 
 The Council was formally announced on the 18 July 1963. At the helm was Major 
General Prince Wan Waithyakon, the famous Thai diplomat and former Ambassador to the 
United Nations. In 1963, he was acting as the Deputy Prime Minister. Prince Phanuphan Yukon 
and his cousin, Prince Anuson Mongkhonkan, the founder of Lawo Studios, also sat on the 
council. Other members of the all-male council were prominent politicians, businessmen, civil 
servants, authors, and filmmakers, including Rat Pettanyi. The composition of the council made 
clear that elite political and economic interests, as well as those of the few major film studios, 
would determine the government’s policy on the film industry.  
Preceding the meetings, a flurry of correspondence was exchanged between the council’s 
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members, the Board of Investment, and other government offices. Several of the filmmakers 
associated with the council provided lengthy letters giving their assessments of the state of the 
film industry and the measures needed to improve it. Prince Phanuphan was amongst the letter 
writers, and in key respects his letter (the lengthiest) provides a general overview of the 
prevailing mindset regarding what was needed. But his letter shows a softer approach to reform 
than the one that would later take hold in the 1970s. It is likely that his measured suggestions 
were informed by his long experience in the film industry, and resume that included both sixteen 
and thirty-five millimeter films. Certainly he recognized the need to develop the industry, but he 
also acknowledged the need to do so slowly and be respectful of people’s livelihoods. In his 
letter, the transitional nature of evolving attitudes regarding the industry may be seen. 
 Like most others concerned with developing the industry, Phanuphan focused on the role 
of technology, and the differences between thirty-five and sixteen millimeter filmmaking. He 
linked the choice regarding which type of film directors chose to their professional mindset. 
Specifically, those that chose sixteen millimeter film tended to be less experienced, and were 
primarily interested in the mass market and making quick money. According to Phanuphan, they 
also tended to work within the star system style. Thus, Phanuphan asserted that those filmmakers 
were, by the nature of the sixteen millimeter market, less critical to the production of film, 
especially in comparison to celebrities. Furthermore, due to the lack of synchronous sound in 
sixteen millimeter filmmaking, narrators played a critical role. Because narrators were able to 
spontaneously change the script, they also contributed to the decreased significance of the 
director.  
By contrast, the director was of utmost importance in thirty-five millimeter filmmaking. 
Phanuphan’s support for the thirty-five millimeter industry was to a large degree aimed at 
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facilitating the rise of the director as “auteur.” That attitude was more in line with international 
attitudes that the director had ownership over the film, and in part reflected the international 
outlook of men like Phanuphan. The approach also asserted film as an artistic rather than purely 
commercial product. It also was a clear reject of the sixteen millimeter system, which was highly 
dependent on the draw of celebrities rather than the artistic merits of the films. 
 But Phanuphan, as well as Anuson Mongkhonkan and others, nonetheless asserted that 
sixteen millimeter film production should be given protection. This inclusion, however, was 
premised on the idea that if filmmakers were given the right environment in which to make 
films, they would inevitably transition to thirty-five millimeter filmmaking. As Anuson 
Mongkhonkan argued in his own letter, “I see that it is appropriate that filmmakers of the sixteen 
millimeter type should receive consideration for assistance as well at this time, such that 
filmmakers and theaters that use sixteen millimeter will be able to transition by themselves to the 
thirty-five millimeter standard.”451 Like Phanuphan, Anuson Mongkhonkan acknowledged that 
only three companies were consistently producing thirty-five millimeter films, namely Hanuman 
Films (owned by Rat), Lawo Films (owned by Anuson Mongkhonkan), and Atsawin Films 
(owned by Phanuphan). Although the three men took a tempered approach to sixteen millimeter 
filmmakers, the ideal model was based on their own studios. Eventually, they all argued, the 
government should only support thirty-five millimeter production. 
 Phanuphan also addressed an issue that continues to plague the contemporary industry, 
and that has proved an enduring problem for Thai filmmakers. He noted that domestic audiences 
had distinctly different preferences than international audiences. Domestically, sixteen and 
thirty-five millimeter films were equally popular. The main difference favoring sixteen 
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millimeter films was that in provincial markets, by far the most profitable for domestic films, the 
theaters lacked the technology to show thirty-five millimeter films. In Bangkok, where the 
theaters were well equipped to show thirty-five millimeter films, the theaters owners favored 
foreign films, often because they had a contract with a foreign company. Boonrak described the 
situation produced by powerful theater owners and American contracts: 
Since the 1960s, for example, the MPEAA had the Siam Entertainment Company as its 
main link, while the WDP forged a similar relationship with the Hollywood Film 
Company. These two Sino-Thai-managed companies were the leading theater operators 
in Bangkok, together running a few dozen of the most profitable first-run theaters in the 
city. Due to their longstanding American connection, in 1976 the two firms were merged 
into the Pyramid Entertainment Corp. (PEC), making their position even stronger. The 
MPEAA and WDP chose to deal with these theatrical chains in a form of “joint 
venture.”452 
 
 Thus, thirty-five millimeter films, due to the Thai cinema environment and lack of audience 
preference for certain technologies, were caught in a sort of “no man’s land.” They were too 
advanced and not sufficiently profitable to be shown in provincial theaters, and couldn’t compete 
with foreign films in Bangkok. 
Internationally, the only Thai films that could be accepted at international film screenings 
and festivals were those made with thirty-five millimeter film. But the filmmakers able to make 
films of sakon, or international, quality, were still very few, and lacked domestic support. To 
address the limited opportunities for showing Thai films abroad, Anuson Mongkhonkan 
suggested that the government take broad steps to address the issue, including diplomatic 
“cultural exchanges” and co-productions. For both Phanuphan and Anuson Mongkhonkan, Japan 
provided an enviable example for how an Asian country might break into international markets. 
Anuson Mongkhonkan discussed in detail the number of Japanese films that won international 
film awards in any given year. They also noted that Japanese films were well regarded around 
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the world, and therefore provided a useful example for Thai cinema’s potential. Japanese films, it 
seems, proved that Asian films could compete internationally.  
 Furthermore, Phanuphan complained, the various duties and tariffs placed on the film 
industry made it very hard to continue working and make a profit. The Thai government placed 
tariffs and taxes on a range of film activities, from import duties on equipment (including thirty-
five millimeter film) to entertainment taxes at theaters. On the one hand, this increased the costs 
of production for domestic filmmakers, particularly those who wanted to work with the more 
complex and expensive equipment needed for 35mm film production. On the other hand, it made 
cinema owners risk adverse. In Bangkok, this meant that foreign films were most commonly 
screened, as they were the most likely to turn a profit. In the provinces, sixteen millimeter 
features starring the biggest celebrities were the main draw. 
 Responding to these varied challenges, Phanuphan suggested four main changes, 
specifically the institution of a quota system, targeted tariffs aimed at foreign films, the gradual 
encouragement of thirty-five millimeter style production, and the creation of a filmmaking 
association. While not all of the suggestions were immediately achieved, they shaped the debate 
about how the government should support the film industry. First, regarding the quota, he 
suggested that all theaters would be required to show a set number of Thai films on a weekly 
basis. Rat also agreed, and referenced examples of Thailand’s neighbors, including India, Burma, 
Japan, Pakistan, and Indonesia, who already had quota systems in place.453 In this suggestion, 
Phanuphan focused almost exclusively on Bangkok’s first run theaters. These theaters seemed to 
be the cinemas that Phanuphan thought would be most successful for thirty-five millimeter 
productions to screen. He made no similar suggestions for provincial theaters. Specifically, the 
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filmmakers suggested that first run theaters cumulatively be required to show between twelve to 
fifteen Thai films per week.454  
Second, he suggested that the government dramatically lower tariffs on film equipment, 
especially that used for thirty-five millimeter production, and remove taxes on cinema tickets for 
Thai films. Instead, tariffs on imported films should be raised. By 1963, the Thai government 
taxed film production and exhibition in a range of ways. Boonrak noted that “from 1947-1977, 
[with the government] claiming that film-going was a “luxurious” activity, film admission tax in 
Thailand was set at a flat rate of 50 percent of the price of each ticket sold.”455 However, import 
tariffs on foreign films were generally low, in 1959 coming to about US$10 per feature.456 Thus, 
foreign films emerged as a steady and low-risk way for cinema owners to make a profit despite 
high ticket prices.  
Adding to this, imported equipment was taxed at high rates. Film stock cost about twice 
what it did in the US or Europe. The filming equipment required for 35mm production was 
likewise made unaffordable through taxation. And even if filmmakers did manage to produce 
something, they still had to send the prints abroad for processing. Upon their return to Thailand, 
they would once again be subject to customs duties.457 Ultimately, Boonrak observed, “the Thai 
government gained US$26.95 million in 1974 through collection of tariffs, censorship fees, 
business taxes, municipality charges, income taxes, profit remittance levies and admission duties. 
This accounted for as much as one-third of the box-office gross for that year, US$81.80 
million.”458 
Third, Phanuphan focused on the various domestic exhibition practices that, in his 
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perception, negatively impacted thirty-five millimeter filmmaking. The first practice was 
narration. Phanuphan suggested that live narrators were a risk for filmmakers, since their practice 
of deviating from scripts violated the government’s censorship rules. Added to their role in 
distracting from the director’s vision for the film, narrators were fundamentally negative 
influences for Phanuphan. He argued that, while the government should consider the need for 
narrators to make a living, they should be gradually phased out of the industry.  
Rat and Phanuphan also recognized the threat that television presented to the film 
industry. Rat observed the in countries where television was already strong, filmmakers had had 
to make changes.459 Phanuphan went further, and suggested that television films were not 
adequately censored, and therefore presented a danger to youth morality. He argued that 
television films should be more rigorously censored and, when involving foreign films, subject 
to tariffs. Like Phanuphan, Anuson Mongkhonkan gave no indication that he was opposed to 
Thailand’s system of censorship. His only criticism, and one that was echoed by Phanuphan, was 
the high fees required to submit a film to the censorship board. Both filmmakers advocated 
lowering the fees significantly, or abolishing them altogether. Anuson Mongkhonkan, however, 
included that caveat that if fees were abolished, they should be maintained for any foreign films 
submitted to the board. 
To enforce all of these suggestions, Phanuphan asserted his fourth suggestion on the need 
for a filmmaking association. He suggested that the American model of the Motion Picture 
Producers Association provided the best example. In that system, he argued, the association 
could regulate its own members and therefore more strictly control the quality of the industry. 
Where filmmakers deviated, the industry could penalize them accordingly. It is intriguing that he 
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would suggest this model, even as the role of the MPAA and major film studios in regulating the 
American industry was breaking down.  
The filmmakers’ suggestions, from tariffs to quotas to greater censorship, revealed a 
highly conservative and protectionist approach to the film industry. To a large degree, the 
reforms would benefit only a very select number of filmmakers. By his and others own 
admission, the changes would only benefit three existing studios. The changes would not 
necessarily make it easier for filmmakers to break into the industry, but rather make it easier for 
those already involved in making films. As part of this strategy, the changes would not support 
any style of domestic filmmaking, but only those that conformed to the “international standard.” 
At the same time that his proposals ignored the plight of most domestic filmmakers, they were 
also explicitly anti-foreign. Even as he suggested modeling a Thai filmmaking association on the 
American example, he asserted the need to decrease the market share of foreign films. Indeed, he 
directly stated that the intended impact of a quota and import tariff would be a decrease in the 
number of foreign films playing in Thailand. None of these suggestions was based on market 
forces or perceived demands of Thai audiences. Indeed, as Phanuphan himself acknowledged, 
audiences either had no preference for a specific style of filmmaking, or, in Bangkok, preferred 
foreign films. The changes served only to address the grievances of a select few.  
Furthermore, the filmmakers’ ideas were largely based on ideas of progress and 
modernization. In Rat’s letter, he began by noting the ways in which Sarit’s policies towards 
industry had led to progress and improvement.460 The men repeatedly used development 
discourse, such as charoen (develop), to describe the impact of their proposed changes. 
Moreover, their almost obsessive focus on technology was linked to international conceptions of 
cinematic progress and modernity. Thai cinema could not enter the international, modern world 
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of filmmaking without reforming as an industry along technological lines. The very use of the 
word industry (utsahakam) to describe the sphere of filmmaking emphasized those 
developmental and technological priorities. Indeed, other spheres of artistic endeavor, such as 
literature or other visual arts, felt no need to be classified as industries. The debates and tensions 
between industry and art were unique to the film industry. 
These opinions were, by and large, reflected in the at least eleven meetings that followed 
the formation of the council. The main issues that came up in the meeting were the extent to 
which the government should take a role, whether through aid or enforcement, the use of quotas, 
tariffs, and technological barriers, specifically regarding sixteen millimeter film. The members 
were far from agreeing on how to approach the varied issues, or even on what to discuss first. 
Oftentimes, the disagreements cut across industry lines, with the filmmakers, businessmen, and 
officials each arguing a different approach. But even within those categories, the members 
disagreed. Rat focused on introducing a quota system, noting that if the government couldn’t 
help in that regard, “there was no point to further debate.”461 Prince Phanuphan, as in his letters, 
returned again and again to the issue of sixteen millimeter filmmaking.  
All of the members agreed on the challenge facing the domestic industry from foreign 
competition. To a large degree the different subjects, from quotas to import fees, revolved 
around the issue of foreign competition. Discussions of quotas, for example, observed that of the 
twenty-four first-run theaters in Bangkok, just two, Chaloem Krung and Empire, showed Thai 
films throughout the year. Some, like Metro Theater, refused to show any Thai features at all.462 
A quota system was intended to guarantee a stable market for Thai productions, thereby 
removing the stigma of Thai films as risky investments. But foreign films were also seen as 
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threatening influences on the moral behavior of Thai youths, especially men. As Prince 
Phanuphan noted, Eastern men were susceptible to sexual influences much earlier than Western 
men, with Thai men lusting after women as early as age fourteen.463 Therefore, Western films in 
particular needed to be controlled to suit the social control of the Thai citizenry.  
As for foreign Asian films, the members also agreed that Japanese increasingly presented 
a new challenge to the domestic market. But Japanese films were also generally admired by the 
members, as was the way that Japanese cinema had gained a positive international reputation and 
broken into the American market.464 Mainland Chinese films, on the other hand, were associated 
with Communism, and the threat of Communism within the Sino-Thai and Bangkok Chinese 
communities.465  
The meetings also reveal a notable rift between producers and exhibitors. Cinema-owners 
were perceived by many of the members, especially the filmmakers, as first and foremost 
interested in profit, and therefore favored foreign productions. So when the members were 
discussing reforms to the system, they were often conceived in ways that circumvented the 
control of exhibitors. For example, when discussing how a quota system might work, Rat 
advocated for formal legislation and enforcement, noting that “If we were to use requests of the 
exhibitors (phuak rong) it would have no benefit, because the exhibitors have never supported 
(us).”466 
As Boonrak summed up the attitude of the TMPPA, “they blamed the individual 
exhibitors, particularly those within the highly concentrated theatrical circuits in Bangkok and 
the major provincial centers, of being ‘unsympathetic, money-hungry, exploitative capitalists’ 
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who did not care about the future of ‘Thai culture.’”467 Those tensions would come to a head 
after the 1977 tariff raise. Ultimately, however, a quota was recognized as unenforceable, 
primarily because there were simply not enough Thai films to sustain one, as well as the fact that 
such a move would upset exhibitors. It was Prince Anuson Mongkhonkan who proposed the 
eventual solution, raising the film import tariff such that less foreign films would come into the 
country.468 
In their discussions, the council members accepted and demonstrated a fundamental 
relationship between government, art, industry, and cultural life. They spoke of government 
support as if it was entitled to them as productive citizens of the nation. Moreover, they asserted 
film as a national good, in need of nurturing and oversight in order to produce something that the 
nation could be proud of. As Rat argued, government support for film would have positive 
effects on the international reputation of Thailand. He wrote that government support would 
allow Thai films to screen abroad and “promote the culture and life of the Thai nation to make 
other countries more familiar with Thai people.”469 Thus, he asserted the role of film in 
promoting national cultural values abroad as part of Thailand’s broader international diplomatic 
and cultural exchange efforts. 
Moreover, these types of demands would have been unthinkable even a decade or so 
previously. Certainly the calls for official government support were relatively new in filmmaking 
circles, only coming from the 1950s onwards. This change in attitude is linked to two further 
changes. First, it was contingent on the rise of a mass film industry and the anxieties amongst 
Bangkok’s educated and cultural elite that it provoked. Second, it relied on a changing role of 
government in people’s lives. The specific policies that were proposed in the 1960s and 
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eventually took root in the 1970s were determined by the changes brought by rapid development 
and the expansion of government in Thailand.  
However, the political landscape in Bangkok was suddenly shaken in December 1963, 
when Sarit suddenly died from cirrhosis of the liver. As I discussed in chapter three, his death 
was quickly followed by scandals concerning his mistresses and the dispute over his fortune. 
Sarit’s chosen successor, Thanom Kittikachorn, began his regime with the promise to follow 
Sarit’s agenda. Shortly after the transition, the government propagated the idea of prachathipatai 
baeb Thai, or “Thai-style Democracy.” Thanom was never able to achieve the cult of personality 
that Sarit had managed. Instead, as Thak observed, “What Sarit had conveyed by personal 
charisma the government now attempted to project by disseminating what can almost be called 
the doctrines of Sarit-ism.”470 The continuity in policy included the focus on development and 
modernization.  
In 1964, while the film industry was recognized according to the “Act of the Promotion 
of Industries,” it was not given eligibility for government financial support. The reason given for 
this was that the production of films was not yet considered to be of international standard.471 At 
that point, many elites and politicians in Bangkok still held a negative or ambivalent view 
towards domestic filmmaking. As many of this class of people were those likely to see foreign 
films themselves, it is hard to imagine that they would be eager to institute measures to increase 
the numbers of Thai features and decrease foreign films. Nonetheless, the Act gave the industry 
some amount of legitimacy, and ultimately proved a stepping stone to further reform.  
Reform also came from inside the industry. The establishment of the TMPPA in 1967 
was intended to instigate progress within the industry. It appears that the association did have 
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some immediate impact. Before 1967, only 1 to 2 thirty-five millimeter films were produced per 
year, but after that year the number increased to 3 to 4.472 Much like the 1963 council, the 
TMPPA was led by the three major production companies Hanuman, Atsawin, and Lawo.473 
While several other trade unions developed in the 1960s and 1970s, including the Film 
Directors’ Club of Thailand, the Artists Association of Thailand, and the Professional Performers 
Association of Thailand, the TMPPA was eventually the most successful in achieving 
government support.474 
The influence of the TMPPA was in part because the associated filmmakers were 
primarily drawn from the ranks of newly urbanized bourgeois class or low-level royals. 
However, with the exception of Prince Chatrichaloem Yukon, it is the former group that became 
most prominent from the end of the 1960s onwards. Benedict Anderson identified the 
development of a “bourgeois strata” in the 1960s as part of a right-wing reaction to American 
influence and social upheaval.475 In fact, a popular nationalism could be found at the time that 
took forms of a leftist or liberal movement on the one hand and a conservation faction on the 
other. Largely the products of modernization programs and educational expansion under Sarit 
and Thanom, the members of this new class represented the ability for progress within the family 
and upward social mobility.476 However, at the same time that this class reaped the benefits of 
modernity, they also increasingly questioned the costs to society and the moral degradation 
brought by American influence.477  
The bourgeois class was particularly susceptible to government and royal conceptions of 
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Thai national identity and culture, especially the concept of “Nation-Religion-King.” In fact, 
they became what Anderson called the “popular” allies of the aristocratic and bureaucratic elite, 
a result of “a growing general awareness that they are no longer genuinely hegemonic, and of the 
real fear and hatred generated by the cultural revolution of the 1970s.”478 As so-called leftist 
elements began to take over after 1973, as well as with the economic downturn accompanying 
the global economic crisis and beginnings of American withdrawal, this urban class increasingly 
blamed the student groups, labor unions, and influences of democracy for the social upheaval 
and economic troubles of the time. In this way, the bourgeois class accepted the October 6, 1976 
massacre of students at Thammasat University by the military and conservative elements despite 
the unprecedented public nature of the violence.479 
The alliance between the urban bourgeois, bureaucratic elite, and aristocrats or minor 
royals was already apparent in the film industry. Whereas previously the royal elite had been 
happy to pursue filmmaking as merely a hobby, once the bourgeois strata entered into 
filmmaking as a professional activity, the market needed to be shaped to address their interests. 
Thus, mass filmmaking only became a real problem when it was perceived to intrude on the 
ability for “professional” filmmakers to control the market. The prevailing mindset of 
modernization and internationalization contributed to understandings of what it meant to be a 
professional. The standards of international film festivals and use of latest film technologies 
became the defining features of quality filmmaking. But the demands of bourgeois and elite 
nationalism also meant that foreign competition and the threat of foreign morality were viewed 
with increasing concern. The demands made by filmmakers from the 1960s onwards were 
entirely the product of shifting social dynamics, economic relations, and nationalism in the Cold 
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War period. 
While filmmakers and government officials sought a way to improve the industry through 
state regulation, changes also came from unexpected places. In 1966, in the course of producing 
a documentary on the Fifth Asian Games, Tae Prakadwuttisan discovered the availability of 
thirty-five millimeter film labs in Hong Kong, which presented a far cheaper alternative to 
having films produced in the United Kingdom.480 Combined with the creation of the TMPPA, a 
transition began as the film industry moved towards thirty-five millimeter production. By 1972, 
almost all films were made of that standard.  
The change was inspired in part by the major success of two Thai films in 1970, Monrak 
luk thung (Magical Love in the Countryside) and Tone (A Man called Tone).481 Like so many 
other films of the 1960s, Monrak luk thung starred Mitr Chaibancha and Phetchara Chaowarat. A 
musical comedy and romance, the film was so successful that it stayed in theaters for six months. 
The film showed what was possibly when the celebrity formulas of the sixteen millimeter age 
were showed in higher quality formats. It also proved to be one of the last films made starring 
Mitr and Phetchara together. Shortly afterwards, Mitr died while filming a helicopter stunt for 
the film Insee Thong. Phetchara continued to make films on a less frequent scale until 1979, after 
which she retired due to blindness caused by the bright lights on the film sets. The sudden death 
of Mitr and gradual retirement of Phetchara closed the chapter on sixteen millimeter era celebrity 
pairings. As for Tone, produced by Piak Poster, the film would go on to inspire a movement of 
socially activist filmmaking in the 1970s. That style of film would take over from the “putrid” 
films of the sixteen millimeter era.  
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In addition to those changes, the government began to finally deliver on promises of 
support. In 1969, the government granted the Thai film industry the right to seek government 
investment. However, in order to be eligible companies had to have significant capital 
investment funds and were required to make films using thirty-five millimeter. Many companies 
and filmmakers lacked the means to qualify for this, so the change initially only affected a small 
portion of the industry. The same three companies Hanuman, Asawin, and Lawo were, once 
again, the only three initially eligible.482  Undoubtedly, new promises of support, as well as the 
commercial success of domestic thirty-five millimeter films led contributed to technological 
shifts in the industry. By 1972, almost no Thai films were made in sixteen millimeter format.483  
In 1969, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, at the directive of the Prime Minister, 
conducted an extensive study of the domestic film industry, importation of foreign films, and 
steps the government might take to improve the industry. Complete with extensive statistical 
information and descriptions of all aspects of the industry from production to distribution, the 
study represents the fullest information available on the film industry in the 1960s. The study 
also compared the Thai industry with other Asian countries, including Japan, India, Malaysia, 
and Indonesia. As with other studies or discussions of the industry, the 1969 study focused on 
development objectives. The point of the study, the authors wrote, was to examine opportunities 
for the film industry to develop and progress (charoen kao na).484 
But government interest in supporting the industry was not merely for the benefit of 
industry workers. As the authors wrote,  
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Aside from saving foreign currency that is lost to foreign films, we could also send Thai 
films abroad for distribution or screening. It would be a source of revenue for the country 
and form of promotion for foreigners to know more about Thailand. Aside from this, in 
the support for the production of documentary films, the government may use the films in 
order to give the people knowledge about different issues and induce people to work with 
the government to solve various problems and for the development of the country.485 
 
Again, the government made it clear that it considered films to be a tool in broader efforts to 
foster national sentiment, influence citizen’s behavior, and promote the international image of 
the country. This approach was very much in line with Sarit’s style of government, as well as the 
use of propaganda in Thailand during the Cold War more generally.  
The study also revealed biases in government toward domestic cinema. According to the 
study, members of the Thai film industry could be classified into three broad groups: 1) 
Filmmakers who owned their own studios, which were stable, as well as their own equipment. 
They also had experience and knowledge about filmmaking; 2) People who worked in specific 
occupations, such as casting directors or cinematographers; and 3) Amateur filmmakers who 
were not seriously interesting in film and lacked the appropriate skills, but wanted to make 
money and would leave the industry at their first failure.  
Of the first group, the study concluded that only Atsawin, Lawo, and Hanuman qualified. 
The list excluded filmmakers such as Dok Din Kanyamal, despite his long years spent in the 
industry and many successful films, as well as the fact that he owned his own film company. 
Either than were not yet making films in thirty-five millimeter, or they were not seen as 
legitimate artists. Of the second group, the study estimated that there were only about twenty 
people.486 The vast majority of those in the film industry were grouped into the third category. 
The categories impacted the role of director more than anyone. Directors were, at least 
implicitly, expected to be attached to and make films with the structure of a studio.  
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This classification reveals the institutionalization of a class bias towards the film 
industry. It also evidenced the attitude that certain characteristics defined a “professional” rather 
than “amateur” filmmaker, especially class, education, and use of quality equipment. Great 
emphasis was placed on formal training in filmmaking (including all specific aspects of film 
production), use of TMPPA approved equipment and thirty-five millimeter film, and access to 
sufficient capital (several million baht) to cover the costs of production. These classifications 
formed the backbone of what types of film production would eventually be eligible for 
government support, but were so restrictive that they applied only to a very limited group of 
filmmakers. These restrictions were aimed at the mass film industry and intended to rid the 
country of low-quality productions. 
The study also noted the unequal import-export dynamics of the industry. There were 
very few opportunities to send Thai films abroad. Apparently, only Laos, Cambodia, and 
Malaysia provided consistent markets. Even then, Cambodia had recently stopped importing 
Thai films. In Hong Kong and the United States, individual films were sometimes sold as 
“Chinese films.”487 Similarly, Thai films had limited success with international film festivals. 
The authors recalled the success of Santi-Vina, noting that even the Soviets and Communist 
Chinese purchased copies of the film.488 But the failure for Thai films to continue that success 
was blamed on sixteen millimeter film production. Intriguingly, the authors also noted that the 
tradition of films based on novels (phapphayon prophet nawaniyai) did not find a market abroad. 
The authors argued that not only was the story already not of international standard by the time it 
reached the filmmaking stage, but also that foreign audiences would not be interested in those 
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films.489 The observation seems to indicate a belief that domestic stories writ large were only 
popular domestically.  
As shown in Figure 4.1 below, Hollywood films were the most popular in Bangkok. 
Western-held film festivals were the most highly regarded by filmmakers, with the exception of 
those held in Japan. But in comparing strategies for development national cinemas, the authors of 
the study most closely examined the cases in Japan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia. These case 
studies were chosen in part due to the categorization of certain Asian nations as developing. It 
wasn’t only that the countries had strong film industries. India, Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
Thailand were also the emergent economics of the “Third World.” Japan, meanwhile, provided 
the model for capitalist and industrial development in Asia, as well as one of the few Asian 
cinemas to break into the national scene.  
 
Figure 4.1 National Origin of Films shown in Bangkok First-Run Theaters per 100 Seats 
(1969)490 
But the great challenge of foreign competition remained. While the government had 
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made some token efforts to support the industry, the independence of cinemas and major draw of 
foreign films meant that the TMPPA continued to lobby for greater protections. Continued 
pressure culminated in a dinner, which opened this chapter, at the Montien hotel in August of 
1970. After a series of speeches by leaders in the film industry and bureaucrats, Rat appeared on 
stage as the last to speak. But he only managed a few words, before he collapsed. A few hours 
later, he had passed away, the result of a heart attack. Just 62 years old, Rat had devoted the 
better part of his life to making films and trying to solve the riddles of the domestic Thai film 
market. He had apparently given up filmmaking after Namtan mai wan, out of hopeless 
frustration with the industry. Unfortunately, in terms of regulation, his greatest impact would 
come only after his death. 
Quickly after this event, the Thai government responded by designating the film industry 
as a protected sphere. The cremation volume put together to honor Rat is full of recollections 
from civil servants with whom he was acquainted through his long years of lobbying for support. 
The Minister of Economic Affairs recalls the day that Rat showed him around his studio, where 
he explained all of the film equipment and showed him Rat’s documentary film Thamajak. 
Afterwards, Rat hosted the Minister to a lunch at his family home.491 They included veteran 
filmmakers, like Prince Anuson Mongkhonkan, Prince Phanuphan, and Manit Wasuwat, as well 
as industry newcomers, such as Choed Songsri. Prince Anuson Mongkhonkan, who recalled Rat 
as a beloved friend, wrote that he was “The only person on the earth who could see Thai film 
‘step forward,’ (kao pai khang na) instead of just sitting quietly or fall behind (thoi lang).”492 
 While some of the contributions from officials took on a rote tone, Choed Songsri shared 
a story that aptly describes why Rat holds such an important place in the history of Thai cinema. 
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In 1970, Choed had only been making films for a few years. His first film, Nora, came out in 
1966, and became one of the greatest hits of the sixteen millimeter era. He would then go on to 
study filmmaking at UCLA and train at Burbank Studios. But Choed recalled a series of 
meetings between himself and Rat at an early stage in his career that proved inspirational. Choed 
wrote that, 
At the time that I was making “Nora,” which was my first film, I had organized 
“Nora Day” at the meeting hall at Thammasat University. Khun Pitsamay Wilaisak dance 
the manora-buchayan. I needed to film it, and required significant lighting. I therefore 
went to rent a lamp from Hanuman Films.  
 “You organized it the production to make merit, correct?”  
 The man asked me. I answered that: 
“All of the income will be donated, Sir. But I will take the opportunity to 
make a film as well.” 
“You’ve just started. Making a film requires a lot of capital. Do you have 
a lot of capital?” 
“Not at all, sir.” 
“Then I will help you…” 
And then that man called over Khun San Pettanyi, his brother, to get the 
lighting for me for free.  
 
Choed went on to recall multiple times when Rat allowed Choed to rent items from Hanuman 
studios for free, like a dolly which would otherwise have cost ฿5,000.  
 Rat Pettanyi was undoubtedly a uniquely skilled filmmaker who understood the role of 
film form and technology in producing films. He was also an astute businessman to be able to 
build a film business in spite of the long odds imposed by transnational market realities and an 
extractive state policy. But as Rat and other elite filmmakers and members of the TMPPA were 
trying to reform the film market according to the ideologies of the time, they were also 
attempting to meet the near impossible demands of both mass market success and film festival 
standards of quality.  
On the one hand, during this period, the tensions between quality and popularity in the 
domestic industry emerged for the first time. The 1963 meetings make it evident that by that 
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point a standard had emerged that Thai films should be both commercially popular as well as of 
high enough technological and artistic quality to qualify for international film festivals. That 
most Thai films failed to achieve this was not blamed on the intrinsic contradictions between the 
demands of film festivals and those of the domestic mass markets, nor on the differences in 
spectatorship patterns that defined mass Thai film going. Instead, amateurish practices, economic 
greed, unsupportive state policy, and foreign exploitation were blamed. Thus, only 
“professional” filmmakers supported by state policy in a carefully regulated market offered the 
solution to the contradictions of the competing markets.  
On the other hand, the modernizing ideologies that drove conceptions of the role of the 
state in people’s lives allowed filmmakers to focus on the role of technology in producing 
quality. It also allowed the filmmakers to re-conceptualize filmmaking as a state “industry” in 
need to progress and development. Thus, the state of the film industry became a barometer for 
the state of Thailand’s national development more broadly. Once filmmakers and bureaucrats 
had designated a national cinema, the threat of foreign competition became more discernable and 
concerning. Even as Thailand entered the “American Era,” American cultural products were 
increasingly suspect. Furthermore, the new understanding of a Thai “national” cinema set the 
stage for the socially active cinema of the 1970s, and eventually for import reforms that led to a 
four-year Hollywood boycott of Thailand.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
HOTEL ANGEL: GENDER, CLASS, AND AUTHENTICITY IN THE FIRST NEW WAVE 
 
“If we don't help preserve Thai identity, what will we use to demonstrate “Thainess”?”493 – 
Choed Songsri 
 Choed Songsri’s seminal 1977 film Phlae kao (The Scar) opens with a raucous village 
celebration.494 As villagers play music, sing, and dance. Onlookers enthusiastically clap to the 
rhythm of folk music. The scene is reminiscent of many village celebrations throughout central 
Thailand. The villagers themselves are likewise dressed in familiar central Thai fashion. 
Elevated, thatch huts further contribute to the familiarity of the scene. A sign informs viewers 
that the location is Bang Kapi District, a small district in the capital region on the fringes of 
Bangkok district. Choed juxtaposed this scene with the above quote as a rallying cry for the 
protection of a Thai identity. From what did Choed want to protect Thai identity? It is likely that 
Choed’s call was in part influenced by the troubled years of political turmoil that climaxed in the 
events of 1973 to 1976. It also came at a time when the government was considering drastic 
protectionist measures for the domestic industry that would, by the end of 1977, end with the 
Hollywood boycott of the Thai market. Those moves were influenced by popular anti-
Americanism after decades of intervention and dramatic socio-economic change. 
Throughout the course of his career, Choed used film as a way to meditate on and 
propagate his understanding of Thai culture. In doing so, his work was very much of the First 
New Wave (khluen luk mai) generation of Thai filmmakers that came to dominate Thai cinema 
in the 1970s. First New Wave films used contemporary political and social issues to convey 
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nationalistic messages and propagate an increasingly urban bourgeois image of the Thai cultural 
citizen. Piak Poster’s 1970 film Tone, set the stage for the First New Wave style. Set in 
contemporary Thailand, the film was shot with the latest film technologies and surprised 
audiences with its controversial plot highlights. That combination, familiar settings, 
technological advancement, and social activism, would characterize the First New Wave 
movement. These films were therefore understood by the filmmakers, as well as audiences and 
the Thai state (which both supported and censored many of these films), to have social and 
political importance and influence in the emerging public sphere that accompanied a greatly 
increased participation in Thai political affairs and engagement with the state.  
However, like the nam nao films, First New Wave directors used melodramatic love 
stories or sexual encounters of rural Thais. They conveniently spoke central Thai, which 
Bangkok audiences would understand and would act as a bridge to help those audiences identify 
with the characters. While born in different parts of the country, the filmmakers were generally 
educated in the United States, often at top tier film schools, and lived and produced their films in 
central Thailand and Bangkok. This was the case with Prince Chatrichaloem Yukhon, who was 
studied filmmaking at UCLA, where he apparently shared film courses with Francis Coppola and 
Roman Polanski. Indeed, during this period the ability to run a successful film business, pursue 
filmmaking as a career, and have access to film technology was by and large conditional on 
possessing the financial means to do so, as the government support programs for domestic 
filmmaking were still in their infancy and inclined to support existing professional film 
companies.   
First New Wave films were indicative of a larger tension in Thailand from the late 1950s 
to the early 1980s, often referred to as the samai patthana (development era). At the heart of the 
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tension was how the relationship between Thai people and the land informed national identity. 
With increasingly rapid urbanization, industrialization, and agrarian development, pre-existing 
social categories based on land-based livelihoods were re-imagined in ways that privileged elite 
interpretations of national identity and sociopolitical hierarchies. These conceptions of the 
national community became rhetorically powerful in the Thai film industry and visibly dominant 
on the screens of Thai cinemas across the country. Consequently, film was a vital medium 
through which a reimagining of the Thai national political and social arena occurred. But it was 
also a site in which the contradictions of a national identity were apparent. 
Filmmakers like Piak, Choed, and Chatrichaloem created a style of filmmaking in which 
they inscribed the threat of modernity to the Thai nation on the bodies of the films’ rural poor 
characters. In this respect, the filmmakers reflected a common feeling amongst the Thai elite and 
middle-class; that is, serious ambivalence towards the entire project of development and 
modernization that Thailand had pursued with great rapidity and with the financial and military 
assistance of the United States. Even as their motivations and the specifics of their ambivalence 
differed, in general the pattern became most evident in depictions of the Thai countryside. The 
filmmakers presented highly romanticized images of an agrarian utopia populated by innocent 
peasants at risk of defilement if they had too much contact with the West, modernity, or politics. 
In doing so, they obfuscated the benefits that modernity brought to other segments of the 
population- notably Thai elites and the filmmakers themselves - as uneven industrialization 
restricted the improvement of living standards to certain segments of the Bangkok core. 
 By the time that the First New Wave gained momentum, Thai cinema was for many of 
the social and intellectual elite a national embarrassment, as well as emblematic of broader 
concerns regarding Thai national identity. Attitudes toward domestic cinema paralleled the 
 211 
popular sense of lethargy that characterized the Thai political and economic atmosphere. 
Different segments of the Bangkok elite had separate reasons for their aversion to domestic 
cinema. Nonetheless, their dislike created some commonality. In general, nam nao was used for 
films that were technologically backward in their use of sixteen millimeter stock and culturally 
unsophisticated due to their appeal to rural and lower class Thai people. It was against this class 
of nang nam nao that First New Wave filmmakers developed their films.  
Two major film movements dominated filmmaking during the 1970s, namely “Art for 
Life” (sinlapa phuea chiwit) and the First New Wave.495 The Art for Life movement was derived 
from the social realist project, which sought to draw attention to the everyday lives of Thailand’s 
poor and critique social hierarchies. Many of these films were adaptations of novels from the 
same movement. Their themes centered on rural life and the impact of development on social 
relationships. Thongpan (1975) remains one of the best known of this genre of cinema.496 First 
New Wave, meanwhile, also used realism and didactic juxtapositions between the rural poor and 
urban excess. However, they advocated nationalistic rather than revolutionary themes. Prominent 
films of this style include Choed Songsri’s Phlae kao and Prince Chatrichaloem’s Khao chue 
kan.497 In both movements, realism was used to portray different versions of an authentic 
Thailand and to deliver political messages through cinema. The filmmaking of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s represented a high point in the shift from the 1950s that resulted in an aesthetic 
regime in which didactic representations of rural lives were tied to the ongoing struggle for Thai 
national identity.  
Thus, the two movements represented a shift in filmmaking that included the social and 
political landscape of the country in domestic films. They also forcefully politicized commercial 
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cinema. However, to do so they utilized a style of narrative filmmaking that presumed a passive 
audience. The filmmakers paid careful attention, for example, to narrative continuity and smooth 
editing. The changes in narratives styles were complemented by changes in the architecture of 
modern theaters that reinforced the switch from active to passive viewing behaviors. Throughout 
the country, particularly in urban and provincial centers, the darkened and air-conditioned theater 
occupied by a silent audience became the ideal. These changes fundamentally altered the 
relationship between filmmaker, text, and audience in Thai cinema. The participatory and 
interactive character of earlier cinema was replaced by a paternalistic approach.  
For these reasons, Plae kao was emblematic of the changes in Thailand’s Cold War film 
industry that I have highlighted thus far. Choed himself benefitted from the Thai-US alliance, 
particularly by his education in the United States. In an earlier era, he may have gone to the 
United Kingdom or stayed in Thailand. Instead, he went to Los Angeles, where he was exposed 
to filmmaking. The experience also drove Choed’s search for Thai social and cultural 
authenticity. His search led him to the village, much like the US and Thai governments in their 
psychological warfare programs. Plae kao, made in part from experience gained in the United 
States and using the latest film technologies conforming to international standards, asserted a 
conservative social vision, where Thainess was defended through the sexual decisions of a 
woman and by rejecting the influences of the West.  
Choed began filmmaking during a tumultuous time. By 1970, the Communist Party of 
Thailand had established a small, but sufficiently strong presence in the country, especially along 
the border with Laos. Various other disputes troubled the country’s borders, such as the 
emerging Islamic separatist movement in the south. There is broad consensus that while these 
issues were troubling, they never seriously challenged the security of the Thai state. They did 
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cause substantial concern within the government and sociopolitical elite. At the same time, the 
Nixon Administration was intent on negotiating an end to the conflict in Vietnam, and all signs 
pointed to an eventual withdrawal of the US from the region. Already US troop levels had fallen 
since their peak in 1969.  
By 1970, despite efforts by TMPPA to improve industry standards, the state of domestic 
cinema appeared for many beyond saving. Praphat reportedly said, “I don’t like to watch Thai 
movies… [T]hey make me feel embarrassed.”498 This was true as well for many filmmakers. In 
response, the TMPPA and a select group of filmmakers sought to create a new national cinema 
based on high cinematic quality. In doing so, they produced a new set of standards on which 
Thai films would qualify as legitimate artistic productions.  
The transition in industry attitudes went hand in hand with changing aesthetic and 
narrative styles that impacted the experience of spectatorship and the socio-political symbolism 
of film viewing. Previously filmmakers like Rat Pettanyi focused on technical aspects of 
filmmaking and foreign competition. Those in the 1970s also emphasized aesthetic features and 
socially engaged content. The shift to thirty-five millimeter production was essentially finished 
by 1972, but perceptions of low-quality domestic filmmaking continued. Filmmakers 
increasingly turned not only to naturalistic styles, but simultaneously became concerned with the 
realism of the stories themselves. Many of the films of the sixteen millimeter era had offered 
escapist experiences depicting mythical kingdoms, historical dramas, or musical romances. But 
with the 1970s, filmmakers used the setting of contemporary, familiar domestic spaces to depict 
the lives of everyday Thais.  
To do so, Thai cinema turned in particular to rural landscapes and village communities. 
These were the same sites deemed of cultural and geopolitical significance by the Thai 
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government and elite, as well as the United States.499 May argued that it was part of a “broader 
cultural and ideological break [that was] distinguished by its idealization of an exemplary rural 
way of life, imagined as a life of simplicity and egalitarian cooperation and its appropriation of 
folk forms for the creation of committed arts and literature.”500 Filmmakers, then, were 
concerned with rural landscapes primarily as they reflected human relationships and social 
values. In general, earlier sixteen millimeter films used indoor studio sets and placed little 
emphasis on broader geographic or social settings. But with the end of the 1960s, Thai films 
moved outdoors.  
Contemporaneous to the “New Wave” movement, the “Art for Life” (sinlapa pheua 
chiwit) movement used “social realist” aesthetics to make art socially and politically relevant for 
the masses. The philosophy also had an impact on film production.501 This movement was led by 
a generation of educated youth, many from rural backgrounds but educated in Bangkok, who 
experienced a sense of cultural displacement. While that displacement compelled them to write 
“for the masses” in opposition to the Thanom government, their positioning as intellectuals led 
them to use language and references aimed more towards their own group than the actual 
masses.502 Indeed the educated backgrounds of the men associated with the “cinema for life” 
movement paralleled those of the New Wave. 
Both groups explicitly rejected the nam nao films and asserted the importance making a 
“quality” cinema that utilized “social realism” techniques. May argued that the use of aesthetic 
realism in New Wave films was an appropriation from cinema for life. It was utilized for 
commercial purposes rather than political mobilization, resulting in what she called “an ethical 
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aesthetic at best, rather than a realist strategy.”503 Contemporary Thai New Wave film is a legacy 
of the first New Wave period in the bourgeois appropriation of the “rural” as a coping 
mechanism for cultural disruption and assertions of Thai identity. May observed that during the 
authoritarian period:  
The impoverished northeastern region of Isan became articulated as a sign of authentic 
Thainess, a countercultural acknowledgment of its history of ethnic and political 
marginalization. By the same token, Bangkok became a disenchanted sign of exploitation 
and cultural degradation, marked by its delights in Americanized mass entertainment, 
hedonism, and consumption.504  
 
With both the left and the right reinterpreting the village and Bangkok as symbolic of Thai 
authenticity and development excesses, respectively, the ideas entered the mainstream. 
Yet if the Thai middle-class/bourgeois rose to be the economically dominant class in 
Thailand, then it still lacked the cultural and creative capital to make it the culturally dominant 
class. The middle-class had yet to assert a cultural product that was entirely or even mostly its 
own. Instead, they have appeared to instead act merely as a site of interaction and mediation 
between external and local forces. Ironically, between those forces, it is the “rural” that has most 
clearly retained its cultural capital, and thus its motifs and norms have been elevated as a 
dominant cultural force. Even as the mainstream depictions of rural life are idealized, it remains 
that these so-called plebeian cultural forms are the most popular and successful to date, 
contrasting with the hollowness of middle-class conceptions.  
Meanwhile, Thai filmmakers saw themselves as representing the ideals of international 
cinematic professionalism. Choed Songsri exemplified that movement in key respects. Choed 
worked within the politically and socially legitimated establishment of Thai cinema, having been 
educated at UCLA film school and trained at Burbank Studios. He owned his own studio, 
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Choedchai. He was involved in the partnership between the Thai Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and the TMPPA to develop programs for government support for the domestic film industry 
since the 1960s. His seminal film, Phlae kao, was made with significant domestic backing and, 
once released, earned the highest box office revenue of any Thai film up to that date.505 Phlae 
kao also went on to win international film awards in 1981, thereby obtaining global recognition 
and legitimation. Both filmmaker and film were the very image of quality cinema advocated by 
the TMPPA and Thai government.  
Indeed, the 1970s New Wave directors like Choed Songsri rejected provincial and rural 
audiences as their primary demographic in favor of Bangkok and international audiences. In an 
interview with Rom magazine in 1974, Choed, while discussing his perspective on government 
support for the film industry and what steps needed still to be taken, asserted that: 
[The government] should help find markets outside of the country. The government has 
many methods to achieve this, for example quota exchanges with foreign countries, 
support for participation in competitions, or joint productions…. When Thai films enter 
the foreign market, producers will aim to make films for the large market (meaning the 
foreign market) instead of the provincial market (talat ban nok) as they do at the present 
moment. When we reach that moment, the quality of Thai cinema will rise to the 
international (sakol) standard.506 
 
His attitude was similar to critics of Thai cinema who saw provincial and rural film consumption 
as an obstacle for the film industry to overcome. It also highlights the tension in 1970s film 
between practice and content. Films were expected to be produced by educated professionals 
using modern equipment and to meet sakon standards of quality that moved away from the Thai 
provincial market. But those same films also used rural landscapes for nostalgic, romantic 
displays of national ecology, and tradition.  
The beginnings of the New Wave are typically attributed to Piak Poster’s 1970 film Tone. 
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Piak Poster started in the film industry painting film posters, thereby earning his last name. Even 
after his transition to directing, he continued to paint his own posters. Dome Sukwong identified 
1970 as a pivotal year in the development of Thai cinema, primarily because of the release of 
Tone and the rural musical Monrak Luk Thung. The former was notable for its use of Isan luk 
thung music and its rural setting. But Tone engaged much more substantively, and critically, with 
aspects of the urban-rural divide. The lead character, a young man named Tone, is an orphaned 
temple boy. But after he saves a visiting man from Bangkok, Aod, from bullying, Aod invites 
Tone to live with him in Bangkok. There, Tone is able to pursue his studies. He also is awed and 
impressed by city life. Bangkok youth culture is embodied by Aod’s beautiful sister, Daeng, who 
enjoys modern music, dates various men, and wears the latest Western fashions, including 
miniskirts. These consumer items and modern, urban cultures are portrayed as liberating and fun.  
But Daeng is captured by some gangsters, who have a vendetta against Tone. They take 
her out of the city, and into the countryside, where they get into a shoot-out with Tone. The 
landscape highlights the dangerous and hostile feeling of the moment. One of the gangsters rapes 
Daeng after Tone fails to rescue her in time. But the pair eventually escape, and are finally able 
to be together. For Tone, Daeng’s assault has no negative impact on their relationship. The film 
broke all of the conventions of mainstream Thai films, from settings to gender norms. In Tone, 
the film set the standard for a major trope in 1970’s filmmaking, where young male college 
graduates underwent a rite-of-passage to find their true purpose.507 Critically for the film 
industry, the two films, Monrak luk thung and Tone, were produced with high standards of 
production quality and in thirty-five millimeter film. The production of these two films, as well 
as the deaths of Rat Pettanyi and Mitr Chaibancha, all in 1970, heralded a new era of film 
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production. But it also saw continued development of the state in Thai cinema.  
After the breakout success of Tone, Piak continued to produce numerous films, most of 
which combined critical success with popular appeal. After 1971’s Duang, Piak released 1972’s 
Chu, which was discussed in chapter three. A comparison of rape in the two films begs some 
interesting questions. The rape against Daeng was off-screen, and only somewhat alluded to. It 
was clearly an act of unwanted violence. But rape was critical to the plot of Chu. Not only the 
actual act, which was shown more extensively, but also the way rape figured significantly in 
Riam’s conceptions of loyalty. There is little evidence to explain these differences. But they 
indicate a complex relationship between femininity, urbanity, and autonomy in Piak’s films. 
Furthermore, the isolation imposed by the island in Chu contrasts with representations of urban 
life in Tone. In fact, Riam’s isolation almost seems to contribute to her passivity. But in Tone, 
the possibilities, for good or bad, are more open. 
Many themes in Tone and Chu, including female autonomy, male coming-of-age, and the 
liberties of urban life, are also evident in Piak’s 1976 Wai Olawon.508 The film’s main character, 
Tam, is living in Bangkok, where he moved from Phetchabun, in order to study at university. To 
earn money, Tam tutors the daughter, O, of his landlord, Met. But after a gossiping neighbor tells 
O’s father, Met, that Tam is preying on O, Met forces the tutoring to stop. But Tam knows that O 
is a lazy student, so he continues to tutor her in secret. Through the years, the relationship 
becomes romantic, in large part out of defiance of Met. Even as the pair’s incompatibility is 
apparent, they stay together. For example, O looks forward to attending Tam’s college 
graduation dance, but Tam simply gets drunk at the party and cannot dance. Nonetheless, the two 
are married. But Met is shown to have the last laugh, when O reveals to Tam that her father 
taught her how to control the family money, and that Tam is on a tight allowance. O’s portrayal 
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is distinctive, as she is clearly shown to have decided her future independently, and in defiance 
of her father. Whether or not her decision was wise, it was her decision. Her control of the 
finances after marriage, furthermore, engages with the traditional role of women as in charge of 
family finances. That depiction is enforced by the depiction of O’s mother, who does most of the 
day-to-day work in running the family’s landlord business. When Met wants to kick Tam out of 
the community, the mother steadfastly refuses. Piak clearly showed the woman as controlling 
events, with the men reduced to petty trickery and small victories over each other. 
In certain respects, Piak’s style, and the depiction of urban youth culture in Tone, marked 
a specific point in the rapid development in the 1960s and 1970s. Through the 1960s, the number 
of migrants to Bangkok, whether for work or for education, expanded exponentially. Likewise, 
the number of tertiary students rose dramatically. These changes had important implications for 
popular hopes of social and economic mobility, if not necessarily for real mobility. University 
degrees were viewed as a pathway to social mobility and financial security. The universities 
became symbolic for many of the promises of development and progress. No matter the origin of 
one’s parents, the next generation might expect unprecedented opportunity.509 Students were not 
only dreaming of a future in the bureaucracy, but also more radical futures. Inspired by 
revolutionary authors like Jit Phumisak and movements led by students, feminists, and farmers, 
amongst others, students moved to the forefront of 1970s activism. For example, students went 
out into the countryside to work with farmers’ groups or community development projects in 
rural villages. At times, their efforts were little more than superficial demonstrations of urban 
presumptions at knowing what was needed by villagers. In other cases, students and farmers, as 
well as “workers, slum dwellers, teachers, and others” worked together to imagine a social and 
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political transformation.510  
Contemporaneously, some hopeful developments for political opening and some level of 
democracy were seen during the period in which Tone was produced. In June 1968, the military 
introduced a constitution that, even as it institutionalized military control and made the Prime 
Minister and cabinet appointment-only positions, did allow for some elected seats in parliament 
and partly legalized political parties.511 In February 1969, the first general elections in eleven 
years were held. The civilian opposition party, led by Seni Pramoj, was particularly popular in 
Bangkok.  
But even those small signs for optimism began to vanish with late 1970 and into 1971. 
The promises of urban development and progress gave way to little real growth for most of the 
country. In the cities, bureaucratic positions were increasingly difficult to come by. University 
graduates had a difficult time finding employment. From a social perspective, the older 
generation found their children coming home not only with changed fashions, but also with 
different political, moral, and social ideas.512 Then, in November 1971, the Thanom-Praphat 
clique overthrew the government, citing concerns about a growing communist insurgency. But it 
was primarily the result of disorganization and factionalism within the military.513 Over the next 
year, the regime constructed another constitution. In December 1972, the news came out that it 
would mandate an entirely appointed Assembly, the vast majority of which would be drawn from 
the military. In response to the news, thousands of students began to publicly protest. The 
constitution proposal was withdrawn.514 
Likewise, in the countryside there was growing discontentment. In large part, this was 
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because those living in rural areas had largely been left out of the nation’s rising economic 
fortunes. While the population boomed, rice productivity remained relatively low. From a 1943 
population of sixteen million, the population had more than doubled to forty million in 1973.515 
And while cultivated acreage increased during that period, the yields from the land did not. So 
when the extents of acreage development were reached, but the population continued to grow, 
landlessness and tenancy became greater problems.516 And then, in 1972, a severe drought 
followed by flooding cut rice output by ten percent and corn by forty percent. With continued 
international demand for rise, prices rose and urban areas experienced shortages.517 Furthermore, 
growing income inequality made it clear that the vast majority of the benefits of development 
and industrialization were going to Bangkok. As the comparison below shows, as city wages 
increased substantially, incomes of farmers saw much less change. 
 
Year 
Per capita income of 
farmers (in Baht) 
 (A) 
Per capita income of 
city people (in Baht) 
(B) A/B (%) 
1960 1,044 6,434 16.2 
1970 1,310 8,618 15.2 
1975 1,433 10,061 14.2 
 
Table 5.1 The Growing per Capita Income Gap of Farmers and City People in Thailand518 
After everything, the economy took a hit, with rising inflation reaching fifteen percent by 
1973.519 Clearly, the promises made by the Thai government and the US through programs like 
the USIS units, had proved false.  
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The state and Bangkok elites were also concerned about the regional situation in which 
Thailand was embedded. Communist insurgencies continued against governments in Laos, 
Cambodia, and South Vietnam. But the US was clearly withdrawing from the region. First, troop 
levels were reduced, although they remained high. Aid levels, both for development and for the 
military, was not as high as the peak between 1967 and 1969, but was still substantial. Thailand 
could not continue to rely on the US, at least not in military terms. In so many ways, then, the 
“boom” of the 1960s was over. As both Anderson and John Girling pointed out, the implicit 
acceptance of authoritarianism in exchange for material development was over. The growing 
discontent with developmental policies and the urban-rural divide were central to the plots of 
Thai films produced in the late 1960 and early 1970s. One of the most notable filmmakers to 
depict these issues in films was Prince Chatrichaloem Yukhon. While Piak Poster inaugurated 
the new technologically and stylistically progressive cinema, Chatrichaloem introduced film as a 
form of direct social criticism. Chatrichaloem was in a privileged position to make that sort of 
film. First, he was a member of the royal family. Second, he was the grandson and son of 
respected filmmakers. He came from a line of filmmakers, including his grandfather Prince 
Yukhon Dikhamphon and uncle Prince Phanuphan Yukhon. His father, Prince Anuson 
Mongkhonkan, was also a filmmaker and founded the studio Lawo Films, with which Khao 
Chue Kan was made. He studied at UCLA, where he majored in geology and minored in film 
studies. Chatri’s position not only enabled him access to film equipment and knowledge of film 
production, especially according to international styles, but it also shielded him from the censure 
of both the government and the market.  
Those factors were certainly at play with the production of Khao chue kan. The film, 
based on a story by writer Suwanee Kuhontha, told the story of a young, poor doctor, Kan, who 
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was committed to serving a small rural community in Phitsanuloke. Kan brings his Bangkok 
society wife, Haruthai, out to the countryside to live with him. Although her mother, friends, and 
jealous ex-boyfriend, Tomon, doubt her ability to survive without city luxuries, Haruthai initially 
follows Kan with a cheerful attitude. But Kan becomes consumed with his work, which causes 
him serious challenges stemming from the community’s isolation, environment, and corruption 
by officials. Haruthai feels increasingly abandoned, and temporarily returns to Bangkok. 
However, after a car accident caused by Tomon, Kan goes to Bangkok to rekindle their affair. 
Unfortunately, Haruthai cannot remember him. Angered at her relationship with Tomon and 
failure to remember their own romance, Kan assaults Haruthai, and the act triggers her 
memories. Haruthai remembers her love for Kan and rejects Tomon at last. Tragically, however, 
when Kan returns to the village, he is fatally shot by a gambler. Although the police and local 
kamnan did not personally carry out the act, they are implicated in it.  
The depiction of corrupt and murderous policemen and government officials was highly 
controversial. As Chatri himself said in a 1993 interview, 
Dr. Khan is the first film ever made in Thailand about the [D]epartment of [I]nterior. You 
see, when you look back at it, it doesn't seem like much. But at that time we were under 
the iron fists of General [Praphat Charusethian] and Prime Minister [Thanom 
Kittikachorn]. Censorship was really strong. But nevertheless all the police, all the 
"interior" were actually politically corrupt. You make this film for the first time and it 
passed the censor. It set up a new trend.520  
But the film didn’t pass the censors easily. As Anchalee Chaiworaporn noted, Chatri needed to 
meeting personally with Thanom to secure approval for the film. Chatri later recalled that “Khao 
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Chue Kan had problems with the censors from the very beginning because this was the first 
movie about the issue of corruption out into the open. I had to show it to Field Marshal Thanom 
and ask him rather bluntly: ‘Is everything in this movie wrong?’”521 But even after Thanom 
apparently gave his approval, the film only had a limited release in Bangkok.  
The film only showed nationally after the overthrow of Thanom’s government in October 
1973. After the military arrested ten student activists on October 6 for handing out flyers, 
thousands turned out to protest the government and demand a constitution. Not only motivated 
by the actions of the government against the students, many of the protesters came out because 
of the government’s obvious corruption, as well as the worsening economic situation. 
Ultimately, the demonstrations attracted somewhere in the realm of 500,000 people, many from 
Bangkok’s middle class. Although the government seemed to back down, on October 14th, police 
fired on some demonstrators. Protesters responded with violence, which in turn led to a full 
military response. The military seized Thammasat University. At least 65 people were killed, and 
hundreds wounded. But on October 15th, Army General Krit Sivara refused further repression, 
apparently the result of factionalism with the regime. King Bhumibol also allowed people to flee 
into the palace. Thanom and Praphat were forced into exile.  
An interim government was appointed, and a draft constitution begun. At last, Thailand 
seemed to have returned to democracy. And indeed, there were some hopeful signs. Farmers and 
workers demonstrated for labor rights and reform of land policies. In some cases, censorship 
declined. Artistic expression flourished in ways that were previously not possible, especially in 
terms of political and social criticism. As I discussed in chapter three, people also tried to 
implement change with regard to women’s rights, particularly in terms of labor rights and family 
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law. 
However, the post-1973 governments struggled to maintain stability, and received plenty 
of criticism from both the left and the right. The challenges faced by the governments were 
serious. First, the 1973 global oil crisis contributed to continued economic decline. Second, 
elections in January 1975 and again in April 1976 failed to produce stable ruling majorities, 
which diminished their abilities to enact reforms. Third, although the government successfully 
negotiated a final withdrawal of American forces from their bases within Thailand, one of the 
few successes of the period. However, the communist insurgency continued to strengthen. The 
threat of the domestic insurgency was heightened with the victories of communist forces in 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in 1975. Laborers, intellectuals, and students turned to the left, 
and saw the government as too slow to institute meaningful reforms. Meanwhile, the 
professional urban middle class, concerned about the threat of communism and alienated from 
the student activists, increasingly moved right. 
But people’s positions were far from black and white. Ambivalences and tensions 
characterized the period. This was clear in filmmaking as well. Beginning in 1974, films 
produced entirely with the democratic period began to appear. One of the most famous was 
Prince Chatrichaloem’s 1974 Theptida rongraem (Hotel Angel). The film directly tied the 
suffering of prostitutes to the problems of military rule and Westernization. The film’s main 
character, Malee, in key respects represented arising contradictions in who constituted the Thai 
middle class. James Ockey pointed out that prostitutes are uncomfortable characters for the 
middle class, as they may earn income to merit inclusion (and often earn more than salaried 
officials), but do not occupy positions fulfilling the professional and moral qualifications.522 
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Originally from a rural farming community, Malee was coerced into prostitution. A man 
convinced her to run away with her, claiming to love and want to marry her. But once they 
arrived in Bangkok, he abandoned her to a brothel. No longer a virgin and convinced that she 
was now shamed beyond reparation, Malee becomes a prostitute. But after becoming quite 
successful and earning large sums of money, Malee was able to afford many of the material 
markers of the middle class, such as a transistor radio and new stylish clothing.523 She was also 
able to send money home to her family, who were able to build a new modern home, thus 
showing Malee’s dedication to fulfilling her moral debt to her parents. Indeed, Malee took some 
pride in her relative autonomy and ability to support her family.  
Yet not all women reacted in this way. One young girl who was forcefully brought to the 
brothel refused to become a prostitute, even as she was beaten. Images of the pimps beating up 
the woman were juxtaposed with flashes of images from the October uprising and violence 
against students. Finally, the woman jumps off the roof, preferring to die than prostitute herself. 
While Khao chue kan relied on implication and webs of intrigue, Theptida rongraem went 
straight to the point: urban violence, prostitution, and consumption were all bound up in the 
problems of society under the dictatorship. In his portrayal of urban prostitution and Malee’s 
character, Chatrichaloem used sex and sexuality to critique the agenda of the authoritarian state, 
but also reinforced aspects of a gendered moral order.  
Describing the female characters in Theptida rongraem, Prince Chatri outlined the 
different characters that he sought to show: 
In The Angel we have three girls. One girl, all you have to do is give her one smack and 
she's willing to be a prostitute. She said it's better than working in the fields. Another girl, 
you have to beat her up quite a bit before she's willing to be a prostitute. And the last one, 
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the third girl, no matter what you do she won't be a prostitute. She'll jump down, kill 
herself, but you can't change her. So, we have three types of girls. Like Malee, you know, 
you have to understand one word: KARMA--like in the film Kama. Thai people actually 
believe in karma. They believe that whatever happens to you in this life, it is a result of 
what happened in the last life.”524  
While Chatri may have been depicting a sort of realism, the documentary film The 
Struggle of Hara Factory Workers (1975) evidenced a different reality for women workers.525 
Through the 1970s, women were active and influential in the student movements, labor strikes, 
and other areas of reform and protest. Produced by Jon Ungpakorn and supported by the Six 
University Professors’ group, the documentary followed a strike by women at the Hara clothing 
factory from December 1975 to March 1976.526 As Kobkua remarked, “The Hara (Thailand) 
Blue Jeans Factory workers’ strike, lasting five months, and their genuine effort to produce and 
distribute their products during the strike, earned the girls a unique place in the history of lab[o]r 
disputes in Thailand.”527 The women working at two of the company’s factories had previously 
labored under appalling conditions. As the women described and the camera showed, the 
dormitories were uninhabitable. Inadequate and expensive food, charged out of the women’s 
salaries, was the only kind available. Women worked for illegally substandard salaries without 
any benefits. Some of the workers were underage. However, the owner of the factory was very 
wealthy, in part because the clothing produced at the factory was sold for high prices.  
Finally, the women went on strike and formed demands for better pay and working 
conditions. They worked with the Labor Department to negotiate a contract with their employer. 
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However even when a workable contract was signed, the employer violated it. The Labor 
Department did nothing to help. So the women occupied the factory. Again, the state failed to 
assist them. The employer paid off police to harass them, and the employer vacated the factory, 
taking the equipment along with him. At this point, however, the women did something 
remarkable: they established a factory collective and sold off shares to collect capital for the 
required equipment. They began to sell clothing for reasonable prices, all the while adequately 
paying the women and maintaining decent working hours. Whereas a pair of jeans was 
previously 180 baht, they were lowered to 85 baht. Meanwhile, the women’s daily income 
doubled.   
The film showed the women during this time, busily working with banners such as 
“Laborers will create a new world” above them. Leftist labor music was played over these 
scenes, linking the strike to a broader movement. The women also talked about other protests 
and campaigns elsewhere in the country. One woman talked about how, after hearing about 
farmer struggles in Loei province, they sent clothing to help keep the people warm. The strike 
was one part of a larger struggle, although one for which the women paid dearly. They spoke of 
harassment by police and gangs, neglect by the government, and opposition to their activities by 
their families.  
Unlike in fiction films, the documentary style allowed the women, as much as possible 
given film editing, to speak for and represent themselves. In fact, the style of the film was poor, 
mainly characterized by poor picture and sound clarity, as well as choppy editing. It lacked the 
stylistic fluidity of Prince Chatrichaloem’s films. Perhaps this is why the film is less commonly 
remarked on, despite the incredible events that it depicts. But unlike Theptida Rongraem, which 
generally creates passive and conservative roles for the women, Hara credited women’s 
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intellectual and physical work in helping to build labor consciousness in Thailand. What is 
further remarkable about the film is its sense of optimism, even in the face of institutional 
opposition to the cause at the center of the film. As one of the women admits, their lawsuit is a 
high risk strategy. If the employer lost, they would be fined just 1,000 baht. But if the women 
lost, they would go to jail. The woman explains that “Prison is only for poor people. No wealthy 
person would go to jail.” The film nonetheless ends with several of the women singing a song in 
support of the labor movement, as the women vow to fight on.  
Perhaps the better known leftist film produced during the democratic period, at least in 
intellectual circles, is Thongpan. The fictive documentary-style film is based on real events. In 
1975, Mike Morrow, the film’s producer, was working with the Far Eastern Economic Review 
and went on an assignment to cover a seminar organized to discuss the United Nations Mekong 
Development Scheme and an associated dam planned for the Mekong River. Present at this 
seminar were some farmers, who were invited to give voice to the people potentially affected 
directly by the construction of the dam. One of the farmers was named Thongpan and, like his 
filmic namesake, he had been displaced by a different dam project and had since been moving 
from place to place in search for work with his family. During the seminar, Thongpan’s wife 
died, after which Thongpan disappeared with his children. Although the other seminar 
participants attempted to find him, they never did.528  
After this experience, Morrow decided to tell Thongpan’s story on film and recruited a 
group of young Thai students to make it. The music was provided by Caravan, a folk music 
group that inspired the “music for life” (phleng phuea chiwit) style associated with the art for life 
movement. Khamsing Sinok, the famous social activist writer, was involved in the script writing, 
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having previously been involved in the original seminar.529 Common villagers from the set 
location portrayed the various characters in the film, while students, intellectuals, and a few 
politicians played the seminar participants.530 By the time of filming, however, the optimistic 
spirit of post-1973 had been overtaken by violent tensions and anxieties between pro-democracy 
and rightist elements. According to a member of the crew, one major incident occurred when 
waiting for a train to Bangkok, 
We attracted the usual crowd of curious passers-by, but one guy in the back caught my 
attention. I could see he was holding an automatic rifle and suddenly felt the whole 
atmosphere in the station change. People had stopped talking and there was tension in the 
air. He came up to the front of the group without saying anything and stood about five 
meters away from me, pointing his gun between my eyes. He seemed a bit drunk and 
angry. Then he cocked the gun. He stood like that for a while until finally the station 
master appeared, quite scared, and said to us, “I think you’d better come in and pick up 
your tickets now.” Then the man fired, right between our heads. He fired a couple more 
times and also threw a small plastic bomb, scattering shrapnel and concrete around. The 
man was arrested later and we found out he was an off-duty policeman. We felt this 
incident was meant to be a warning from the police.531  
 
Threats such as these, as well as even more serious cases of violence and assassination, 
increasingly were used by right wing elements to intimidate supposed or actual leftist individuals 
and groups, including artists, intellectuals, politicians, and activists, amongst others. 
Indeed, the promises of activism and the activists themselves were under violent threat. 
In the north and especially around Chiang Mai, farmers and activists faced assassination and 
harassment. Anthropologist Tyrell Haberkorn recorded that  
In total, between March 1974 and September 1979, thirty-three farmer leaders were 
assassinated, eight were seriously injured, and five were disappeared. At the height of the 
assassinations, between March and August 1975, twenty-one FFT [Farmers’ Federation 
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of Thailand] leaders were killed…. The assassinations of farmers were committed openly 
and seemingly without fear of consequence.532 
It was a violent reaction against the threat that revolutionaries and activists posed to the 
entrenched elite and status quo. The assassinations of farmers’ leaders also served as brutal 
evidence of the shallowness of rural nostalgia and romantic depictions of the countryside in 
propaganda and commercial film. Unlike the simplistic and passive farmers of those films, the 
FFT demonstrated rural knowledge of the law and the ability to mobilize.  The alternative future 
imagined by rural students and farmers was violently crushed, and replaced instead by the 
romanticized ideal of Bangkok. Even as audiences would go on to weep for the melodramatic 
tales of poor villagers, a collective forgetting of the real problems confronting villagers and 
farmers had already begun.  
Finally, on 6 October 1976, the Thai military used the specter of the communist threat to 
justify an attack on student protestors at Thammasat University and once again seize power of 
government through a coup. Thongpan was banned before it could ever be screened 
domestically. Almost everyone involved in the film fled either to different countries or to the 
jungle region of eastern Thailand. However, the film showed outside of Thailand, including at 
the London Film Festival where it won the “Outstanding Film of Southeast Asia” award.533 It 
continued to play before audiences in the United States, Europe, and Australia, where it became 
a much-used text in groups associated with Southeast Asian studies.534 Thongpan returned to 
Thailand in 1978, after the reinstitution of civilian rule. But even then, a public security office 
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(santiban) observed the first screening.535 Since then, the film is mainly popular amongst 
academics.536  
 After the coup against Seni’s government in 1976, King Bhumibol appointed Thanin 
Kraivichien interim prime minister. Thanin, a prominent judge and president of the Supreme 
Court of Thailand, had during the democratic period become a member of the far-right 
Nawaphon movement. He also ran a television program, where he commonly denounced 
progressive movements and politicians. His appointment clearly signaled a return to social 
conservatism, as well as to the influence of the king, who would later appoint Thanin to the Privy 
Council. Thanin’s government immediately cracked down on protest and reform in Bangkok as 
well as in the countryside. Many of the activists were further radicalized, and joined the 
Communist Party of Thailand in the jungle. Political parties were outlawed.  
 The reaction to the democratic period, therefore, was as much about culture and society 
as politics. In November following the coup, the Public Relations Department issued the 
following statement:  
Our culture, upheld by our ancestors and customs, was neglected, considered obsolete 
and regarded as a dinosaur or other extinct creature. Some had no respect for their 
parents, and students disregarded their teachers. They espoused a foreign ideology 
without realizing that such action is dangerous to our culture and did not listen to the 
advice of those who have much knowledge of that ideology.”537  
Much like Sarit, and indeed like contemporary governments, the Thanin government defined 
Thai social and political problems in cultural terms.  
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The film industry, identified as a “national problem” by the Thanin government, took on 
new significance in the post-1976 period. Thanin himself admitted that he was “particularly 
concerned with the quality of Thai movies and their role in social development.”538 This phrase 
seems to put a spin on the word “quality” not just to imply technological or stylistic quality, as 
was the case in earlier discussions. Now, a film of “quality” was one that would produce the 
correct social effects. The government responded to the problem of cinema in two ways. First, 
the government renewed efforts at industry censorship. Films like Thongpan were banned. 
Authorities also specifically targeted film promotion in a regulation prohibiting pornography 
(broadly defined) from use in public advertisements. A policy adopted in September 1976 sought 
to monitor language used by live film narrators. After the 1976 military coup, the police 
department replaced the guidelines established under the Ministry of the Interior with four 
prohibited categories, including those films encouraging sexual abuse, depictions of cruelty 
against humans and animals, presenting political issues (domestic and international), and 
violating “established moral, cultural, and social values.”539 
On top of concerns over domestic cinema, a cooled attitude towards the US, as well as 
right-wing nationalism provided an opportunity for the TMPPA to advance its position. In 
cooperation with the TMPAA, the government made its second move to deal with the industry 
when, in December 1976, it raised the import duty on exposed film from US$.11 to US$1.50 per 
meter. When combined with other changes (such as a 10% municipality charge), Boonrak 
estimated that this would amount to an average of US$4,500 per film print imported.540 The 
move was largely intended to target all foreign films, but especially American ones, and provide 
an advantage to the production of domestic features. One of the major complaints about foreign 
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companies, mainly Hollywood studio offices, was that through the popularity of the films and 
contracts with local theaters, Thai capital was being extracted from the country. Indeed, 
according to Boonrak’s figures, in the year 1974, the film industry drew in an estimated 
US$81.80 million in gross receipts. But through the 1970s, an average of US$25 million went to 
foreign film distributors and television networks. On top of that, significant revenues went to the 
Thai government through fees and taxes. Again in 1974, US$26.95 million went to the 
government. Thus, it appears that less than half of the revenue generated by films went to the 
production and exhibition sectors.541  
But given the climate of increasing censorship, it also seems that the change was driven 
by a desire to further limit the important of foreign cultural and political models. American 
soldiers had already been withdrawn from the country; now was the time to remove films as 
well. Boonrak also made this argument, finding that:  
As soon as the T[h]anin regime came to power, the [TMPPA] took advantage of the acute 
crisis in the country by urging the state to become more active in engineering domestic 
filmmakers towards the right-wing ideology of ‘nation, religion, king.’ The TMPPA 
claimed that this could be achieved by limiting the number of foreign pictures entering 
the Thai market through either a quota system or a high tariff and by decreasing the 
traditional film admission tax of 50 percent to 10 percent. As a spokesman of the TMPPA 
put it: 
The Government should use this media to develop our people, to explain, to 
persuade, and to educate through films. Developed countries all over the world 
use feature films to educate their people in the form of screen entertainment 
without letting their people realise that they are absorbing uncommitted 
knowledge and messages that film makers or their government lead them to 
believe.542 
 
But of course, the members of the TMPPA stood to benefit, professionally and financially, from 
protectionist measures. Many surely also believed that films should promote certain perspectives 
on Thai cultural values. The various motivations, economic, prestige, and nationalism, were 
                                                
541 Ibid, 269.  
542Ibid, 269-270.  
 235 
intertwined. Much like the censors, filmmakers in certain positions stood to gain from the 
nationalist drumbeat.  
 The same could not be said for domestic exhibitors. Theater owners and distributors of 
foreign films were reliant on the consistent profitability of foreign films. When news of 
legislation on imported films arose, the exhibitors firmly opposed the move. In fact, their 
opposition did apparently have some success. While the bill ultimately placed a duty on imported 
films, the original proposal apparently also included an import quota. In a cable from the US 
embassy in Bangkok to the Kissinger in July 1976, the early life of the bill and domestic 
opposition was described through information from William Blamey, at the time the Thailand 
Manager of Twentieth Century-Fox and Columbia Films.  
According to Blamey, this bill was proposed by Deputy Minister of Interior, Samak 
Suntharawet, acting on behalf of the Thai Motion Picture Industry, but that it recently 
was withdrawn as a result of opposition mainly from the movie houses which feared a 
drastic reduction in attendance if the import of foreign films were reduced. He said he has 
reported this to the Motion Picture Association of America…. 
To attempt to forestall an adverse decision, [Embassy official] met with three importers 
of U.S. films (Blamey, Boon Tun-Rakoman of Warner Brothers and Chana Charkykarana 
of Cinema International Corporation) on July 26 to formulate plans. These men, who 
hope to be joined by importers of non-American films, will draw up a petition addressed 
to the minister of finance listing the reasons why such an action would be harmful to 
Thailand, e.g., loss of tax revenue, etc. At that time embassy will render appropriate 
support.543 
 
The emerging sides of the debate were quite clear. US interests allied with distributors and 
exhibitors, while the Thai government, particularly as it shifted to after the 1976 coup, worked 
with the TMPPA.  
 Finally, after decades of discussion and debate, the duty on imported film came into 
effect on December 24, 1976. The MPEAA responded with the statement that, “Regrettably, it is 
viewed that member companies of the MPEAA have no other alternative in the present 
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circumstances but to suspend further imports of foreign films.”544 The decision inaugurated a 
four-year boycott of the Thai market. It was a remarkable move. As Boonrak pointed out, 
alternative strategies included loopholes, which domestic distributors turned to, as well as 
changing price structures. But apparently the association was concerned that accepting the duty 
would have implications for other markets.545 Subsequently, Jack Valenti, the President of the 
MPEAA, sent a letter to Thanin appealing for a return to previous rates, and arguing that foreign 
films would not impact the development of the local industry.546 
There was also widespread opposition to the move in the press. Certainly many of the 
Bangkok journalists would have been the target audience for foreign films at the top cinemas. 
Indeed, the opposition was widespread and strong. Boonrak found that “virtually all the English-
language newspapers such as the Bangkok Post, Bangkok World, Nation and Express, and the 
Thai-language papers such as Siamrath, Siamrath Suppada Wijarn, Matichon, Thairath, Daily 
News, Dao Siam, Ban Maung, Arthit, Kukhang, among others, became deeply involved in the 
conflict at one point or another.”547 Kukrit Pramoj, for example, blasted the legislation in Siam 
Rat. In part, this was likely due to his rivalry with Thanin. But he also argued that foreign films, 
rather than hurting the domestic industry, helped to improve it by example and competition.548  
Despite this, and even after Thanin’s own ouster later that year, the high import duty 
remained in place. Indeed, Thanin also created in Thai Film Industry Promotion Committee 
(TFIPC) in 1977. In a symposium held that year on film, the committee asserted that “films are 
closely related to the state of national stability [and] the government should thus devote more 
concerted attention to the make-up of the film industry, particularly at this time when our nation 
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is encountering manifold crises on many fronts.”549 This remarkable statement is one of the 
clearest assertions of film as a component of national security. That idea had previously 
manifested in bans on imports from anti-communist countries, and piecemeal against films from 
other countries. But the statement was clearly directed at the films of an allied nation. The 
Thanin government’s decision to promote domestic cinema and halt foreign imports marked the 
height of nationalist cinema in the Cold War period.  
Subsequent governments, even those that did not support the legislation, did not remove 
it. In part, this was due to continued pressure from the TMPPA, which treated the issue as a 
matter of “national sovereignty.”550 Nonetheless, the issue brought criticisms from within 
government ministries. For example, the Finance Ministry attempted in 1978 to propose a series 
of policy alternatives, including replacement of the tariff with quotas.551 At one point, General 
Kriangsak considered significantly reducing the tariff in favor of a quota system.552 But those 
apparent alternatives still relied on the idea that the import of foreign films should be restricted. 
And for the next several years, first under the Kriangsak government and then under Prem, the 
rate was discussed and debated. But it was never revised. In part, this was likely due to the fact 
that, despite the MPEAA boycott, the rate raised significant revenue for the government. But 
perhaps the longstanding nature of the debate also diminished its importance. And certainly the 
significance given to it was likely limited to Bangkok. Many Thai were still able to watch 
American films, as exhibitions simply used old films or films that they had not yet shown before 
the ban. This certainly would have been true for provincial markets. The Prem government 
finally concluded that the issue lacked significance. Eventually, in May 1981, the MPEAA 
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removed its boycott without achieving any concessions.553 
Domestically, the impact of the tariff was dubious. The number of distributors dropped 
dramatically. While before 1976s, somewhere around 200 small distributors brought most the 
films into the country. But by 1980, only six or seven remained. By 1983, the Sino-Thai “Big 
Four Monopolies,” including Apex Productions, Five Star Productions, Sahamongkol Films and 
Go Brothers, dominated the film market both in terms of production and distribution.554 The 
concentration of distributors impacted film production as well. In a return to the early period of 
film production in Siam, filmmaking once again became accessible only to the few with 
connections and money.555 Moreover, the tariff on imported films did nothing to alleviate the tax 
burdens on domestic film production and exhibition. Indeed, Boonrak argued that the TMPPA’s 
support for the tariff spent its political capital, and therefore could not be used for other policies 
targeted at domestic producers.   
Amid these debates, Choed Songsri produced what is arguably his most famous film. 
Released on the 24th of December 1977, Phlae kao is the tragic love story of Riam and Kwan, 
two young villagers from feuding families in 1930s Siam. It was immensely popular both 
domestically and in 1981 became one of the first Thai films to win a major international award. 
In the beginning of the film, Riam and Kwan fall in love, but are prevented from being together 
by Riam’s family. Her father, an abusive alcoholic, sells her to a wealthy Bangkok lady.556 Riam 
is brought to her mansion, where the woman is struck by Riam’s resemblance to her own 
deceased child and adopts Riam as her own. Riam is pulled into the sophisticated lifestyle of 
elite Bangkok until the death of her mother necessitates her return to the village. This return is 
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ill-fated, however, as it leads to a series of incidents resulting in Kwan being shot by Riam’s 
wealthy Bangkok suitor. Riam seems to break out of a fog, and screams repeatedly that Kwan is 
her husband (phua). She swims to the place where Kwan’s body floats, in the water near the 
isolated spirit house where the two used to secretly meet. Riam finds Kwan’s body in the water, 
and stabs herself to death. The two lover’s families gather around to stare at the bodies.  
The film incorporates none of the characteristics so visible in sixteen millimeter era films, 
such as altered voices and disaggregated episodes, but instead follows the more typical narrative 
structure that had become dominant by 1977. It is also shows more attention to the editing of the 
film, with gradual transitions and more logical scene transitions. The style of the film is far from 
one of the “cinema of attractions,” and demands an immobile, silent audience. While Phlae kao 
likely did play in outdoor cinemas and traveling shows, the form of the film lends itself strongly 
towards a darkened, permanent theater experience with synchronous sound rather than live 
narrators. 
Choed produced the film to address what he saw as important social issues in Thailand.  
While Phlae kao ostensibly depicts an earlier era, it is clearly critical of infatuation with Western 
ideas of civility and progress. The criticism would have strongly resonated in the 1970s context 
of development and American influence. The critique is notably in Riam’s identity crisis 
between her sophisticated urban lifestyle and her rural past with Kwan. Kwan, meanwhile, falls 
into depression with the departure of Riam, and refuses his father’s requests to ordain as a monk. 
In the end, both Kwan and Riam die, a conclusion that may be seen as the result of excessive 
influence from Western things and a refusal to maintain so-called traditional Thai ways. The 
didactic nature of the film strongly promotes a sort of agrarian, idealized “Thainess” that faces 
serious threat from Western influence and urbanization.  
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The spatial context of the film likewise resonated with contemporaneous concerns. The 
film is set in the verdant and visually pleasing backdrop of the Thai countryside and rice fields. 
This backdrop is crucial to the film’s perspective on how human relationships with the land 
shape social structures and ways of life. A clear message of the film is that maintaining a 
livelihood connected to the land linked people to a timeless community and essentialized 
Thainess. It is for that reason that Riam’s infatuation with urban, Western-influenced society is 
so offensive and why the only way she can be rehabilitated is to go back to the village, and 
ultimately die in the water that feeds the rice fields.   
It was no coincidence that the rise of thirty-five millimeter, narrative style coincided with 
the rise of a genre of socially and politically engaged films. In Phlae Kao, as well as the film 
industry more broadly, a striking tension is visible in the desire for technological and aesthetic 
advancement and also a deep sense of rural nostalgia. So-called traditional rural life was depicted 
in Phlae Kao on advanced thirty-five millimeter film to urban Bangkok audiences viewing the 
film from the comfort of the modern film theaters. Also apparent is the sense of risk involved in 
progress and development as far as non-elite classes are concerned. There is the sense of urban 
society gazing at the rural masses as potential tragedies as they risk losing their traditional 
identities in the pursuit of Western-inspired progress and civility. In this sense, it is perfectly 
logical for film directors like Choed Songsri to use only the most advanced filmmaking 
technology as a marker of how developed the Thai nation is in order to capture a rural lifestyle 
that remains a symbol of how Thailand has not lost its traditional roots and identity. 
After the beginning of the 1980s, however, the rural themes that preoccupied the 
filmmakers of the First New Wave largely disappeared from domestic cinema.557 With the rising 
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popularity of television, films struggled to compete and remain economically viable. Instead, the 
industry discovered economic success with teen-oriented, low-budget comedy films, which 
dominated from 1985 until 1999.558 Those films were also widely criticized for introducing 
dubious morality to the Thai youth and shamelessly imitating Hollywood films.559 Whereas 
Western modernity was desirable, “slavish imitation” of the West was not.560 Prince 
Chatrichaloem’s dramatic depiction of youth drug use in his 1994 Sia dai (Daughter, 1994) was 
an early response to the rise of teen films.561 However, the trend was relatively short-lived. After 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the film industry was once again in dire straits. Whereas one 
hundred Thai films were released in 1990, just twenty came out in 1997.562  
In the wake of the 1997 crisis, the Second New Wave emerged.563 Films from directors 
like Pen-ek Ratanaruang, Wisit Sasanatieng, and Nonzee Nimitbutr transformed the domestic 
film industry from apocalyptic to celebratory. Nonzee achieved domestic success with Dang 
Birely and the Young Gangsters (1997), while Pen-ek’s Fun Bar Karaoke (1997) and Wisit’s 
Tears of the Black Tiger (2000) garnered acclaim on international film circuits.564 All three 
directors previously worked in advertising, and used that experience to produce aesthetically 
attractive, artistic films more likely to attract investment, critical recognition, and commercial 
success. In the context of the 1997 crisis, the intentions of the directors, the content of the films, 
and consumer markets were widely understood within frameworks of national identity crisis, 
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globalization, and nostalgia. The post-1997 period came to be defined by a certain set of 
characteristics, namely increasingly attention to aesthetic features, appeal to both domestic 
commercial audiences and international critical communities, and depictions of a domestic 
landscape that have variously been deemed nostalgic and exoticized, oftentimes with didactic 
juxtapositions of rural and urban lives.  
 Thus, the rise of the Second New Wave shared important features with the first. It 
followed a period of filmmaking that was widely derided, albeit quite popular. Criticisms were 
concerned with issues of morality, as well as cultural representation and national identity. They 
both were influenced by periods of tumult and trauma. In the 1970s, it was the American 
intervention, authoritarianism, and political radicalism. In the 1990s, it was globalization and 
economic crisis. The films that followed all engaged in a search for authentic Thainess, while at 
the same time ensuring artistic legitimacy. International success remained an important marker 
legitimacy, as well as a point of honor for all Thais. Contemporary filmmaking, moreover, 
highlights the institutionalization of the Thai director as auteur. It is the directors, more than 
anyone else, who are the focus of acclaim, criticism, and scholarly analysis. Aphichatphong 
became the premier auteur of contemporary Thai independent film. Nonzee, Pen-ek, and Wisit 
have risen to become some of the most defining auteurs of post-1997 Thai film.565 
As Annette Hamilton pointed out, cinema is as much the product of social, economic and 
political contexts as it is derived from the technical elements moderating “space, time, and 
perception.”566 Hamilton argued for the decisive role of the Thai government and elites in using 
post-1997 cinema as a tool to assert control of the political and social consciousness of Thai 
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audiences.567 Pattana Kitiarsa showed how films like Ong Bak asserted a standardized, 
“authentic” Buddhism in reaction to perceptions of increasingly secularized treatments in 
popular culture broadly.568 Likewise, Pattana’s analysis of nostalgic parody films acted as a sort 
of coping mechanism in reaction to the economic crisis and political turbulence caused by the 
2006 coup against Thaksin Shinawatra.569  
 Furthermore, in both periods, films fixated on depictions of human relationships with or 
set amongst nostalgic rural landscapes. Indeed, rural themes returned to screens in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s with features such as Wonderful Town and Isan Special, as well as historical 
epic films like Nang Nak and Hom Rong (The Overture, 2004). The character of the landscape is 
intimately connected to the films’ characters, a relationship that is most clearly revealed in the 
distinctions made between urban and rural characters or when characters move between these 
two realms.  
The former genre of films, which May called “Thai bourgeois heritage cinema,” display 
an exotic, verdant Thai landscape set nostalgically in the past. These representations of historical 
Thai life idealized class structures and abundance provided under elite rule, emphasizing the 
apparently enduring and stable relationship between peasants and the monarchy. 570  The themes 
established in the Cold War period proved enduring. The temporal setting of these films further 
emphasizes the stable enduring quality of these tropes, connecting the past to the present day. 
Unlike the teen films, moreover, the films are presumed to be authentically Thai. As May 
observed, idealized representation of the rural in Thai cinema is ultimately about a “specifically 
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urban middle class investment in cultural goods that enact the trope of arresting the eyes of the 
world for their display of ‘exemplary’ Thainess.”571   
Ironically, however, the films drew on expressions once derided by the bourgeois and 
elite. Using Pen-ek Ratanaruang’s Monrak transistor (Transistor Love Song, 2001) as an 
example, May argued that through “capitalist appropriation and commodification of plebeian 
cultural forms, such as luk thung music and postwar lowbrow Thai cinema…. [films] are being 
transformed into signifiers of national authenticity.”572 Likewise, Kong Rithdee noted the “search 
for roots” in the films of these directors, lamenting that “it’s an expedition of young men and 
women who’ve rummaged through the old boxes in the corner of the attic to find what’s still 
useful for their new ventures.”573 Whereas First Wave directors were pioneering a new way of 
using film as a platform for expression and depictions (as well as critiques) of Thainess, many of 
the Second New Wave directors, particularly those making heritage films, appear to simply be 
polishing-up old tropes.  
While forms of cinematic realism came to characterize Thai filmmaking from the early-
1970s to mid-1980s, the role of the spectator was not forgotten. Indeed, Phlae kao opened with a 
direct appeal to audiences to protect Thainess. It demonstrated that the narration of a film’s 
message and meaning was no longer a spontaneous act in the hands of comedic characters or live 
narrators, but more than ever before in those of the directors. These directors, alongside their 
production teams, consciously constructed the films’ editing, content, aesthetics, and packaging 
to make an impact on audiences’ psychologies and emotions. Furthermore, a discourse of 
intellectual and artistic legitimacy protected and made dominant those methods of production. 
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Combined with changes in film exhibition styles, these changes resulted in a standardization of 
new demands made on the perceptive habits of Thai film audiences.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Between the late 1950s and 1970s, Thai and US films created Cold War era constructions 
of Thai national identity based primarily on gendered cultural difference. National identity 
during the Cold War was paradoxically based on both the Thai state’s strategic collaboration 
against communism with the United States government, and the cultural rejection of Western 
liberal social norms by the urban Thai bourgeois. From the 1950s onwards an array of people, 
from bureaucrats to US operatives to artists to activists, turned to film to make claims to national 
consciousness, political norms, and social values. Film was an important medium for social 
power, a modern technology capable of crossing spatial boundaries within and across nations. 
These characteristics became significant for the first time during the Cold War. Study of the Cold 
War film industry in Thailand, therefore, highlights significant ambiguities in Thailand’s alliance 
with the United States and the developmental agenda. Official and elite engagement with film, 
whether actively as producers or reactively as regulators, asserted a deeply conservative image of 
the country on screen and a desire to build a national cinema through protectionist measures. At 
the intersection of these forces, women and their sexual behavior became important signifiers of 
cultural distinctiveness and belonging in the Thai nation. Women’s gender and sexual norms 
became central to elite assertions of cultural citizenship in opposition to both political ideologies 
(i.e. communism) and cultural models (especially American). National identity was predicated 
on women’s unique and unequal status. 
Film both followed and facilitated the spatial and psychological extension of the Thai 
state and the capitalist economy.  Exposure to cinema grew symbiotically with the penetration of 
development schemes into villages of the rural North and Northeast. Villages became important 
sites for building loyalty to the government and asserting Thailand’s position as a modernizing, 
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capitalist society. Thailand’s modern identity was made true through national development. At 
the same time, nationalist assertions of cultural identity considered the village an important 
location of national authenticity, in part because of the lack of capitalist, and Western, 
sophistication. However, villagers also proved threatening because in the view of Bangkokians, 
villagers were not sophisticated film consumers. With the expansion of communication 
infrastructure and capitalist markets, provincial taste started to matter and negatively impact 
Bangkok. In the film industry, government officials, intellectuals, and many filmmakers linked 
the profitability of the provincial film market with the low-quality state of Thailand’s cinema.  
This created a tension in which villages were simultaneously sites of authenticity but also 
embarrassing examples of Thailand’s lack of sophistication and modernity. Film was a two-way 
process, albeit in a limited and unequal fashion. Film was used to broadcast propaganda to the 
provinces, and provincial sensibilities to Bangkok through the ability for provincial viewers to 
exert market influence. In response, the government and Bangkok-based filmmakers enforced 
invented constructions of rural authenticity that avoided embarrassing displays of provincialism, 
but also strategically wielded a lack of sophistication against the threat of Westernization. This 
was part of a highly paternalistic process that also served to maintain hierarchal social 
relationships. As the films of the late 1970s show, Thailand’s Cold War experience ended with 
the standardization and ritualization on screens of a conservative, Bangkok-centered construction 
of a uniquely Thai cultural identity.   
By way of conclusion, I will give a brief overview of my major arguments, and then turn 
to a more detailed discussion of my four major contentions. In part, my research addresses a 
surprising absence in the historiography of modern Thailand. While the Cold War period is often 
understood and referred to as transformative, very few studies exist that critically and seriously 
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engage with why and how that transformation occurred and what it meant for people living in 
Thailand.574 The period between the 1940s through to the 1990s is still largely uncharted territory 
in the historiography of Thai social history. This is a significant gap that obscures the critical 
popular experience of the interaction of authoritarianism, industrialization, development, 
modernization, and American intervention in Thai society, culture, and national identity 
formation. The American alliance, for example, is important because it served as a site for the 
popular contestation of national development and state power. Rather than focusing on elite 
politics, this directs the gaze at how people more generally experienced the intimate implications 
of development, psychological warfare, and anti-communism.  
It some cases, the existing historiographical neglect of the authoritarian and Cold War 
period implies that some processes of national consolidation and identity formation, such as the 
position and role of women (meaning actual women and women as symbols), were complete by 
the mid-twentieth century. This in turn contributes to the invisibility of women in histories of the 
Cold War and radicalism in Thailand. I have shown, however, that these processes were very 
much ongoing and contested. Women were far from the passive creatures shown in films like 
Plae Kao or Cold Fire, or even the figures in the background like the sick wife in Thongpan. 
Women from diverse backgrounds were actively engaged in questioning the status quo, from 
labor conditions to family law to political structures.575 Queen Sirikit was likewise more 
                                                
574 The best studies for looking at politics, society, popular culture, and national identity include Thak 
Chaloemtiarana, Despotic Paternalism; Fineman, A Special Relationship; Phillips, Cold War; Harrison, “The Man 
with the Golden Gauntlets”; Anderson, “Introduction to In the Mirror”; Anderson, “Withdrawal Symptoms”; 
Saichon Sattayanurak, Khukrit and the Invention of “Thainess” (Khukrit kap pradittakam “khwampen Thai”) 
(Bangkok: Matichon, 2007); Phinyaphan Photchanalawan, The Origins of “Thailand” Under Authoritarianism 
(Kamnoet “prathet Thai” phaitai phadetkan) (Bangkok: Samnakphim Matichon, 2015).  
575 Both Tyrell Haberkorn and Sudarat Musikawong discussed women as student activists and women’s movements.  
Haberkorn, Revolution Interrupted; Sudarat Musikawong, “Gendered Casualties.” Benedict Anderson also 
referenced the gendered aspects of intellectual engagement between Bangkok and the provinces in his study of 
literature during the “American Era.” However, he did not engage directly with gender analysis, including in his 
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significant to the revival of the monarchy as an institution imbedded in tradition, cultural 
heritage, and Thainess than is commonly acknowledged. Characters like Riam in Rongraem 
Narok or Daeng in Tone, as well as the women filmed at the Hara Factory strike, give a better 
impression of the diversity of women’s activities and perspectives on feminine behavior.  
Despite the political and social activism of real Thai women, filmic and Thai state 
propaganda constructed a feminine national ideal as passive, loyal, politically uninterested, and 
morally upright.576 Throughout the twentieth century, modern Thai national identity depended on 
gender conformity, not only in public or surface appearances, but also in daily behavior and 
social interactions. However, the pressures of imperialism and Westernization had, to some 
extent, inserted discourses concerned with women’s status and the need to modernize, among 
other things, family law. In part, this was to bring Thailand’s modern identity in line with 
Western standards imposed through imperial expansion. However, with the Cold War, 
significantly more emphasis was placed on women as bearers of tradition in opposition to both 
communist and American models. On the one hand, loyalty, obedience, cultural uniqueness and 
authenticity, and respect for social institutions were all part of Thailand’s identity as anti-
communist. Women were depicted as generally impervious to the appeals of communism. On the 
other, they were highly vulnerable to the appeals of consumerism and Western excess. As we see 
in a range of films, from Theptida rongraem to Khao chue kan, women were both less political 
                                                                                                                                                       
discussion of the only female author included in the volume, Si Dao Ruang. Anderson and Mendiones, In the 
Mirror, 47, 59-61. 
576 The dynamics of gender and nationalism during the Cold War has received little scholarly consideration, with the 
exception of Jeffrey, Sex and Borders.  Several scholars have shown the significance of gender and sexuality in 
historical processes of in Thai history, historiography, and national identity formation. These include Tamara Loos, 
Subject Siam : Family, Law, and Colonial Modernity in Thailand / (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2006); Barme, 
Woman, Man, Bangkok; Peleggi, “Refashioning Civilization”; Craig Reynolds, “Engendering Thai Historical 
Writing,” in Seditious Histories: Contesting Thai and Southeast Asian Pasts (Singapore: University of Washington 
Press, 2006), 122–40; Hong Lysa, “Palace Women at the Margins of Social Change: An Aspect of the Politics of 
Social History in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 30, no. 2 (1999): 310–24; 
Hong Lysa, “Of Consorts and Harlots in Thai Popular History,” The Journal of Asian Studies 57, no. 2 (1998): 333–
53. 
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than men, but also more easily seduced by the allure of the West. They represented the best of 
Thai cultural and social authenticity, but also the threat of how Thainess might be lost. This 
created a situation in which women experienced the processes of modernization and 
development in highly unequal ways. 
The Cold War period was also a unique historical moment for film. Technological 
changes and international market exchanges allowed more people access to film production 
technologies than ever before. Previously, the extreme expense and lack of access to film 
equipment and processing facilities meant that only a select few engaged in filmmaking. 
However, with the rise of sixteen-millimeter film and eventually eased access to thirty-five 
millimeter film, something resembling a mass industry could develop. This created a tension 
between perceptions of film as an elite or government activity and the reality of mass tastes and 
sensibilities. At the same time, a site of film distribution and consumption was still fairly limited. 
The VHS revolution was still on the horizon, so most people viewed films in large audiences in 
cinemas or open air settings. This meant that film was still a social experience, and one that often 
took on a ritual-like significance. Cinema, from production to exhibition to spectatorship, was a 
political act at the boundary between the personal and the public. It had the capacity to shape not 
only political identities, but also intimate understandings of social belonging. Consequently, the 
stakes for how films were exhibited and who controlled their content were high.  
Film also elicited intense emotional reactions. That was the understanding, at least, when 
the royal anthem was played before each film or when officials expressed embarrassment over 
the sorry state of domestic cinema. For this reason, and those discussed above, film became an 
important tool and a site in the contestation of social power. This was true for the production of 
films by the USIS, intellectuals, and conservative elites. It was also true when the state 
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intervened to fund quality filmmaking and established studios. It was again true when censors 
prohibited films from exhibition when they were seen to violate moral standards. Cold War 
cinema intersected with development discourses, gendered assertions of national identity, and 
official and elite attempts to intervene in the social life of the nation. Cinema thus became one of 
the critical spaces where what it meant to belong to the modern Thai nation was expressed and 
consumed.  
 My first main contention is that from the 1950s forward, the Thai state inserted itself into 
the social fabric of society on a national scale. Whereas previous attempts, notable under Phibun, 
were limited by practical logistics and the ability for the state to enforce its will, changes in 
communication technologies and national development schemes granted new capabilities to the 
state. To a large degree, those changes were the result of massive intervention in Thailand by the 
United States. That intervention, in line with the system of US geo-political power 
internationally and transnationally, was based on discourses of development, opening capitalist 
markets, and improving the standard of living. It was also based on the promotion of American 
cultural values, and therefore made the promotion of American cultural exports a priority. 
Meanwhile, the possibility of American intervention was predicated on the interest of the Thai 
government in inaugurating and maintaining the alliance. The rise of military politics and 
authoritarianism under Phibun, Sarit, and Thanom enabled this. While the military welcomed the 
alliance due to the material and status advantages it brought, the authoritarian structure of the 
regime arguably meant that socio-economic change that accompanied the deepening of the 
relationship occurred more quickly and extensively. In sum, social change was produced by the 
interplay of three major forces: namely, the nature of American intervention, authoritarian 
domestic politics, and technological innovation.  
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 Using Chwe’s conception of how ritual produces and influences common knowledge, I 
argued that film was a critical tool in producing social power and as a medium for official and 
elite conceptions of Thai national society and culture. As I discussed in chapter two, for example, 
films shown in rural villages by mobile information teams represented significant events in the 
dissemination of information. The films were a focal point of village life, potentially watched by 
everyone. No one would be unaware of the broad content of the films, even if their grasp of the 
specifics were hazy. The film showings held by the mobile teams therefore had the potential (and 
the aim) of influencing the collective political and social narratives shared by village 
communities.  
However, films also represented potential threats to the common knowledge and 
normative practices valued by the urban elite. As I showed in my discussion of censorship in 
chapter three, bureaucratic censors strictly regulated the exhibition of films, which provided 
potentially disruptive models for female sexual agency and family structures. It was that attitude 
that led the censors to ban The Touch, a film about a Swedish housewife who has an affair with 
an American anthropologist. Adultery had a significant function in the film, specifically as a way 
to explore marital relationships, social expectations, and the role of women in the family. The 
themes were deeply embedded in the film. However, regulation was not simply a matter of 
policing hypothetical disruptions, but was intimately connected to debates over family law, 
women’s rights, and female sexuality. Therefore, while censorship was a matter of public image, 
it was also a tool to police private sex.   
 The exercise of social power, however, was not simply a matter of state repression. It was 
also a productive process in which non-state actors, including American officials and Thai socio-
economic elites, played a critical role. Indeed, as I highlighted in chapter four, non-government 
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actors, such as prominent filmmakers, actively argued for increased government intervention in 
social and cultural life. The case of Santi-Vina demonstrates those attitudes. Officials, 
intellectuals, and filmmakers initially celebrated the film’s showing abroad for showcasing Thai 
culture. But upon his return to Thailand, director Rat Pettanyi was essentially fined for his failure 
to follow bureaucratic procedure. The role of the state in creating barriers to professional 
filmmaking and the subsequent need for reform was increasingly clear. The creation of policies 
to protect quality filmmaking, moreover, was motivated by anxieties over the impact of foreign 
cultural, social, and economic influences. The proliferation of conservative, rural messages in the 
First New Wave films of the 1970s highlights the role of non-state actors in shaping 
constructions of Thai national identity, as well as the perceived need to compete with Hollywood 
films in exercising social power. Choed Songsri, who was educated in the United States, returned 
to Thailand to make explicitly “Thai” films. Plae kao epitomized that search for authenticity, but 
also the need for filmmaking according to international standards. Overall, these efforts were 
highly successful in imbedding a deeply conservative, static conception of national identity in 
modern Thai politics and society.  
 The concerns over reforming and regulating film evidence that film wasn’t simply a 
popular form of entertainment, it also became both an indexical point at which the state of the 
nation could be revealed and a conscious tool in the promotion of national identity. On the first 
point, I have shown how the state of the film industry was commonly linked to the state of the 
nation. This perspective first emerged in reaction to the popularity of sixteen-millimeter 
productions and the profitability of provincial markets. The phrase nam nao, originally used to 
imply political stagnation, was transferred to film, creating the derogatory category nang nam 
nao. The phrase highlights the anxieties felt by those in Bangkok, including military officers, 
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government officials, intellectuals, and filmmakers, at the low quality of the rural taste, and by 
implication the threat of broadening national enfranchisement initiated by development schemes. 
I used the Dok Din film Julatrikhun to discuss the characteristics of the sixteen-millimeter, 
which utilized characteristics from local performative practices and failed to follow the tenets of 
Hollywood-style production, such as continuity editing. Even though Dok Din was enormously 
successful, produced numerous popular films, and had his own film studio, he was not accepted 
by the elite as a “professional” filmmaker.  
Coinciding with the attempts by Thai filmmakers such as Rat Pettanyi to participate in 
international film festivals, nang nam nao weren’t simply a domestic nuisance, but an 
international embarrassment disrupting Thailand’s attempts to portray itself as a modernizing 
nation. Even today, achievements by filmmakers like Prince Sapphasat and Rat Pettanyi are 
referred to as honoring or granting dignity (kiattiphum) to the nation. Thus, film heroes emerged 
to pull the industry out of stagnant water, and promote the value of Thai national culture at home 
and abroad through a national cinema. These attitudes were at work at the 1958 Brussels World’s 
Fair, when the Rat Pettanyi produced The Diamond Finger showcased Thai dancing and music 
in a story narrated by Kukrit Pramoj and film with the latest film technologies. The film was 
screened in a theater and attended by political and social elite, including King Bhumibol and 
Queen Sirikit. The high technological and aesthetic quality of films by these directors, from Rat 
to Choed Songsri to Prince Chatrichaloem Yukhon, represented the hope of legitimate film 
practice.  
While opposition to the low-quality nang nam nao grew, so too did anxieties regarding 
foreign productions, particularly those from Hollywood. From the perspective of fearful (and 
perhaps curious) censors, Hollywood films were often too compelling, presenting seductive 
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depictions of women engaging in illicit behavior. In the context of challenges to family law, 
women’s rights activities, and foreign models for female behavior brought by American 
consumer goods, depictions of sex and sexuality in cinema became a focal point of regulation. 
Sex on screen threatened the morality of the nation. Even as adultery amongst bureaucrats was 
gossiped about and debated in newspapers, depictions of adultery in films, particularly of female 
adultery, were erased by the censors. This was linked to the connection between female behavior 
and national belonging. Once films produced in the United States crossed the national borders 
into Thailand, they ceased to be appropriate based on different understandings of sexual decency. 
Those differences were understood as being critical to the national culture. Like The Touch, Piak 
Posters Chu featured adultery as a prominent part of the storyline. However, because Piak drew 
on domestic conceptions of sexual authority, morality, and karma, film censors considered it 
appropriate. In censoring offending images, the officials that populated the censorship boards 
revealed a high level of consciousness about what film may be capable of revealing and what its 
impact on audiences would be.  
Opposition to foreign films was supported, moreover, by filmmakers like Prince 
Phanuphan Yukhon, Rat Pettanyi, and Prince Anuson Mongkhonkan. Hollywood films drew 
most of the criticism. In part, this was because Hollywood films had a near monopoly on the 
market. Chinese and Indian films, moreover, were seen to appeal primarily to the Chinese and 
Indian populations, as opposed to Thais. The criticism of Hollywood films also resulted from 
growing antagonism towards the American presence in Thailand. The dominance of Hollywood 
films in Bangkok theaters served a clear evidence of US economic exploitation and the problems 
of intervention. That stance, for different reasons, found supporters from across the political 
spectrum, including individuals as difference as Jit Phumisak and Thanin Kraivichian. Thus, 
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what films were shown at cinemas, and the competitiveness of domestic films, became signs of 
the nation’s ability to maintain its national culture and economic independence.   
 Thus, I have argued that, in the twenty or so years that encompassed Thailand’s 
engagement with the United States and the fight against communism, national belonging was 
increasingly predicated on moral values based on a uniquely Thai cultural system.  Thai cultural 
identity was anti-communist. The US and Thai governments were both eager to assert that 
message to the population. As I noted in chapter two, movies such as Fai Yen portrayed 
communists as liars, murderers, and disrespectful, while loyal Thais were hardworking, honest, 
and deferential. In Fai Yen, the communist-bandits targeted the schoolteacher and the abbot. 
Together, those figures represent both tradition and progress. Whereas the abbot is important in 
maintaining Buddhist values, and implicitly the male hierarchy of authority, the schoolteacher 
represents modern educational values and the promise of improvement.  
Constructions of the threat of communism, moreover, were highly gendered. Men were 
most vulnerable to the persuasions of communism, as seen most particularly with Phon. Both by 
implication and explicitly depicted in the film, moreover, women upheld values of Thainess. As 
the scene between Phin and Phon’s mother reveals, those values were associated with loyalty to 
the symbols of the state, but also an acceptance of one’s position and the inevitability of 
suffering. Those values are embedded as well in a Buddhist worldview in Thailand, in which 
women and men are thought to experience worldly attachment (and therefore suffering) in 
gendered ways.577 Thus, notions of loyalty, gratitude, and social hierarchies were deeply 
imbedded into Cold War constructions of Thai national identity. Moreover, those values were 
increasingly linked to the Thai village, which, as I discussed both in chapters two and five, was 
                                                
577 For a more extensive analysis of gender and Buddhism in Thailand see Charles F. Keyes, “Mother or Mistress 
but Never a Monk: Buddhist Notions of Female Gender in Rural Thailand,” American Ethnologist 11, no. 2 (1984): 
223–41. 
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viewed as both historically situation and authentic. Thus, Thainess was read back into the Thai 
past as a timeless value.   
However, while Thainess as anti-communist was critical to the development of social and 
cultural national identities, I argue that national identity was also framed in opposition to 
Thailand’s most important ally, the United States. This sentiment became more apparent as the 
1970s wore on. Whereas in Piak’s 1970 Tone, characters enjoyed Western fashion and music 
uncritically, by 1977 Phlae kao explicitly called for the need to protect “Thainess” at the 
beginning of a film that contrasted rural authenticity with urbanized Westernization. Many of the 
prominent filmmakers of the 1970s had in fact received their education in the United States, gone 
back to Bangkok film studios and, increasingly, the Thai countryside to make their films, and 
then to international film festivals for exhibition. Moving between these spaces, they situated 
themselves, and their films, in Thailand’s international and domestic politics. Hollywood studios, 
and the greedy theatre owners who rejected domestic films in favor of the more profitable 
Hollywood productions, were seen as part of a predatory system indicative of the problems of 
American intervention. Aside from being exploitative, the films also introduced foreign cultural 
values that threatened the fabric of Thai national society. A national cinema was conceptualized 
to take back the Thai industry and to promote Thai national culture. The creation of the Thai 
Motion Picture Producers Association and production of films like Plae kao highlight the 
ambivalences that characterized Thailand’s Cold War experience. 
 With depictions of Thai cultural difference and the rise of conservative nationalism, 
women as figures of tradition and continuity became critical to defining the borders of national 
identity. This was clear early on when Queen Sirikit attracted the attention of the international 
and Thai press with her savvy use of so-called traditional Thai female costume to promote the 
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image of the nation abroad. It also played a significant role in censorship, when depictions of 
foreign female sexual expression posed a threat to “Thai” morality. First New Wave films, 
meanwhile, explored female sexual choices, whether by Riam in Plae kao or Malee in Theptida 
rongraem, as a way to express political and social commentary. In Theptida rongraem, the 
women’s sexual choices were explicitly linked to national issues. This was most clear when the 
young girl refused to become a prostitute and was beaten on top of a roof. The scenes of violence 
against her, and her ultimate decision to jump from the building, were juxtaposed with scenes 
from the 1973 popular uprising. Malee’s descent into prostitution, on the other hand, went hand 
in hand with the excesses of American consumerism, including short skirts and a new transistor 
radio. Her final decision to leave the trade is likewise revealed in her change to simple, although 
still Western, jeans and a shirt. In this way, women and femininity was critical to how Thai 
political and social actors constructed Cold War identities in the face of early globalization and 
capitalist expansion.  
Aside from creating idealized (and likely unattainable) constructions of women and 
femininity, gendered forms of national belonging and Thailand’s Cold War, anti-communist 
identity also denied women’s agency as political and economic actors. Political activism was 
defined as masculine by both conservative and progressive elements. In Khao chue kan, for 
example, Kan’s devotion to his rural patients and disgust for official corruption contrasted 
unfavorably with Haruthai’s domestic boredom, nostalgia for Bangkok, and need to go shopping. 
Cold Fire demonstrated the layered implications of women as bearers of cultural authenticity. As 
shown with young Phin and also with Phon’s elderly mother, the women in the village never had 
the possibility of becoming communists, unlike men. This was not because of any role or 
responsibility, as was the case with the schoolteacher or the abbot, who felt a duty to serve the 
 259 
people of the village and loyalty to the state and sangha. Instead, the women naturally expressed 
core aspects of Thai cultural identity, including deference to authority and passivity, which 
characterized Cold War Thainess. Similarly, when censors repeatedly banned films depicting 
adultery, they helped to obscure debates about marriage and the role of women in the family. 
 This analysis supports my contention that studies of Thai history, and of the Cold War 
period in particular, need to utilize methodological approaches that take women seriously in 
international relations and domestic politics. Making women visible is part of the process of 
highlighting the gendered dynamics of how social, economic, and political power during the 
Cold War. By tying women to cultural and social tradition, not only was their political agency 
denied, but so too were their opportunities to engage with the changes brought by 
internationalization and consumer culture. In other words, women were neither consumers nor 
radicals, but instead “Thai.” However, as the documentary on the Hara factory strike reveal, 
women were active in the radical movement. Far from passive observers, they intelligently 
questioned and sought to change their social, economic, and political surroundings. The women 
discussed tactics and ideology. Ironically, they did so through a combination of a typically 
female occupation: sewing.  
 Cinema in Thailand from the 1950s to the 1970s, much as elsewhere in the world, was a 
shared public activity. It was not, however, experienced or shared equally. How people made and 
watched films depended on their social background – their gender, class, and geographic 
identifications. This was not just the result of how Thai audiences positioned themselves, but 
also the ways that the creators of the films—whether the government bodies or commercial 
filmmakers—understood the relationship between spectators and screen and, by implication, 
citizens and society. As the Cold War period wore on, shaped as it was by development 
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discourse, calls for modernization, and assertions of national cultural authenticity, cinema 
became a critical site in the contestation over how spectators engaged with the modern Thai 
nation and their belonging in the national community.   
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